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论文编号：	7587
作者编号：	1120120766
上传时间：	2015/6/16 9:23:00
中文题目：	政府规制下制药企业的创新激励与市场绩效研究
英文题目：	Research on Pharmaceutical Firms’ Innovation Incentives and Market Performance
指导老师：	侯文华
中文关键字：	政府规制；创新激励；市场绩效；药品定价；制药企业
英文关键字：	Government Regulation; Innovation Incentive; Market Performance; Pharmaceuticals Pricing; Pharmaceutical Firm
中文摘要：	制药业是典型的创新驱动型产业，新药研发创新是该产业生存与发展的基础和获得长期竞争优势的关键。由于药品是不同于普通消费品的特殊商品，为保障患者利益，世界上绝大多数国家都对药品市场实施不同程度的监管和干预，即政府规制。政府规制包括激励性规制和约束性规制，对制药企业创新行为和市场绩效的影响已经成为学术界关注的热点问题。此外，鉴于我国特殊的体制，以制药企业为主导的产学研合作新药研发，已成为中国制药业重要的新药创制模式。本文立足于中国药品市场的现实背景，综合运用博弈论、产业组织理论、创新管理理论、纳什讨价还价理论、市场营销和最优化理论等相关理论和方法，研究了制药企业创新的战略决策、产学研创新联盟的形成和利润分配机制，研究价格管制、集中采购规制、政府创新激励政策和医保支付政策（可视为对需求方的支付限制规制）四种政府规制政策和不同政策组合下，政府、制药企业和集中采购平台的决策行为，深入探讨了不同政策组合对制药企业创新激励、药品定价和药品市场绩效的交互作用机制。 具体而言，本文主要研究了以下三个方面的内容： 1. 制药业产学研联盟的创新决策与利润分配 针对中国制药业中多家制药企业与同一家学研机构进行合作创新的现实背景，通过构建两家相互竞争的制药企业与学研机构的双边纳什议价模型，分析制药企业的创新价值和议价能力对联盟成员绩效的影响，探讨合作创新对药品价格、企业市场份额、经营绩效和社会福利的影响，研究制药企业的创新战略选择以及创新对企业可能的风险。研究表明，产学研合作创新能够提高社会总福利，但不一定提高制药企业的绩效和药品的价格；议价能力强的制药企业不一定总是获得高的利润份额，企业最终的利润份额受到企业自身及竞争者的议价能力、创新价值的共同影响；虽然产品创新能够提高消费者的购买意愿，但是盲目跟风创新可能会带来双输的结果。 2. 价格管制对制药企业创新激励和市场绩效的影响 首先，综合考虑价格管制和医疗保险支付政策，研究了完全竞争市场下，制药企业创新投入和创新药协调决策问题，探讨了制药企业创新投入配置扭曲的原因，揭示了价格管制与医疗保险政策对制药企业创新动机的交互作用机制。研究发现，制药企业定价机制的选择受到管制价格和医疗保险支付政策的双重影响，特别地，当医疗保险支付比例较高时，价格不能完全反映药品的创新水平，适当降低医疗保险支付有助于控制企业创新中的机会主义行为；价格管制对制药企业创新投入的作用受到医疗保险支付政策和企业自身创新能力的共同影响；价格管制并非总是降低企业的创新激励，当医疗保险支付比例较高时，价格管制可在一定程度上纠正创新投入配置的扭曲，提高创新能力中等的制药企业的创新激励。 随后，将上述模型扩展到双寡头竞争市场的情形，探讨了价格管制、政府创新激励政策和医疗保险支付政策对制药企业创新激励、药品定价以及药品市场绩效的交互作用机制。研究发现，价格管制并非总是降低制药企业的创新激励，管制价格的合理设置能够纠正制药企业创新投入配置的扭曲，实现社会最优配置；政府的战略性创新激励政策能够对制药企业的创新投入进行双向调节，纠正价格管制和医疗保险支付政策导致的制药企业创新投入配置的扭曲，引导企业的创新投入实现社会最优配置，并能够增进药品市场的社会福利，但并不一定能够提高制药企业利润。此外，价格管制政策将削弱战略性创新激励政策的福利效应。 3. 集中采购规制对制药企业创新激励和药品市场绩效的影响 综合考虑制药企业的创新和价格竞争，构建了集中采购平台和制药企业间的多阶段动态博弈模型，研究了无集中采购规制和存在集中采购规制下，制药企业和采购平台的决策行为，探讨了集中采购规制和平台收费机制对制药企业的创新激励、药品采购价格、医疗价格采购成本和社会总福利的交互作用机制。研究发现，集中采购规制下，制药企业的差异化战略不仅能够缓解市场竞争对制药企业的不利影响，而且有助于提高制药企业的创新激励；无论集中采购平台采取佣金制还是两部收费制，集中采购规制在降低药品采购价格和医疗机构采购成本方面具有积极作用，平台向制药企业收取交易服务费不会导致药品采购价格和采购成本的上升；集中采购规制并非总是对制药企业的创新投入产生负面效应，而是受到平台的收费机制的影响。特别地，两部收费制下，当创新效率较小时，集中采购规制有助于提高制药企业的创新激励，进而提高药品的创新水平；最后，当且仅当集中采购带来的交易成本节约足够大时，集中采购规制才能提高药品市场的社会总福利，从而改善整个药品供应链的绩效。
英文摘要：	Pharmaceutical industry is a typical innovation-driven industry. New drug discovery is critical for the existence and development of this industry. Since drugs are special products, governments in most countries conduct regulations and invention in the pharmaceuticals markets. Impacts of those government regulations including incentive regulations and restrictive regulations on pharmaceutical firms’ innovation behavior as well as the market performance have raised great attention among the international academic circle. Further, due to the special medical system in our country, industry-university-institute cooperation innovation dominated by the pharmaceutical firm has been one of main modes in new drug research and development. Based on the realistic background of China pharmaceutical market, by using Game Theory, Industry Organization Theory, Managing Innovation, Marketing Science, Bargaining Theory and Optimization Theory, this thesis first studies the strategic choice of pharmaceutical firm’s innovation, the formation of the Industry-University-Institute (IUI) cooperation innovation alliance as well as the profit allocation among alliance members. Then, this thesis studies decisions-making behavior of the government, pharmaceutical firms and the centralized procurement B2B platform under four government regulations such as price regulation, centralized drug procurement regulation, the innovation incentive policy, as well as medicare insurance policy (which can be viewed as the regulation for the paymlent of demand-side) and different kinds of regulation mix, and investigates interplay of all sorts of regulation mix on pharmaceutical firms’ innovation incentives, pharmaceuticals pricing, as well as the market performance. More specially, we study the main problem in the following three aspects: 1. Innovation decisions and profit allocation of pharmaceutical IUI alliance Considering the realistic backdrop that a number of pharmaceutical firms cooperate with one university or institute in Chinese pharmaceutical industry, we formulate a bilateral bargaining game between two competing pharmaceutical firms and one institute to analyze impacts of value brought by innovation and bargaining powers on alliance members, and discuss the impacts of cooperative innovation on drug prices, pharmaceutical firm’s market shares and profits as well as social welfare. Further, we investigate pharmaceutical firms’ innovation decisions and probable perils of innovation in the presence of competition and negotiation. Results derived from model solution are as follows: First, innovation can improve the social welfare but does not necessarily enhance drugs’ price and firms’ performance. Second, a pharmaceutical firm with higher bargaining power does not necessarily gain higher profit allocation. The final profits of firms and the institute depend on the combined factors. Finally, though cooperative innovation can enhance consumers’ purchasing willing, it is not always an optimal strategy for pharmaceutical firms and even results in the lose-lose outcome. 