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论文编号：	7459
作者编号：	2120132432
上传时间：	2015/6/10 10:09:11
中文题目：	风险资本、企业家两职兼任与公司投资行为——来自中国民营上市公司的证据
英文题目：	Venture Capital, CEO Duality and Company Investment Behavior: The Evidence from China''s Private Listed Companies
指导老师：	覃家琦
中文关键字：	风险资本；两职兼任；过度投资；投资不足
英文关键字：	Venture capital; CEO Duality; Over-investment; Under-investment
中文摘要：	对于中国的民营上市公司而言，企业家具有多重身份：创始人、最终控制人、大股东、董事长、CEO。特别是在中小企业中,两职兼任（董事长兼任总经理）的情况较为普遍。目前关于两职兼任是提升或者降低公司业绩的影响尚未得到学者们的一致结论，两者均获得一定的实证支持。公司业绩其实源于公司投资，因此作为理论的延伸和应用，本文进行初步地尝试，研究两职兼任与公司投资行为的关系。另一方面，近年来我国的风险资本机构迅猛发展，为我国的中小企业提供了新的资金渠道。在注入资金的同时，风险资本被寄予厚望，还能够带来优秀的管理和治理经验，参与企业经营和投资决策，能够在企业后续的人力资源管理、技术创新、市场开发等方面扮演重要的角色。我国的民营上市公司是风险资本的主要投资对象。因此，本文主要研究两职兼任对公司投资行为的影响，以及风险资本在前两者关系中的调节作用。本文选取了2005-2010年上市的505家中国民营上市公司作为研究对象，其中风险资本企业111家，非风险资本企业404家；两职兼任企业214家，CEO两职分离企业291家。采用Richardson(2006)模型预期企业的投资支出水平，然后将企业实际的投资支出水平与预期的投资支出水平的差额作为衡量企业投资水平效率的指标，差额大于0的为过度投资，差额小于0的为投资不足。实证研究发现，两职兼任能提高公司的过度投资水平，并且会增强自由现金流的过度投资水平，但是两职兼任会降低企业的投资不足水平。风险资本不能抑制两职兼任对公司过度投资的提高作用，但能加强两职兼任对投资不足的抑制作用。按照持股比例高低分组的实证结果表明，高持股比例的风险资本能够使得两职兼任抑制公司的过度投资，同时使两职兼任缓解投资不足的作用更加明显。
英文摘要：	For China's private listed companies, entrepreneurs have multiple identities: the founder, the ultimate controller, a major shareholder, chairman, CEO. Especially in SMES, CEO Duality the situation is more common. Whether CEO Duality enhance or reduce the impact of the company's performance has not yet been the unanimous conclusion of scholars, both of two views get some empirical support. In fact, corporate performance is directly related to investment behavior, so as to extend the theory and application, this paper preliminary attempt to study the relationship between CEO Duality and firm investment behavior. On the other hand, in recent years, China's venture capital organization develop rapidly, it provides new funding channels for China's SMEs. Venture capital is regarded as capital provider and one who also can bring good management and governance experience, and participate in business and investment decisions, play an important role in the enterprise subsequent human resource management, technological innovation, market development, etc. China's private listed companies are major investments objection of venture capitals. Therefore, the paper studies the effect of CEO Duality to the company's investment behavior, and what adjustment form venture capital. This paper selected 505 Chinese private listed companies what listed on 2005-2010 as the research sample, including 111 venture capital companies, 404 non-venture capital companies; 214 CEO Duality companies, 291 CEO and Board Chairman separated companies. Using Richardson (2006) model to calculate expected business investment spending levels, and then calculate the difference between the actual level of business investment spending and the expected level of investment spending levels as a measure of business investment efficiency indicators. The difference is greater than 0 as for over- investment; the difference is less than 0 as for under-investment. The empirical study shows that, CEO Duality can improve the level of over-investment, and will enhance over-investment level of free cash flow. However, CEO Duality can reduce the level of under-investment. Venture capital cannot reduce the influence of CEO Duality to over-investment but can enhance the effect between CEO Duality and under-investment. However, the empirical results of high stake and low stake groups show that when venture capital takes high-stake, CEO Duality can restrain company over-investment, while alleviate under-investment more obvious.
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