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论文编号：	7446
作者编号：	2120132373
上传时间：	2015/6/9 22:47:39
中文题目：	大股东掏空与盈余管理关系的实证研究
英文题目：	The Empirical Study of the Relationship Between Controlling Shareholder’s Tunneling and Earnings Management
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	大股东掏空；盈余管理程度；盈余管理方式
英文关键字：	Controlling Shareholder’s Tunneling; the Degree of Earnings Management; the Way of Earnings Management
中文摘要：	在中国，企业股权集中度高的特征非常明显，这给大股东掏空提供了机会，虽然在监管层面提出要求、企业对该问题整改后，有所好转，但是由于股权集中度高、控制权与现金流权分离的背景，大股东掏空行为依然普遍存在。而大股东掏空这一不好事件的发生，必然会给被控股公司造成负面影响，为了降低这种负面影响，被控股公司必然进行盈余管理。因此，本文研究内容为大股东掏空与盈余管理的关系，包括大股东掏空近年来的变化趋势、大股东掏空程度对盈余管理程度的影响、对盈余管理方式选择的影响。 本文在对大股东掏空和盈余管理现有研究成果总结归纳的基础上，结合第二类代理问题和信息不对称理论，提出研究假设：（1）随着打击力度的增大，我国上市公司大股东掏空行为是呈显著下降趋势的；（2）大股东掏空现象越严重，上市公司真实及应计盈余管理程度越大；（3）存在大股东掏空现象的公司，在盈余管理方式的选择上，更倾向于使用真实盈余管理。实证分两个层次进行，第一个层次为验证假设一，本文使用2006—2013年我国A股上市公司存在大股东掏空的公司作为样本；第二个层次为验证假设二和三，本文使用样本的时间范围为2010—2013年。为了验证假设，本文使用了均值T检验和多元线性回归的研究方法，从描述性统计和模型回归结果可以看出，假设一未得到验证，大股东掏空程度虽然是呈下降趋势，但是差异并不显著；假设二和假设三得到验证。最后，本文综合实证结果，结合我国目前资本市场特点，对企业以及监管部门提出了针对性建议。
英文摘要：	In China, the characteristic of the high concentration of corporate ownership is very obvious, which gives the controlling shareholder opportunity to tunnel the company. Although the situation is much better after the government regulatory agency taking stringent measures, the major shareholder’s tunneling behavior is still widespread because of the high concentration of ownership and the control rights and cash flow rights separation. Tunneling is a bad news, which will inevitably result in a negative impact. Due to the presence of asymmetric information, earnings management is the inevitable choice for controlling shareholder in order to reduce this negative effect. Therefore, this research is about the relationship between controlling shareholder’s tunneling and earnings management. Firstly, literature review is carried on, which is about tunneling, earnings management and the relation between tunneling and earnings management. Then on the basis of literature review and related theory, three hypotheses are put forward: (1) from 2006-2013 controlling shareholder’s tunneling is a downward trend; (2) when controlling shareholder’s tunneling phenomenon is more serious, the degree of true and accrued earnings management will be deeper; (3) among the companies which exist tunneling phenomenon, on the choice of the ways of earnings management, real earnings management is preferred. Empirical analysis is divided into two parts: the trend of tunneling and the relationship between tunneling and earnings management. In order to verify the trend of tunneling, we use the 2006-2013 A-share listed companies existing tunneling behavior as the sample, and the sample size is 4575. In order to verify the relationship between tunneling and earnings management, we use the 2010-2013 A-share listed companies as the sample. The sample size is 2326 after a screening process. In order to verify the hypotheses, we use the mean T-test and the multiple linear regression model, from the point of descriptive statistics and regression results, we can know that the first hypothesis is not verified (controlling shareholder’s tunneling is a downward trend, but not significant), but hypotheses two and three are verified. Finally, combined with the empirical results and the characteristics of the capital market in China, we put forward the suggestions for the companies and supervision department.
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