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论文编号：	7524
作者编号：	2120132482
上传时间：	2015/6/11 13:49:29
中文题目：	董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬绩效敏感性的关系研究
英文题目：	The Study on the Relationship Between Board Informal Hierarchy and the Sensitivity of the Executive Pay and Firm Performance
指导老师：	张耀伟
中文关键字：	非正式层级；高管薪酬；敏感性
英文关键字：	Board Informal Hierarchy; Managers; performance-related pay;
中文摘要：	经过多年的市场化改革，我国公司逐渐建立起与绩效挂钩的薪酬体系。然而高管薪酬体系有效性问题一直是学术界和理论界关注的热点问题。作为高管薪酬制定的主体，董事会在高管薪酬契约制定中的作用一直是学术界关注的焦点。相关的研究表明，董事会的结构特征及其运作与高管薪酬契约关系密切，这方面的研究深化了对董事会特征及其履职能力的认识。但仅从董事结构层面考察其履职能力并不能深刻揭示董事会运作的内在动力机制及其对履职能力的影响。在此背景下，借鉴社会认同理论和高阶梯队理论研究成果，从董事个体行为特征出发，探讨其对董事会运作及其职能目标实现的影响和作用机理，就成为当前研究的热点。 本文以2011-2013年度沪深两地上市公司为研究样本，对董事会因个体之间社会资本不同而引致的非正式层级进行了测算。然后基于高管薪酬契约有效性视角，探讨董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性的关系，并考察不同情况下董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬契约有效性产生影响，从而为从董事会微观运作层面理解董事会治理效应提供一种新的视角和结论。 本文的实证研究发现：（1）我国企业高管薪酬与公司绩效之间存在着显著的正相关关系，并且董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬绩效敏感性有着显著的弱化作用；（2）与业绩上升的公司相比，只有当公司处于业绩下降时，非正式层级才对高管薪酬绩效敏感性存在显著负向调节作用；（3）当董事会非正式层级的最高层级是公司的独立董事时，非正式层级才对高管薪酬绩效敏感性存在负向调节作用；（4）与国有企业相比，民营企业的董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬绩效敏感性存在显著的负向调节作用。
英文摘要：	After years of market-oriented reforms, our company has gradually established a performance-related pay system. However, the validity of executive pay system has been a hot topic of concern academics and theorists. As the main role of executive pay maker, the board has been the focus of attention. Related studies show that structural features and operation of the Board and executive compensation contracts are closely related, Research in this area have deepen understanding of the characteristics and performance ability of the Board of Directors. In this context, drawing on social identity theory and higher echelon theoretical research, Starting from the directors of individual behavioral characteristics. To investigate the effect and mechanism of functioning of the Board and its functions to achieve the objective has become a hot research topic. In this paper, we used 2011-2013 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies as samples, and estimate the Board Informal Hierarchy. Based on the perspective of the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts, to investigate the relationship between the Board Informal Hierarchy and effectiveness of executive compensation contracts. And study the relationship between Board Informal Hierarchy and executive pay under the contract and investigate the effectiveness of different situations and provide a new perspective and conclusions. The empirical study found that:(1) there are significant positive correlation between executive pay and corporate performance, and Board Informal Hierarchy can reduce this positive correlation; (2) Compared with the results of the rise of the company, only when the performance of the company in decline, Board Informal Hierarchy can reduce this positive correlation; (3) When the highest level of informal hierarchy Board is an independent director of the company, Board Informal Hierarchy can reduce this positive correlation;(4) Compared with the state-owned enterprises, Board Informal Hierarchy can reduce this positive correlation in private enterprises
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