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论文编号：	7496
作者编号：	2120132440
上传时间：	2015/6/10 21:42:51
中文题目：	公司治理对代理成本影响的实证研究——以2003-2013年上市公司数据为例
英文题目：	An Empirical Study of the Impact of Corporate Governance on Agency Cost---on Chinese listed company 2000-2013 of empirical data
指导老师：	郝臣
中文关键字：	委托代理理论；公司治理；代理成本；公司治理；治理要素
英文关键字：	principle agency theory; equity agency cost; corporate governance; governance elements
中文摘要：	上世纪30年代，Berle和Means提出所有权与控制权分离的观点后，代理问题成为中外学者研究的一个热点话题。经过实践与探索，公司治理成为解决代理问题的有效途径之一。1993年起，我国开始了公司治理机制的探索，到今天20余年的时间里，对我国公司治理机制的有效性进行考察是十分有必要的，因此本文就近十年的公司治理有效性进行研究，即研究我国上市公司建立的公司治理机制是否真正的达到降低代理成本、保护股东权益的效果。 本文以2000-2013年沪深两市15989个样本数据为研究对象，以资产周转率衡量股东与经理层之间代理成本即第一种股权代理成本、以其他应收款占总资产比例作为资金侵占指标量化控股股东与小股东之间代理成本即第二种股权代理成本，考察股权结构、运作机制、决策机制、监督机制、激励机制共12个经典公司治理因素对两种股权代理成本的影响。研究方法为首先利用最小二乘法分年度考察公司治理因素在短期内对两种股权代理成本的影响，然后通过面板数据回归方法从中长期视角考察新公司法颁布前后、股权分置改革前后、金融危机前后6个阶段以及全年份样本12个公司治理因素与代理成本之间的关系，最后通过滞后一期数据进行稳健性检验。 结果发现，股权集中度的提高可以在短中长期内都起到降低两种股权代理成本的作用；运作机制方面，董事会会议次数与第二种代理成本在中长期内呈现U型，监事会会议次数与第一种代理成本在短期内负相关、在中期内呈现U型关系，股东大会会议次数在短期中期内与第一种代理成本呈现U型相关，与第二种代理成本长期内负相关；决策机制方面，董事会规模在长期内与两种股权代理成本呈U型相关；监督机制方面，监事会规模与第一种股权代理成本的效果不显著，在中期与第二种代理成本呈现U型，独立董事比例对于两种股权代理成本起到相反的作用；激励机制对于降低股东与经理层之间的代理成本的效果更为显著，董事会持股比例、高管薪酬的增加可以有效降低的第一种股权代理成本、但高管持股比例的增加以及董事薪酬的增加却会增加第一种股权代理成本。根据分析结果，我们提出了相应的建议以及未来的研究方向。
英文摘要：	In the 1930s, Berle and Means put forward the view of the separation of ownership and control, the agency problem became a hot topic of research. Corporate governance became one of the effective ways to solve the problem of agency. Since 1993, our country began to explore the corporate governance mechanisms, so it is very necessary to explore the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. The paper, selecting Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market 15989 listed companies from 2000 to 2013, studies the relationship between 12 classical government elements and two kind of ownership agency cost, which one is the first equity agency cost between shareholders and managers measured by asset turnover, the other is the second equity agency costs between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders measured by receivables to total assets ratio as an index of capital occupation using the ordinary least square and panel data two econometric methods. The results show that equity concentration played the role of reducing two equity agency cost in the short and medium and long term. As to operating mechanism, the relationship between number of meetings of the board of directors and the second kind of agency costs is u-shaped in the medium term, number of meetings of the board of supervisors is negatively related to the first agency costs in the short term, number of shareholders' meeting is u-shaped relation with the first agency costs in the short term and has negative correlation with the second kind of agency cost in the long term. As to decision-making mechanism, the relationship between the size of the board and two types of equity agency costs show U shaped in the long term. As to supervision mechanism, the size of supervisory board size has no significant effect on the first kind of equity agency cost, but has U shaped relation with the second agency cost in the medium term, independent directors proportion has the opposite effect on two types of equity agency costs .As to incentive mechanism, the effect of reducing agency cost between shareholders and managers of is more pronounced; increasing board of directors shareholding and executive pay can effectively reduce the first kind of equity agency costs, but rising executive shareholding and directors pay can increase the first type of agency cost.
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