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论文编号：	7501
作者编号：	2120132475
上传时间：	2015/6/10 22:52:34
中文题目：	上市公司两职分离形式与企业绩效
英文题目：	The different forms of separation of listed companies and company performance
指导老师：	武立东
中文关键字：	分离；见习式分离；离职式分离；降职式分离；绩效
英文关键字：	separation；apprentice；departure；demotion；performance
中文摘要：	在最近的几十年里，众多知名公司破产事件的发生，让内部公司治理机制成为了焦点，也让人们真实地看到董事长与总经理两职设置问题对公司的重要性。学术界关于两职状态的研究大多是与公司绩效相关的，其相关的理论以委托代理理论、管家理论和资源依赖理论为主。但是，学者们在相关研究上并没有得出一个统一的结论，在中国甚至有研究表明两职状况对我国上市公司绩效基本是无法解释的，这就使得我国上市公司两职设置与绩效关系的研究陷入了一个困局。随着对两职设置研究的不断深入，最近有学者提出了对不同的分离形式进行区分并分别与公司的绩效相联系，这三种分离形式包括：见习式分离、离职式分离与降职式分离。这一研究是第一次对董事长与总经理分离形式的研究，也打开了一条关于董事长和总经理二元性研究的新路径。与国外对两职状态和公司绩效关系的研究相比，目前国内关于两职问题的研究多集中于两职合一和两职分离的不同效果上，没有对具体分离形式与公司绩效的关系做过相关研究。 综上，本文以2006年到2013年间中国上市公司为样本，通过实证研究对公司选择何时分离、如何分离及其对公司绩效的影响进行了研究。本文在研究时考虑了中国的情境，旨在通过结合我国企业的特点，分析两职分离三种形式对绩效的影响，希望能够为中国企业的公司治理以及管理上提供一些参考，有利于企业根据自身情况更好地做出决策。研究结果发现：在两职合一的公司中，绩效较好时发生两职分离会使公司的绩效下降，但是当公司绩效不好时，两职分离会使公司绩效提高。在三种分离形式中，降职式分离产生的董事长与总经理分离和当前公司绩效的交互作用对公司未来绩效的影响最显著。在三种分离形式中，降职式分离产生的董事长与总经理分离和当前公司绩效的交互作用对国有控股股东公司绩效的影响最显著，其次为离职式分离；降职式分离产生的董事长与总经理分离和当前公司绩效的交互作用对非国有控股股东公司绩效的影响最显著，其次为见习式分离。
英文摘要：	In recent decades, many bankruptcies of well-known companies let the internal corporate governance mechanism become the focus, and at the same time let people realize the importance of manager—chairman duality to the company. The academic researches about the duality are mostly related with corporate performance, and the related theories are given priority to with principal-agent theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory. However, scholars in this field don’t have a unified conclusion, studies even have shown that duality is unable to explain the performance of listed companies in China, this make the studies of relations between the duality and performance of listed companies fall into a dilemma. Along with the deepening of the researches on duality, there are some scholars introduce the different forms of separation and associate them with corporate performance respectively, the three forms of separation include: apprentice, departure, and demotion. This study is the first time to study the form of separation of chairman and general manager, and also open a new path to study the duality. Compare with the foreign studies of relation of duality and performance, domestic researches focus on the different effects on unity and separation, and don’t have done related research on specific separation to the performance. In conclusion, our sample for this study consists of all the Chinese listed companies, between 2006 and 2013. We research on when companies choose separation, how companies choose the forms of separation and their impact on the corporate performance base on empirical. When we do the research, we consider the situation of China, aiming to combine the characteristics of enterprises in China and analyze three forms of separation on performance. We hope we can provide some references on the corporate governance and management to China’s enterprises who can make better decisions according to their circumstance. The results find that: When a firm is performing well, separation of the CEO and board chair roles decreases firm performance, but when a firm is performing poorly, separation increases firm performance. The interactive effect of separation of the CEO and board chair roles with current firm performance on future firm performance is the strongest when the separation is a demotion. Seemly, the interactive effect of separation of the CEO and board chair roles with current firm performance on future firm performance is the strongest when the separation is a demotion for state-owned enterprise, followed by departure. The interactive effect of separation of the CEO and board chair roles with current firm performance on future firm performance is also the strongest when the separation is a demotion for non-state-owned enterprise, followed by apprentice.
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