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论文编号：	7509
作者编号：	2120132470
上传时间：	2015/6/10 23:38:43
中文题目：	董事高管责任险、独立董事与投资效率
英文题目：	Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance、Independent Director and Investment Efficiency
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	董事高管责任险；过度投资；投资不足；独立董事激励
英文关键字：	director’and officers’liability insurance; over-investment; under-investment; independent director incentive
中文摘要：	欧美等西方国家具有发达的资本市场和严苛的法律机制，而且随着1929年美国股市的大崩盘，监管层更是逐渐加强了对资本市场的监管。美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的成立和随后颁布的证券法更是确立了严格的证券市场的问责机制。这一系列措施的颁布除了加强了对证券市场的约束之外，也增加了上市企业董事和高管的执业风险。因此，上市公司高管亟需要一种降低其诉讼风险的工具，此时董事高管责任险应运而生。该险种出现之后得到极大的关注和引用，到21世纪初欧美等发达国家上市公司的投保率达到90%以上。与此形成鲜明对比的是董事高管责任险在自2002年引入我国之后却没有受到太大的重视，截止到目前上市公司投保率仍不足5%。 英国、美国、加拿大和我国的台湾地区对董事高管责任险的研究比较成熟，因为这些地区强制要求上市公司披露董事高管责任险的相关信息。而目前该险种的购买信息在我国尚属于自愿性披露的范围，所以国内对该险种的研究并不多。但是考虑到董事高管责任险对企业公司治理机制带来的巨大影响，我们通过中国资讯行和Wind金融数据手工搜集了目前上市公司中所披露的董事高管责任险信息，并且在借鉴已有文献的基础上，从监督假说、激励假说以及风险转移假说三个方面研究了中国上市公司的董事高管责任险对非效率投资的影响机制。 我们首先利用Richardson的模型，计算出企业预期投资水平，然后与企业真实的投资水平做差计算出企业的非效率投资水平。然后将非效率投资水平作为因变量，董事高管责任险作为自变量进行回归分析，以得出董事高管责任险对企业投资效率的影响。除此之外，我们还做了独立董事和董事高管责任险的交互项，来考察独立董事制度对主效应的影响。研究发现，首先，D&O会加剧公司的非效率投资程度(即发挥了风险转移效应)。在细分非效率投资的种类后发现，D&O只会加剧投资不足的程度，而对过度投资没有显著影响。其次，独立董事对D&O的这种影响产生了显著的治理作用，即减弱了D&O加剧公司非效率投资的程度。最后，我们将样本企业按照独立董事激励程度进行分组，发现在独立董事激励水平较高时，独立董事能够缓解D&O对投资不足的影响；而在激励水平较低时，则表现出相反的影响，即D&O会减弱非效率投资水平(即发挥了监督和激励效应)，独立董事甚至会削弱这种影响。
英文摘要：	Europe, The United States and other western countries has developed capital markets and strict legal mechanism, and with the 1929 stock market crash in the United States, regulators gradually strengthened the regulation of capital markets. The establishment of the securities and exchange commission (SEC) along with the securities law is established the strict accountability mechanism of securities market. The establishment of these series of measures not only strengthened the constraints of the securities markets, but also increases the risk of the practice of listed corporate directors and executives. Therefore, the executives of listed companies need a tool to lower the litigation risks, at the historic moment directors’and officers’liability insurance arises. This kind of insurance received great attention and references after apperance, the listed companies of United States and other developed countries brought this insurance to the rate above 90% to the early 21st century. In contrast after introduced since 2002, this insurance has not been paid much attention in our country, and the brought rate by the listed companies is still less than 5%. Britain, the United States, Canada and Taiwan area of our country have mature study of the directors’and officers’liability insurance, because these areas are forced to require listed companies to disclose information of directors’and officers’liability insurance. But at the moment, this information in our country belongs to the scope of voluntary disclosure, so the study of which is not much in China. But considering the directors’and officers’liability insurance bringing huge impact to our company governance mechanism, we manually collected the information of directors’and officers’liability insurance in listed company at present through China information lines and Wind financial data. And on the basis of reference literatures, this paper studies the impact mechanism of Chinese listed company’s directors’and officers’liability insurance on inefficient investment from three aspects of monitoring hypothesis, incentive hypothesis and risk transfer hypothesis. We first use the Richardson model to calculate the expected investment levels, then make difference with true investment level of enterprise to calculate the efficiency of investment level. Then we have a regression analysis to draw the impact of the directors’and officers’liability insurance to the inefficient investment using the inefficient investment level as the dependent variable and using directors’and officers’liability insurance as the independent variable .In addition, we also made a interaction of independent director and the liability insurance, to examine the effect of the independent director system to the main effect. Research shows, firstly, directors’and officers’liability insurance will increase the level of company's inefficient investment (that is, plays a risk-transfer effect). After we subdivide the kinds of inefficient investment, the paper shows that directors’and officers’liability insurance will only aggravate the extent of under-investment, and will not significantly affect over-investment. Secondly, the independent directors play a marked governance role on these effects, that is, reduce the extent of inefficient investment which increased by directors’and officers’liability insurance. Thirdly, after further examining the incentive moderating effect of independent directors, we find that when independent directors’ incentive level is high, the independent directors can cushion the impact of D&O insurance on under-investment; But when the incentive level is low, it shows the opposite effect, that is, D&O will reduce the level of inefficient investment (that is, plays monitoring and incentive effects), and the independent directors may even weaken that impact.
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