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论文编号：	7503
作者编号：	2120132479
上传时间：	2015/6/10 23:05:20
中文题目：	独立董事制度的有效性——基于自主性治理的视角
英文题目：	The Validity of Independent Director System Based on the Perspective of Voluntary Governance
指导老师：	牛建波
中文关键字：	独立董事制度有效性；自主性治理；独立董事薪酬和声誉
英文关键字：	validity of independent director system；voluntary governance；compensation and reputation of independent director
中文摘要：	自中国证监会要求上市公司引入独立董事制度以来，其已有将近十四年的发展历程，发展阶段也从“合规性”阶段逐渐转为“有效性”阶段。在这个转变的过程中，关于独立董事制度的有效性成为学术界或者实务界的热议的话题。在实务界，由于《指导意见》的最初制定具有强制性，公司不能根据自身的实际需求来聘任独立董事，因而称独立董事为“花瓶”。在学术界，独立董事制度是公司治理研究领域的重点问题之一，但是现有经验证据并不统一甚至相互矛盾。因此需要以创新的视角来研究独立董事。 本文根据独立董事制度发展的实际，以自主性治理的视角来研究独立董事制度的有效性。选取2004年~2012年中国上市公司的数据为研究样本，采用面板数据处理方式，从自主性治理的角度实证检验了公司在独立董事制度建设过程中的自主行为对公司业绩的影响。实证结果表明，首先，董事会独立性正向自治与负向自治都不仅与公司账面绩效正相关，而且与公司的市场价值也存在正相关关系。其次，独立董事的薪酬激励会减缓董事会独立性自治程度对公司业绩的促进作用，即实证结果支持了合谋假说而非有效监督假说，即较高的独立董事薪酬没有让其发挥有效的监督作用，而是产生合谋的消极影响。这给予中国上市公司在制定独立董事薪酬方面提供了理论依据。最后，独立董事声誉会加强董事会独立性负向自治对公司业绩的促进作用，主要是加强负向自治对公司价值的促进作用。以自主性治理的角度进行研究，提供了关于独立董事制度有效性的全新认识，在理论和实践上均具有重要创新价值。
英文摘要：	There has been fourteen years since China Securities Regulatory Commission introduced independent director system, whose developing stage is from compliance to validity. During the transition, the validity of independent director system has been the buzz in the academic or practical circles. In the academic field, the formulation of “Guidance Advice” was mandatory at first, listed companies could not employ independent director according to their own needs, thus, the independent director was called “VASE”. In the practical field, The system of independent director is one of the important issues in the field of corporate governance, but the existing experimental evidence is not unified and even in contradiction with each other, , which needs to study in an innovative perspective. According to the practice of development of independent director system, this thesis focuses on independent director system in the perspective of voluntary governance. Based on quoted companies in 2004~2012 Chinese capital market, using panel data processing method, this paper does an empirical research on the impact of corporate voluntary behavior in the process of constructing the system of Independent Director on corporate performance in the perspective of voluntary governance. The results show that the degree of voluntary governance of the independence of the board of directors helps to improve corporate performance and it can not only increase the financial performance significantly, but also be advantageous to enhance firm value. In addition, the empirical outcome supports the hypothesis of conspiracy instead of valid supervision that the compensation motivation of independent director can slow down the effect that the degree of positive voluntary governance of the independence of the board of directors could promote corporate performance. This provides theory evidence for the listed companies in China in the aspect of formulating the compensation of independent director. Last but not the least, the negative voluntary governance helps improve company performance, especially the firm value. This paper provides a completely new understanding of the validity of independent director system in the perspective of voluntary governance and has essentially innovative value in theory and practice.
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