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论文编号：	751
作者编号：	20050772
上传时间：	2008/6/23 15:37:02
中文题目：	上市公司终极控制权特征对多元化
英文题目：	A Study on the Effect of the U
指导老师：	薛有志教授
中文关键字：	终极控制权特征 多元化经营 终极
英文关键字：	characteristics of the ultimat
中文摘要：	多元化经营程度的增加与组织结构的复杂化相伴而生。伴随着多元化经营的不断开展，我国上市公司普遍建立了复杂的金字塔式控股结构。此结构导致的控制权与现金流权的偏离使得终极控制股东与中小股东利益产生了冲突，同时我国上市公司特有的股权结构以及分拆上市等制度背景导致的终极控制股东的绝对控制权更是加剧了这一冲突，使得终极控制股东可能会将多元化经营作为实现其利益侵占的手段之一。因此，突破上市公司控制权层面，从终极控制权的视角研究上市公司的多元化经营决策，将终极控制股东纳入多元化经营决策的分析框架具有一定的必要性。 组织结构的差异会导致终极控制股东利益侵占方式选择的差异。集团上市公司的复杂结构为其终极控制股东提供了更大的利益侵占空间以及更加多样化的利益侵占方式，从而可能导致集团上市公司的终极控制股东，相对独立上市公司，更可能将多元化经营作为利益侵占方式之一；然而，各种利益侵占方式之间替代效应的存在使得集团上市公司的终极控制股东会倾向于选择关联交易、现金股利等更加简单直接的利益侵占方式，而并不青睐多元化经营。因此，基于以上分析，本文分别建立了“结构复杂性假说”及“利益侵占方式替代效应假说”，并构建了终极控制权特征影响多元化经营的理论分析框架。在此基础上，本文利用我国上市公司的数据进行了实证研究，以验证我国上市公司的终极控制股东是否会利用多元化经营侵占中小股东利益，以及如何利用多元化经营实现利益侵占；这种利益侵占行为在集团上市公司与独立上市公司之间存在何种差异；差异产生的原因何在。以上问题的解答对于揭示终极控制股东多元化经营的动机，以及不同组织结构上市公司终极控制股东利益侵占方式选择的差异，进而严格上市公司监管，保护中小股东利益具有一定的意义。 通过本文的研究，主要得到以下结论： 1．我国上市公司的终极控制股东的确存在利用多元化经营侵占中小股东利益的行为。 除了现金股利、关联交易等利益侵占方式之外，我国上市公司的终极控制股东也会将多元化经营作为利益侵占的手段之一。从而说明我国上市公司的多元化经营决策不仅仅是管理者私利动机的体现，更是终极控制股东追求自身收益的体现。终极控制股东为了获取控制权私有收益会倾向于将自由现金流用于多元化经营投资，而且，倾向于选择投资风险较高、投资效率较低的多元化经营项目，而金字塔结构的存在又促进了多元化经营的实施，从而为终极控制股东的利益侵占行为提供了必要前提。而且，随着证监会对关联交易等可能利益侵占方式管制程度的加深，终极控制股东倾向于选择更加隐蔽性的利益侵占方式，从而使得多元化经营成为其选择之一。 2．独立上市公司的终极控制股东，相对集团上市公司，更可能将多元化经营作为利益侵占方式之一。 利用我国上市公司数据得出的实证结果没有支持“结构复杂性假说”，验证了独立上市公司的终极控制股东更可能将多元化经营作为利益侵占方式之一。通过对其内在原因的进一步检验发现，多元化经营与现金股利、关联交易这些可能的利益侵占方式之间的确存在着显著的替代关系，这些替代性利益侵占方式的存在使得集团上市公司的终极控制股东并不倾向于将多元化经营作为利益侵占方式之一，而独立上市公司的终极控制股东却更可能利用多元化经营实施利益侵占行为。这说明组织结构，如终极控制权特征一样，也会影响到终极控制股东利益侵占方式的选择。正如邓淑芳（2006）等学者提出的，结构本身具有深层次含义，集团组织结构即意味着更加复杂的终极控制权特征以及更加严重的利益侵占动机。 3．我国上市公司治理机制并不能有效抑制终极控制股东利用多元化经营实施的利益侵占行为。 本文在分析我国上市公司治理特征的基础上，对我国上市公司治理机制能否有效抑制终极控制股东利用多元化经营实施的利益侵占行为进行了分析。结果发现我国上市公司的多数治理机制并不能有效抑制终极控制股东的利益侵占行为，从而说明我国上市公司一股独大、分拆上市的制度背景影响了合理内部治理结构的构建，导致内部治理机制对终极控制股东利益侵占行为的抑制作用无效。因此，除了完善外部法律等制度环境外，还应该从根本上改变上市公司一股独大、分拆上市的现状，督促上市公司建立更加合理的内部治理结构，如加强股东之间的制衡，强化董事长与总经理职位的分离，从而抑制终极控制股东的利益侵占行为，保护中小股东的合法权益。 综上所述，本文验证了终极控制股东代理问题的存在，除了关联交易、现金股利，终极控制股东也可以将多元化经营作为追求控制权私有收益的手段。从而说明管理者的代理问题仅仅是上市公司实施多元化经营的动机之一，我们更应该警惕终极控制股东出于私利动机的多元化经营。而且，本文发现集团上市公司与独立上市公司终极控制股东对利益侵占方式选择的次序存在差异，说明组织结构特征也会影响到终极控制股东利益侵占方式的选择。本文的研究对于监管部门有针对性地进行监管，以及投资者理性的提高均具有重要意义，而且，对于补充现有终极控制权领域的理论研究，指导上市公司多元化经营实践均具有一定的意义。
英文摘要：	The increase of firms’ diversification degree is accompanied by the complication of their organizational structures. With the implementation of diversification strategy, the Pyramidal Ownership Structure is widely used by listed companies in China, which causes conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders because of controlling shareholders’ deviation of control rights from voting rights. Meanwhile, the absolute control rights of the ultimate owners in Chinese listed companies resulted from the specific ownership structure and listing institutions make the conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders more severe. So diversification may be one more way for controlling shareholders to pursue self-interests. Therefore, it is quite necessary to study diversification strategy from the ultimate ownership level, beyond the listed companies’ control rights level, and include ultimate owners into the analysis framework of diversification strategy decision. Different organizational structures can cause different choices of appropriation means for ultimate owners. On the one hand, complicated structures of group affiliated companies provide their ultimate owners larger space for appropriation and more diverse appropriation means, so the ultimate owners of group affiliated companies are more apt to take diversification as one more means for their appropriation activities, compared with those of independent companies. On the other hand, the substitutive effects between various appropriation means makes the ultimate owners of group affiliated companies more apt to choose such direct and easy means as related party transactions, cash dividends, so diversification may be not the best choice for the ultimate owners of group affiliated companies. Based on the above analysis, “the complicated structure hypothesis” and “the substitutive effects of appropriation means hypothesis” are established, and the analysis framework of how ultimate control rights affect diversification is formed. Based on these theories, some empirical research is done using data of Chinese listed companies, to examine whether their ultimate owners use diversification to expropriate the minority shareholders’ interests, and how; what differences exist between this appropriation means in group affiliated companies and independent companies, and what causes these differences. The answers to the above problems has some implications for uncovering the motivation of ultimate owners’ diversification activities, and different choices of appropriation means for different organizational structure companies, which can be used for strengthening the governance of listed companies and protecting minority shareholders’ interests. Through this study, the following conclusions are drawn: 1. The ultimate owners of Chinese listed companies do have the motivation to use diversification to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests. Besides cash dividends, related party transactions, the ultimate owners of Chinese listed companies also take diversification as one more means to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests. So diversification of Chinese listed companies is not only the self-interested activities for managers, but also that of the ultimate owners. In order to achieve private control benefits, the ultimate owners are inclined to put free cash flow to diversification investment, and to choose more risky and less efficient diversification projects. Furthermore, the existence of Pyramidal Ownership Structure makes diversification easier to be implemented and provide a necessary premise for ultimate owners’ appropriation activities. Furthermore, with the strict refrain of such appropriation activities as related party transactions, ultimate owners are more apt to choose hidden appropriation means, which makes diversification one more choice for them. 2. The ultimate owners of independent companies, compared to group affiliated companies, are more apt to use diversification to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies, the empirical results do not support “the complicated structure hypothesis”, and validate that the ultimate owners of independent companies are more apt to use diversification to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests. Through further study, this dissertation find out that diversification is a substitutive means for cash dividends, related party transactions to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests, and it is the existence of these substitutive appropriation means that makes the ultimate owners of group affiliated companies use them to substitute diversification, while the ultimate owners of independent companies are more inclined to use diversification. This means that, organizational structure, like ultimate control rights, can also affect the choice of appropriation means of the ultimate shareholders. Just as what Deng Shufang(2006) has mentioned, organizational structures have deeper implications, group structure means more complicated ultimate control characteristics and more serious appropriation motivation. 3. The governance mechanisms of Chinese listed companies can not effectively restrain the ultimate owners’ appropriation activities through diversification. Based on the analysis of corporate governance characteristics of Chinese listed companies, whether they can effectively restrain the ultimate owners’ appropriation activities through diversification is analyzed. The results show many governance mechanisms can not effectively do so. It means the specific one big share and listing institutions make the internal governance structures unreasonable. So, besides the perfect of external legal institutional environments, the one big share and listing institutions should be totally changed. And measures should be taken to supervise and urge listed companies establish more reasonable internal governance structures. For example, strengthening the counterbalance of shareholders and the separation of responsibilities between board of directors and general managers to restrain the ultimate owners’ appropriation activities and protect minority shareholders’ interests. In summary, this dissertation validates the existence of the ultimate owners’ agency problem. Besides related party transactions, cash dividends, the ultimate owners can also use diversification to pursue private control benefits, which means the agency problem of managers is only one reason for listed companies to implement diversification strategies. We should be more aware of the ultimate owners’ self-interested diversification activities. Furthermore, this dissertation finds out the ultimate owners of group affiliated companies and those of independent companies have different choices of appropriation means, which means organizational structures can affect the choices of appropriation means. This study is quite useful for supervision departments to strengthen the governance of listed companies and for investors to increase their reasonability. It also complements the theoretical study of the ultimate ownership field and directs the diversification operation of listed companies in China.
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