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论文编号：	76
作者编号：	2120051896
上传时间：	2007/6/21 15:24:31
中文题目：	基于股权代理成本的企业过度投资
英文题目：	Research of corporations' over
指导老师：	周宝源
中文关键字：	股权代理成本 合理投资 过度投
英文关键字：	Stockholder-operator agency co
中文摘要：	投资决策作为公司成长的主要动因和未来现金流量增长的重要基础，将直接决定公司的融资决策和股利决策，从而对公司的经营风险、盈利水平和发展前景构成较大影响。随着我国的城市化和工业化的发展进程全面加速，市场的自我调节功能暴露出来的问题导致许多行业出现了过度投资的现象，严重损害了股东价值，影响我国未来的经济发展。因此，针对这一热点现象，本文运用了规范和实证的分析方法，从股权代理成本的角度对其影响因素进行了综合研究。 文章首先回顾了代理成本及过度投资的基本理论，包括产生动因、表现形式及重要变量的计量方法，为下文的实证研究打下基础；然后，从规范的角度和简单的经济学原理分析了股权代理成本对过度投资行为的影响。本文认为，股权代理成本确实是导致过度投资行为的原因之一：由于所有权和经营权的分离，经营者有可能从自身利益出发，将企业的自由现金流投资于净现值为负的项目。其中，投资额是经营者私人收益的增函数，当私人收益为零时，投资额等于信息对称时的理想投资水平。在我国的特殊经济环境下，由于国有企业具有双重目标和所有权缺位的特点，因此比起非国有企业，其过度投资行为受股权代理成本的影响较为严重。 本文基于2001~2004年面板数据进行多元回归检验，结果表明：企业的过度投资规模与自由现金流量显著正相关；与股权代理成本的替代变量（资产利用率）显著正相关；增加经营者持股比例及负债比例则可以显著降低自由现金流量导致的过度投资水平。同时，本文根据企业控制类型的不同，将以上样本分为两类分别进行检验。检验结果表明，国有企业的过度投资规模显著受股权代理成本影响，而对于非国有企业来说，二者则不存在显著的关系。以上实证研究的结果充分证实了上一章理论分析得出的结论。此外，本文还对关键变量进行了敏感性分析和基于面板数据的Hausman检验，以得出更有说服力的结论。 最后，本文在总结全文的基础上提出了政策性建议，这些建议有助于企业改善委托代理关系和公司治理结构，从而从根本上抑制过度投资行为的发生。
英文摘要：	As the main incentive of the corporation’s growth as well as the crucial basis of future cash flow’s increase, investment decision will directly influence other decisions and have huge impact on the management risk, profit level, etc. With the acceleration of civilization and industrialization in China, over investment in many industries were becoming more serious, which would do harm to the stockholders’ value and economy development in the long run. As a result, comprehensive researches were made in both normal and empirical way on this phenomenon. First of all, this thesis reviewed basic theories of agency cost and over investment, including incentives, forms and measuring ways, in order to build foundation to the researches below. In addition, great influences on over investment, which had been made by stockholder-manager agency cost, were analyzed in the normal way with the help of economics theory. This thesis declared that stockholder-operator agency cost was one of the incentives of over investment because operators may invest free cash flow to the project which had a negative NPV for their own sake. Moreover, state corporations were more inclined to over invest compared to non-state corporations. The thesis did regression test based on panel data from the year 2001 to 2004. Results showed that the higher free cash flow or asset turnover ratio, the higher over investment. However, over investment was influenced by operator-share percentage or debt in an opposite way. It also showed that such influence still existed in the state corporations rather than non-state corporations. These results well confirmed the conclusion which was drawn in the last chapter. Furthermore, sensitive test and Hausman test were also done in the thesis. In the end, the thesis was concluded and suggestions were made, which could help corporations solve serious agency problems and improve governance structure. Only in this way, could over-investment be radically restrained.
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