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论文编号：	7513
作者编号：	2120132481
上传时间：	2015/6/11 8:46:39
中文题目：	银企关系对银行系机构投资者持股的影响
英文题目：	Influence of Bank Enterprise Relation on the Holding of Institutional Investors
指导老师：	张耀伟
中文关键字：	银企关系；信息传递；银行系机构
英文关键字：	bank-enterprise relationship；information dissemination；institution investor
中文摘要：	在我国经济增长速度逐步放缓的大背景下，金融市场进一步推进改革开放，加快了多元化发展的步伐，同时企业融资也逐步加快“脱媒”速度、利率逐步实现市场化、互联网金融也逐步兴起。基于以上背景和竞争压力，国内商业银行开始以综合化经营为突破口，从事两种或多种金融服务业务，进而加快自身的战略转型。同时，中信集团、平安集团、光大集团在保持原有市场的基础上，设立或控股金融类的公司，实现综合化经营，如平安集团在维持保险业务市场份额的基础上，逐步发展设立平安证券、平安大华基金管理公司等子公司，并涉足于银行业。在金融控股集团内存在信息传递，银行作为公共服务机构，具有很广的客户源，提供金融服务过程中能够获得客户的相关信息。基于集团内协同作用理论，本文就银行获得的信息是否能够在金融控股集团内传递，是否影响到其他机构投资者的持股决策的问题进行探究。 本文以2008-2013年沪深A股上市公司作为样本，通过构建实证模型，分析上市公司中银行贷款与银行系基金持股比例的关系，并进一步从审计质量、市场化、实际控制人三个角度研究在信息透明程度不同的情况下两者的关系，从而验证银行作为金融控股中重要组成部分，能够将获得的企业私有信息传递给集团内的其他机构投资者，从而影响他们的持股决策。最后对实证结果进行稳健性检验。 通过实证研究发现，银行贷款与银行系机构投资者之间存在显著相关关系，主要表现为上市公司中银行贷款的期限结构与银行系机构投资者持股成显著正相关关系，贷款成本与银行系机构投资者持股成显著负相关关系。本文进一步探究信息透明度对银行贷款与银行系机构投资者持股关系的影响，结果显示，当企业的实际控制人为非国有企业时，银行贷款与银行系机构投资者持股比例的关系得到强化；在市场化程度高时，银行贷款与银行系机构投资者持股比例关系通过了1%水平的显著性检验，而在市场化程度低时，两者的关系弱化；而上市公司低的审计质量对银行贷款的期限结构和基金持股的关系具有强化作用，但对贷款成本与基金持股的关系影响不大。通过以上实证，说明银行能够将贷款过程中获得的企业信息传递给集团内的机构投资者，进而影响机构投资者的持股决策。
英文摘要：	As the rate of economic growth is slowing down，the reformation，the innovation and the diversification of the financial market has been quicken，the financial disintermediation has developed rapidly,the marketization of interest rate is carried forward，and the on-line financial is in the making. Against these background，some commercial banks，based on the idea of comprehensive business，begin to work on more than two financial services，such as bank，security，insurance，fiduciary and funds，to speed up the transformation of strategic. At the same time，the China International Trust and Investment Corporation，the China Everbright Group and the Ping An Group are also carrying out a comprehensive business. They work on a wide range of financial services through the establishment of the financial company or the shareholding of other financial company. As we all know，subsidiary companies in the financial shareholding company send message to each other. As a public service organization，the banks have many clients，and they can get a lot of private information about the corporate borrower. Based on the theory of Synergistic Effect，this paper will study whether the private massage gotten by the bank would passed to another institutional investor in the same financial shareholding company，and whether those massage would influence the decision-making of shareholding of the institutional investor. This paper select the data of the public companies between 2006 and 2012 as the initial sample to research the relationship of the bank load and the proportion of shareholding of the institutional investors of the financial shareholding company. For further study，this paper study their relationship form the view of information transparency，which influenced by auditing quality，marketization and the controlling shareholders，in order to verify the transformation of massage among companies in the financial shareholding company. The empirical study found significant correlation exist between the bank load and the shareholding ratio of the institutional investors which belong to the same financial shareholding company with bank. In another words，when the public company get the longer loan，or borrowing a loan at a lower cost，the institution investor will boost their holdings of the public company. Further studies showed that marketization will have strengthening impact on this effect，while if the controlling shareholders is the state-owned enterprises，the effect will be weakened. And when the auditing quality of the public company is low，the relationship of the term structure of the bank loan and the shareholding ratio of the institutional investors will been strengthened，while the relationship of the cost and the shareholding ration of the institutional investors will been weakened. Thought the empirical study，we can draw conclusions that the bank load have an effect on the investment decisions of the institution investors in the same financial company. When the bank gets the internal information which is under wraps to the public，the institution investor also obtain the information which will impact their decision of shareholding. This way of information transmission will undermine the fairness of disclosure of accounting information on some level.
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