联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	7516
作者编号：	1120120791
上传时间：	2015/6/11 11:11:06
中文题目：	公司IPO前后的媒体治理效应研究
英文题目：	A Effect Research of Media Coverage on Corporate Governance Before and After IPO
指导老师：	薛有志
中文关键字：	公司治理；首次公开发行（IPO）；媒体报道；信息不对称；代理成本
英文关键字：	Corporate Governance; Initial Public Offering (IPO); Media Coverage; Information Asymmetry; Agency Cost
中文摘要：	在公司财务与公司治理领域的研究中，关于管理层利用信息不对称损害投资者利益的研究层出不穷。从理论和实践两个层面上分析，财经媒体因其信息传播、公众舆论监督等特点，都成为了投资者与管理层之间对话的平台之一。一方面，财经媒体能够通过对公司行为进行报道降低投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称；另一方面，财经媒体也可以利用其公众舆论的定位对公司行为进行监督和评判，积极参与到公司治理框架中的“激励-约束”制度安排中，在公司治理的信息流中占有重要角色。论文聚焦于财经报纸的报道，基于我国上市公司IPO前后的数据，探索了媒体报道在公司治理机制运行中所扮演的角色，分别从逻辑动机、路径分析和效果检验三个部分共同搭建了我国上市公司治理制度安排中的媒体报道影响关系框架，并以此为基础为公司治理优化提供了理论依据。具体而言，论文的主体内容主要分为三个部分。 首先，从投资者需求的角度对媒体参与公司治理框架的动机进行分析。为了对管理层的机会主义行为进行约束，投资者需要利用媒体的信息传播功能降低投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。论文通过IPO前的情景检验也确实验证了这一逻辑，表明媒体由于投资者的需求而参与到公司治理框架中，并会受到投资者与管理层之间代理成本的直接影响。接下来，论文对媒体报道和上市首日投资者反应的影响关系进行了分析，探索了媒体报道是否通过信息传播对投资者的决策行为产生了影响，从信息中介的角度验证了媒体报道参与公司治理的路径，并发现了媒体关注度与上市首日换手率之间的正相关关系。最后，论文从双重代理成本的角度对媒体报道的治理效应进行了检验。实证结果表明，公司IPO后，媒体报道情绪对第一类代理成本降低的显著影响回应了媒体参与公司治理的动机，即响应投资者的需求对信息不对称带来的管理层私利行为进行监督影响。 总体而言，论文通过对我国首次公开发行上市公司的样本数据检验，系统性的对媒体报道参与公司治理框架的逻辑进行了一步步的分析验证，并将终极控制人性质和政策法规变化引入到研究框架中，为理解公司外部主体对公司内部行为产生影响提供了进一步的证据。
英文摘要：	The topic about the opportunism behavior of management is always meaningful in financial and corporate governance research. Giving the characteristics of information transmission and public social arbitrator, financial press, theoretically and practically, exactly plays the role of linkup platform for both investors and top management. On one hand, the media coverage of the company helps induce the information asymmetry between investors and management. On the other hand, the role of social arbitrator played by financial press is to monitor the company, which makes media as a stakeholder in the framework of corporate governance. Media play important role in the “Incentive-Restrict” mechanism. Based on the empirical examination of Chinese Initial Public Offering companies, the dissertation discusses the role of financial press coverage in corporate governance, which constructs the effect framework of media coverage on corporate governance by verifying the logic motivation, path analysis and effect examination. Specifically, the dissertation mainly includes three parts as following. First, I analyze the motive of media coverage involving in corporate governance from the perspective of investors’ demand. For investors, media coverage is involved to induce the information asymmetry between investors and management by information transmission, for restraining the opportunism behavior of management. The empirical evidence before IPO conforms to the inference that more media attention is paid on the companies with higher agency cost, which means that media coverage is involved in corporate governance for the investor needs, and is directly affected by the agency cost between investors and management. Second, the dissertation tests the path of media coverage involving in corporate governance by analyzing the effect of media coverage on investor reaction, which explores the impact of information transmission on investor’s decision-making. The empirical examination between media coverage and turnover rate on first day trading shows significantly positive results. Finally, the author verifies the influence of media coverage on double agency costs. The results show that negative coverage could trigger the significant decrease of first type agency cost other than second type agency cost after IPO. The conclusion responds to the logic motivation of media coverage involving in corporate governance, which is to reduce the information asymmetry between investors and management and to monitor the opportunism behavior of management. Last but not least, the dissertation inspects the role of media in corporate governance by the empirical examination of Chinese listed companies. The ultimate controller property and policy change are also taken into account. The results provide further evidence in understanding the impact of outsiders on insiders’ behavior.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)