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论文编号：	7444
作者编号：	2120132385
上传时间：	2015/6/9 22:15:25
中文题目：	基于机会主义成因的成本粘性问题研究——来自中国A股上市公司的证据
英文题目：	Research of Cost Stickiness based on the Opportunism Theory——Evidence from China’s A Shares Listed Companies
指导老师：	王志红
中文关键字：	成本粘性；机会主义成因；公司治理
英文关键字：	Cost Stickiness; Opportunism Motivation; Corporate Governance
中文摘要：	近年来，我国经济下行的压力不断增大，要适应“中国经济新常态”下的公司经营业绩压力，成本管理与控制成为公司管理的重中之重。而成本粘性是公司进行成本管理必须考虑的一个方面，所以成本粘性是不容被忽视的。 在此背景下，本文从成本管理的视角出发，提出不同成因下产生的成本粘性应采取不同措施进行应对。基于前人的研究结论和我国企业管理现状，本文认为机会主义是成本粘性的主要成因。因此，本文以我国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本，将规范研究和实证研究相结合，对2007年-2013年间我国A股上市公司成本粘性的存在性、主要成因进行了实证检验。研究结果表明：（1）我国上市公司确实存在着成本粘性；（2）管理者的机会主义行为与成本粘性显著正相关，且机会主义动机是我国上市公司成本粘性的主要成因。 由于机会主义动机是成本粘性的主要成因，成本粘性的程度越大说明公司管理者自利行为越严重，越不利于业绩提升和企业价值最大化，故而需要通过一定的措施进行抑制。从管理者机会主义行为与代理问题、公司治理的关系考虑，本文认为通过良好的公司治理能够对机会主义动机下的成本粘性进行有效抑制，从而改善公司的成本管理能力、提升经营绩效。 为了对公司治理的好坏程度进行区分，本文利用主成份分析法为各企业的公司治理水平进行评分，在此基础上将样本分成公司治理好与公司治理差的两个组，分别检验在不同的公司治理水平下成本粘性是否存在差异，研究结果表明：公司治理能够对机会主义动机下的成本粘性起到显著的抑制作用。具体来说，公司治理水平高时，机会主义对成本粘性的作用被弱化了，而公司治理水平低时，机会主义与成本粘性之间的正相关关系更为显著。 本文的结论说明管理者的机会主义行为是导致我国上市公司成本粘性的主要原因，而加强公司治理能够在一定程度上限制管理者的机会主义行为，缓解代理矛盾，从而使成本粘性得到有效抑制。
英文摘要：	Recent years, the economic situation of China is very serious. Cost management and control is a very important aspect of the company management. And cost stickiness is an important part of the company's cost management, so the cost stickiness should not be neglected. Under the background of the academic and practical, the paper puts forward the viewpoint that different measures should be taken to deal with the cost stickiness under different causes. Based on the research conclusions of predecessors and the enterprise management status of China, this paper holds that opportunism motivation is the main cause of cost stickiness. So the paper chooses listed companies as research samples, combining normative research and empirical research, using the data in 2007-2013 to analyze the existence and the motive of cost stickiness. The results suggest that: (1) there is a cost stickiness phenomenon in China’s listed companies; (2) there is a positive association between manager’s opportunism behavior and cost stickiness, and the opportunism motivation is the main causes of cost stickiness in China. As opportunism motivation is the main cause of cost stickiness, the bigger the degree of cost stickiness, the greater the degree of the managers’ self-interest behavior. Then the cost control level of companies is lower, and the company’s performance will be affected. So some certain measures to suppress cost stickiness need to be taken. This paper argues that corporate governance can effectively suppress cost stickiness of the listed companies, thus the ability of cost management and business performance of the listed companies will be improved. In order to distinguish the stand or fall of corporate governance level, this paper uses principal component analysis method. Then the sample will be divided into two groups: the group of good corporate governance and the group of bad corporate governance. We test if there is a difference of cost stickiness under different corporate governance level. The results suggest that: corporate governance plays a significant inhibitory effect on cost stickiness. In particular, under the high levels of corporate governance, the role of opportunism to cost stickiness is weakened, and under the low levels of corporate governance, there is a more significant positive correlation between the opportunism and cost stickiness. The conclusion of this paper is that the manager’s opportunism behavior is the main cause of cost stickiness, and strengthen the corporate governance can limit the manager’s opportunism behavior and alleviate the agency conflict, so that the cost stickiness can be effectively suppressed.
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