联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	7477
作者编号：	2120132372
上传时间：	2015/6/10 15:08:40
中文题目：	询价制度改革对IPO抑价影响的研究
英文题目：	A Study of the Impact of Book Building Reform on IPO Underpricing
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	询价制度改革;IPO抑价;投资者公平性问题
英文关键字：	Innovation of Book Building; IPO Underpricing; Fairness between Institutional Investors and Medium and Small Investors
中文摘要：	“IPO抑价”是指IPO的股票上市首日在二级市场的交易价格远高于发行价格的现象，我国IPO抑价率在世界资本市场中一直处于较高水平。在我国资本市场25年的发展历程中，IPO制度历经多次改革，其中2005年开始的“询价制”改革是我国新股定价迈向市场化的重要开端。因此，本文基于这一背景，探索“询价制”在2009年的第一阶段改革和2010年的第二阶段改革后，“IPO抑价”情况有无改善，并且在这过程中，有哪些改革的变量影响了IPO抑价，从而对改革的效果做出评价。 中小投资者在我国资本市场投资者中占有较大比例，因此在评价改革效果时，不仅要研究“IPO抑价”代表的定价效率，还应考虑机构投资者和中小投资者在价值分配中的公平性问题，只有中小投资者的公平得到保障，我国才有可能维持资本市场的有效状态。 因此本文主要研究了两个问题：第一，询价制度两阶段改革后，IPO抑价是怎样变化的，以及有哪些改革因素影响了IPO抑价；第二，询价制度两阶段改革后，机构投资者和中小投资者在价值分配中是否公平。 为了回答这两个问题，本文先从对IPO抑价的解释、政府监管与IPO抑价、询价制度改革与IPO抑价三个方面对国内外相关文献进行综述，再对我国发行准入制度、定价制度和配售制度进行梳理，最后在实证检验中使用了描述性统计、T检验以及多元线性回归的方法对询价制两阶段改革的样本进行研究，得出结论： 询价制第一阶段改革后IPO抑价有所降低，其中取消新股定价市盈率管制和促进询价对象竞争有助于降低IPO抑价，但是中小投资者在价值分配中所处的劣势地位没有改善；询价制第二阶段改革后IPO抑价也有所降低，其中网下中签率的提高有助于降低IPO抑价，但改革措施没有达到促进询价对象竞争的目的，而取消网下申购3个月限售期的规定对IPO抑价没有影响，中小投资者在价值分配中地位的变化没有得到验证。
英文摘要：	IPO Underpricing refers to the phnomena the first day prices of IPO shares are much higher than the market price of the secondary market. The average rate of IPO underpricing in China is also higher than that of most world capital markets. The IPO mechinsm has experienecd several reforms during its twenty-five-year development. The book building reform in 2005 marks the commence of marketalization of IPO pricing. On this background, a comment of the reform and a study of IPO underpricing rate and influential factors of IPO underpricing in first phase reform in 2009 and second phase reform in 2010 of the inquiry system reform are the aim of this paper. When veiwing the capital market reform in China, it is necessary not only to evaluate the efficiency of IPO pricing, but also the fairness in valve distribution for medium and small investors, because they represent a large proportion of capital market investors in China. Only when the fairness for medium and small investors is guaranteed, can the efficient state of capital market keep. Two problems are examined. First, after two phase of the book building reform, how the the IPO underpricing changes, and which are influential factorsof the IPO underpricing. Second, after two phase of the inquiry reform, does the fairness between institutional investors and medium and small investors realize. In order to answer these two problems, this article firstly makes a literature review of the interpretation of the IPO underpricing, the realtionship between government regulation and IPO underpricing, and the realtionship between the book building reform and the IPO underpricing. Then draw a summary of IPO entry mechnism, pricing mechnism and ration mechnism. The final part includes an empirical study, such as descriptive statistics, T test and multivariate linear regression, and the conclusion. The IPO underpricing decreased after the first phase of inquiry reform. The cancallation of PE ratio control in IPO and higher competition level of inquired objects contributes to the decrease of IPO underpricing, but the disadvantage position of medium and small investors in the value distribution did not improve.In the second phase of inquiry reform, IPO underpricing also reduced . The increase of lot winning rate and the improvement in the quality of inquired objects contributes to the decrease of IPO underpricing, but the reform failed to achieve a higher competition level of inquiry instituions. Additionally, cancellation of 3-month restricted period has no effect on IPO underpricing. The change of the medium and small investors in the value distribution status has not been verified.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)