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论文编号：	7552
作者编号：	2120132471
上传时间：	2015/6/14 17:19:50
中文题目：	董事会稳定性、高管权力与薪酬契约——基于中小板信息技术业的数据
英文题目：	Board Stability,Executive Power and Compensation: Based on Listed Companies of Information and Technology from SME Board
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	董事会稳定性；高管权力；薪酬契约
英文关键字：	Board Stability；Executive Power；Compensation
中文摘要：	董事会是股东大会以下，负责公司日常经营活动的最高权力机关。董事会的稳定与否，对上市公司来说可谓“牵一发而动全身”。伴随国内A股市场的巨大发展以及经济形势的不断变化，上市公司的董事会在近几年频繁发生人事变动。有的基于股权的变更，有的则是基于政策的限制，董事的去留对市场释放出强烈的信号，为投资者提供可供参考的角度。 随着上市公司中的治理机制不断完善，薪酬激励逐渐成为弥合股东与管理层矛盾，引导管理层为股东利益最大化服务的手段。然而，监管机制的欠缺导致管理层存在利用公司内部信息获取私利的动机，损害股东价值。高管权力成为影响薪酬契约的重要因素。 本文基于产权理论、委托代理理论和管理层权力理论，研究高管权力阴影下，以薪酬形式转化的剩余利润。并且从动态视角出发，研究董事会的稳定性对高管权力与薪酬契约之间关系的调节作用。 本文对高管自利行为进行了深入研究，重新划分权力维度，为研究高管权力提供了新角度、新思路。同时将董事会人事变动的效果从董事会内部与外部性视角进行研究，并与高管权力和薪酬契约建立联系，丰富了董事会与高管权力相关研究。 股东向公司选派董事以及随之而来的管理层人事变动是一种正常现象，但这种变动不应太随意，更不能在长时间里使董事会处于不稳定之中。否则，市场会产生疑惑：董事会变动的背后是大股东之间激烈的权力斗争，还是董事会对上市公司未来的发展战略缺乏清晰的思路？面对走马灯般的人事更迭，中小股东及相关利益主体对上市公司可持续发展难以树立信心。 过往研究表明，高管权力与上市公司现金股利分红、高管的盈余操作、业绩预告等存在显著相关性。本文使用国泰安数据库、万德数据库与新浪财经数据，并选取中小板信息产业公司，2010年至2013年四年的数据进行回归分析。研究发现，高管权力与薪酬水平存在显著相关性，并且高管权力对薪酬业绩敏感性起到调节作用。而董事会的稳定性则与高管权力与薪酬水平之间的关系密切相关。董事会的稳定性的提升可以部分削弱高管权力对薪酬水平的影响。本文为董事会相关特征与高管薪酬契约的研究提供新视角，为抑制高管获取超额收益，保护股东利益提供理论支撑。
英文摘要：	The board is the highest authority of the company, discussing and determining all important issues regarding the company. The stability of the boardroom counts for a lot. With the developing of economy and share market, public companies’ boards go through rapid turnover of members. Some changes are based on alteration of equities, while some are based on new rules from regulator. Directors demission releases strong signal to the market, which provides references for investors. As the governance mechanism of public companies continuously improving, incentive pay becomes main method to minimize conflicts between shareholders and executives, and it makes executives serve for maximizing the interests of shareholders. However, the lack of supervision on managers leaves room for selfish moves by using internal information, and damages company value. Executive power is one of the main factors that affects compensation contracts. Based on the property rights theory, agency theory and executive power, this paper studied the transformation from residual profit to compensation. From a dynamic view, we studied the moderate effect of boardroom stability between executive power and compensation contracts. We explored executive’s self-interested behavior by division measurement dimensions of executive power into depth and breadth. And we studied the shuffle of boardroom from internal and external perspective, and then establish contact with the executive power and compensation contracts. Our efforts should enrich the research of boardroom characteristics and managers behavior. Boardroom turnover and the resulting management personnel change were supposed to be normal phenomenon, but this kind of change should not be casual as it leads to boardroom unstable. Otherwise, the investors will worry if the change reflects conflicts between large shareholders or the boardroom lack clear strategy of the company. In the face of rapid personnel change, it’s hard for investors of the public company to build up confidence. Previous studies show that CEO power is connected with cash dividends, earnings management activities, and earnings pre-annunciation. Our data comes from CSMAR,WIND and SINA finance website, including 55 companies from SME Board of the information industry, from 2010 to 2013,four years in total. We find that there is a strong correlation between executive power and sensitivity of compensation-performance. Strong executive power relates to high compensation. And the stability of board moderates the relationship of executive power and compensation. Stable board can weak the executive power,which also affects compensation. Our study of boardroom stability provides a new viewpoint for compensation research, providing theoretical support to inhibition of executive selfish moves and protection for shareholder interests.
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