学生论文
|
论文查询结果 |
返回搜索 |
|
|
|
| 论文编号： | 7436 | |
| 作者编号： | 2120132362 | |
| 上传时间： | 2015/6/9 21:57:55 | |
| 中文题目： | 内幕交易、分析师跟进与持续经营审计意见 | |
| 英文题目： | Insider Trading，Analyst following and Going-Concern Opinion | |
| 指导老师： | 张继勋 | |
| 中文关键字： | 内幕交易；持续经营审计意见；分析师跟进 | |
| 英文关键字： | insider trading; going-concern opinion; analyst following | |
| 中文摘要： | 上市公司高管内幕交易行为屡禁不止，致使广大投资者损失惨重。注册会计师独立性受到质疑，证券分析师行业发展良莠不齐，投资者信心受挫，这都对资本市场的健康发展产生巨大影响。作为新兴的资本市场，中国证券市场还存在一些发展弊端亟待解决，而证券分析师行业发展时间尚短，仍需予以关注，正确指导证券分析师行业发展，才能充分发挥证券分析师的市场作用。 本文旨在研究高管内幕交易行为是否会影响审计师发表持续经营审计意见。先前的研究表明，公司在收到持续经营审计意见后，市场会表现出负面反应。此时内幕交易行为更容易引发监管者的关注和投资者的诉讼。文章预期上市公司高管在进行内幕交易之后，为避免诉讼风险，有动机向审计师施压，以降低上市公司收到持续经营审计意见的可能性；而当分析师对上市公司进行盈利预测时，高管和审计师的行为可能会受到影响。本文主要采用两阶段回归的方法，对深沪A股市场上2009-2014年间共1343家具有财务困境的公司年度样本数据进行Logit回归，结果证明高管的内幕交易行为与上市公司收到持续经营审计意见之间存在负相关关系；进一步的研究表明，当存在分析师跟进时，分析师跟进数量越多，高管内幕交易与公司收到持续经营审计意见之间的负相关关系越强。由于分析师普遍存在乐观倾向，审计人员认为分析师倾向于跟进有发展前景的上市公司，导致审计师对上市公司持续经营审计意见产生误判。因此，分析师作为信息中介，虽然能够缓解证券市场信息不对称，但其信息准确性不高，同时监管作用未能有效发挥。据此，本文为规范证券分析师行业发展提供可行性建议，为揭露上市公司违规交易行为提供新渠道，并为提高审计质量提供新的研究思路。 | |
| 英文摘要： | The behavior of insider trading occurs frequently even though there are laws of prohibition. As a result, the general investors suffered great losses. The suspicion of independence of auditors and the mixed level of development of securities analyst make investors lose their confidence of capital market. As an emerging capital market, there are still some drawbacks to be solved in the Chinese capital market. For the short time of development of securities analyst, the society should pay more attention to it so that the analysts can play an important role on the capital market. The purpose of this paper is to research whether the insider trading of executives affects the likelihood of auditors issuing going-concern opinions. Prior research documents that the issuance of going-concern opinion triggers significant negative market reactions. And insider trading, especially selling, after bad news announcement are more likely to attract regulator’s scrutiny and investor’s trade-related lawsuits. Therefore, the paper predicts that after insider trading, executives have an incentive to put pressure on auditors to decrease the likelihood of receiving going-concern opinion and avoid the risk of litigation. On the other hand, when there are analysts following and earnings forecast, manager behavior might be affected. Based on the sample of the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2009 to 2014, this paper uses two-stage regression and logistic regression to analyze the hypothesis. The results indicate that the probability of receiving going-concern opinion is significantly negatively associated with the level of insider trading. Further study indicates that the negative association is more pronounced for firms with more analysts following. Optimistic tendency of analyst leads to wrong judgment of company’s going-concern ability. As information intermediary, analysts decrease the degree of information asymmetry, but the accuracy of forecast must be increase. The paper provides some feasible suggestions to regularize the development of securities market. | |
| 查看全文： | 预览 下载(下载需要进行登录) |