2. Impacts of price regulation on pharmaceutical firms’ innovation incentives and the market performance First, this thesis studies collaborative decisions on innovation investment and pricing mechanism considering both the price regulation and the current medical insurance policy, and further analyzes reasons of the distortion in firms’ innovation investment allocation. Based on the above analysis, we reveal the interplay of price regulation and medical insurance policy on pharmaceutical firms’ innovation incentives. The results show that, what pricing mechanisms are chosen by the pharmaceutical firm are determined by price regulation and medical insurance policy, especially the price is not able to indicate the drug’s innovation level if the medicare payment is low. Lowering the medicare payment appropriately will help to manage the firm’s opportunistic behavior; impacts of price regulation on pharmaceutical firm’s innovation investment are influenced by both the medical insurance policy and firm’s own innovation ability; in fact, price regulation does not necessarily result in underinvestment of innovation and it might correct the distortion of innovation investment allocation and encourage the pharmaceutical firm with medium innovation ability to increase its innovation investment when the medicare payment is high. Second, we extend to duopoly market where the government might conduct strategic innovation incentives to pharmaceutical industry, and explore the interaction among price regualtion, strategic innovation incentives and medical insurance policy on firms’ innovation incentives, pricing policy and the performance of the pharmaceutical market. Results derived from model solution are as follows: First, price regulation does not lower the firms’ incentives to innovation. On the contrary, reasonable celling price can correct distortions of firms’ innovation investment, and induce firms to achieve social optimal outcome. Then, government’s strategic innovation incentive policy for the pharmaceutical industry shows bi-directional regulation effects on pharmaceutical firms’ innovation investment, and can correct distortions of firms’ innovation investment driven by price regulation and medical insurance policy, and then not only achieves the social optimal outcome but improves the social welfare. However, government’s strategic innovation incentive policy does not necessarily to enhance pharmaceutical firms’ profits. It is worth mentioning that price regulation will reduce the welfare effects of the strategic innovation incentive policy. 3. Influences of the centralized procurement regulation on pharmaceutical firms’ innovation incentives and the market performance This part proposes a multi-stage dynamic game model which captures innovation and price competition between pharmaceutical firms, and studies decision-making behavior of pharmaceutical firms and the B2B centralized procurement platform. Based on the above analysis, we explore the interaction between the centralized procurement regulation and charge mechanisms of the B2B platform on firms’ innovation incentives, pharmaceuticals pricing policy, providers’ procurement costs as well as the social welfare. It is found that pharmaceutical firms’ strategy of product differentiation not only can reduce negative effects of market competition on pharmaceutical firms but can increase their innovation incentives, and the centralized procurement regulation can lower prices and procurement costs for healthcare providers in both charge mechanisms, and the service fee charged by B2B platform will not lead to higher prices and procurement costs for healthcare providers. We also find that the centralized procurement regulation dose not lower firms’ incentives to introduce innovation to the existing products necessarily, and effects of this regulation on firm’s innovation incentives depend on the charge mechanisms of the B2B platform. In some times, for example, when the innovation efficiency is higher and the B2B platform conducts two-part tariff charge mechanism, this regulation will increase firms’ innovation incentives. Finally, the centralized procurement regulation will not always improve the social welfare, and only there are enough cost savings from this regulation, can the social welfare, namely, the performance of the whole procurement supply chain be improved.
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