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论文编号：	7521
作者编号：	2120132421
上传时间：	2015/6/11 11:45:29
中文题目：	高管离职对企业竞争优势的影响研究 ——从高管人力资本属性角度
英文题目：	Study on the impacts of executive turnover on competitive advantages of enterprises ——from the view of executives’ human capital property
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	企业竞争优势;高管离职;一般性人力资本;专用性人力资本
英文关键字：	Enterprise competitive advantages;executive turnover;general human capital;firm-specific human capital
中文摘要：	中小企业是我国市场经济的重要主体，在国民生活的方方面面都发挥着重要作用，肩负着维护社会稳定、增加就业机会和促进经济发展等使命。但是由于规模的限制，中小型企业的成长受到了层层制约。为了助力中小企业实现更好的发展，我国政府于2009年10月30日推出了创业板，主要服务对象为尚未达到主板上市条件而又急需融资的中小型新兴企业和高科技公司。然而喜悦之余，创业板也迎来了特有的棘手问题——新股发行的“三高”现象，即高市盈率、高发行价和高超募资金。更奇怪的是，在许多高管费尽心力让公司在创业板IPO后不久，正值事业巅峰期的他们却纷纷在公司上市不足一年内选择了离职，这一风潮甚至被业内冠以专属名词——创业板公司高管“离职潮”。 本文基于上述研究背景，采用深圳创业板2011年至2013年的数据，以创业板高管“离职潮”这一现实问题作为切入点，展开高管离职对企业竞争优势的影响研究。高管作为战略决策的行为主体之一，拥有的人力资本禀赋是企业竞争优势的资源基础。本文在前人研究成果的基础上提出“人力资本属性”这一创新的角度，探究高管人力资本属性在影响高管离职和企业竞争优势关系中扮演的角色。首先，本文进行了文献综述，在对核心概念进行界定的基础上梳理国内外学者的主要观点并进行述评。其次，基于资源基础理论，从高管人力资本属性角度分析高管离职对企业竞争优势的影响并提出研究假设。再次，进行变量和模型设计并展开实证分析。最后，总结本文的研究结论并提出建议。 研究结果表明：第一，高管离职会损害企业竞争优势；第二，高管离职对企业竞争优势的损害受到高管人力资本属性的调节作用；第三，不同属性的人力资本对高管离职行为的影响不同。形象的可以描述为高管专用性人力资本是高管离职的“退出壁垒”，起着阻碍作用。基于上述研究结论，本文的政策建议如下：首先，完善创业板的制度法规建设，延长股票抛售的解禁期；其次，规范股票市场，诱导股价回归至正常水平；最后，鼓励企业投资于高管专用性人力资本，充分利用其“退出壁垒”效应。通过上述途径，能够有效促进我国创业板市场的日益完善，同时也有益于公司留住高级管理人员，让企业竞争优势得以持续。
英文摘要：	Small and medium sized enterprises are the major entity of Chinese market-oriented economy, which shows their vital effects to a mount of different aspects in the daily lives of residents, playing a vital historical role in preserving sustained society, creating potential career opportunities and facilitating economic development. However, with constraint scales in size, small and medium sized enterprises have been witnessing the restrictions in development. To indicate better development of these enterprises, Chinese government has opened the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) board. The GEM board is mainly faced to those small and medium sized enterprises and hi-tech companies which are unqualified to be public on Main Board but in need of funding. Putting delightful feeling aside, GEM board has its unique and urged issues – the phenomenon of “the three high” in IPO: high issue price, high issue price-earnings ratio, and high over-raised fund. What more weird is, although numerous of executives had spent efforts to dedicate their enterprises to start IPO on GEM board successfully and eventually, most of them chose to quit the jobs within no more than one year after the IPO, disregarding the peak period they were in. Moreover, this trend is even named specifically as” the resign trend of GEM companies’ executives”. This paper is based on the research background as above, utilizing the statistics of Shenzhen GEM board from 2011 to 2013 and focusing the resign trend, to develop a study on the impact of executive turnover on competitive advantages of enterprises. As one of the critical roles in strategic management, executives own human capital, which is the basic of enterprises’ competitive advantages. Therefore, based on the previous research, “human capital property” is focused to finalize its role in the relationship between Executives turnover and enterprises’ competitive advantages. Foremost, literature reviews are done to conclude and comment domestic and international researchers’ views with foundations of definition on core concepts. Besides, based on the Resource-Based View, the impacts of Executives turnover on enterprises’ competitive advantages are analyzed from the aspect of executive human capital property, indicating research assumptions. Furthermore, variables and models are designed to develop empirical analysis. Eventually, the research results are summarized, and recommendations to policies are illustrated. The research indicated that: 1. Executives turnover have negative impact on enterprise competitive advantages. 2. The impacts are adjusted by the executives’ human capital property. 3. Human capital with varied properties leads to different effects on executives resign behaviors. It can be described that general human capital is the “exit barrier” on executive turnover, which shows a rejection effect. According to these conclusions, several politic recommendations are illustrated. First, perfect the rules and acts on GEM board, and postpone the limited sale period. Second, regulate the stock market to guide the stock price back to normal level. Finally, encourage investments to executive firm-specific human capital in order to fully utilize the exit barrier effect. By applying these advises, Chinese GEM board will be perfect, whereas the companies can sustain high level managers to have sustained competitive advantages.
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