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论文编号：	7432
作者编号：	2120132381
上传时间：	2015/6/9 21:39:08
中文题目：	产权变更、高管激励与企业创新投入
英文题目：	Property Change, Executive Incentive and Innovation Input
指导老师：	陆宇建
中文关键字：	产权变更；高管激励；研发投入
英文关键字：	Property Change; Executive incentive; R&D
中文摘要：	企业创新能力的提升是国家创新能力提升的基础。近年来，虽然中国的经济增长速度一直处于世界领先地位，但真正的创新能力还有待提升。提高创新能力不仅是一个企业得以长期生存发展的必要手段，也是一个国家提升国际竞争力的重要途径。国有企业改革近年来一直是社会热议的问题，股权分置改革完成之后国有企业在改革的过程中不断通过减持或转让国家股将一部分国有企业的产权民营化，但就在这种大背景之下，市场上也不难看到民营企业被国有企业收购进而变为国有企业的例子，因此学术界也出现了对于近年来“国进民退”的现象进行研究的文献。因此本文从产权变更的视角聚焦这两类企业，以企业研发投入代替企业的创新能力，探索产权变更对企业研发投入的影响。 本文选取了2007-2012年间A股上市公司中有产权变更的企业作为研究样本，选取企业性质相同，但并购重组之后没有发生产权变更的企业为对照样本，研究了这些企业在产权变更前后企业的研发投入有何变化，同时研究了高管的短期薪酬激励和长期股权激励分别对于企业研发投入的影响，在此基础之上进一步探索了不同类型的产权变更对企业的高管激励对研发投入的影响有何不同。采用规范研究与实证分析相结合的方法，在对前人的研究结果进行回顾的基础之上，提出本文所要研究的三个假设，通过t检验，多元回归等方法对本文提出的假设进行检验。 实证研究结果发现：（1）从国有企业变为民营企业之后，企业在研发投入方面的变化要比没有产权变更的企业高，而从民营企业变为国有企业，企业在研发投入方面的变化与没有产权变更的企业没有显著差别；（2）高管的短期薪酬激励与长期股权激励都与企业研发投入呈正相关关系；（3）国有企业变为民营企业之后，股权激励对于研发投入的促进作用有所加强，民营企业变为国有企业之后，股权激励对于研发的促进作用有所减弱，而短期薪酬激励对于研发的促进作用在产权变更前后没有显著变化。本文的研究结果丰富了在产权变更领域方面的研究，对于认识产权变更作用，促进国有企业改革，以及完善产权变更企业的企业制度具有一定的参考意义。
英文摘要：	The enterprise's innovation ability is the foundation of the national innovation ability. In recent years, although China's economic growth has been in the leading position, but the real innovation ability needs to be improved. Improving the ability of the innovation is not only a necessary means to long-term survival and development of the enterprise, but also it is an important way to improve the international competitiveness of a state. In addition, the reform of the state-owned enterprises has been the social hot issues in recent years. After completion of reform of the shareholder structure, the state-owned enterprises transfer part of the property to privatization continuously through the underweight of state shares. But the in this background, in the market, it is not difficult to see the private enterprise purchased by state-owned enterprises. So there are also some literature to study the "guo jin min tui" phenomenon in the academic area. So this paper will focus on the change between these two kinds of enterprise. Using enterprise’s R&D to represent enterprise's innovation ability, trying to explore the effectiveness of the property changes to the enterprise’s R&D from the perspective of property rights changes. This article selects enterprises with property changes in the a-share listed companies from 2007 to 2012 as the research sample and select enterprises whose nature is the same with the research sample, but there is no property change after the merger as the comparison samples. We study how the enterprise's R&D change before and after the change of enterprise's property. At the same time with the we study the influence of short-term executive compensation incentive and the long-term equity incentive on enterprises’ R&D input. On this basis we further explore how different types of property changes influence the relation between the enterprise executive incentive the enterprises’ R&D. We combine the theoretical analysis and empirical analysis method, and review the previous research results, on this basis, propose three hypotheses of the study, using t test, multiple regression and other methods to test the proposed hypothesis. We mainly draw the following conclusions through our result: (1) For those enterprise which change from state-owned enterprises to private enterprises, the change of the enterprises’ R&D is higher than those which did not change the property; For those enterprise which change from private enterprises to state-owned enterprises, the change of the enterprises’ R&D has no significant difference with those which did not change the property; (2) Both the Executives’ short-term compensation incentive and the long-term equity incentive are positively related to enterprises’ R&D; (3) After the state-owned enterprises transform to private enterprises, the positive relation between stock ownership incentive and the enterprises’ R&D is strengthened and after the private enterprises transform to state-owned enterprises, the positive relation between stock ownership incentive and the enterprises’ R&D is weakened; the positive relation between salary incentive and the enterprises’ R&D has no significant changes before and after the change in property rights. This paper enriches the empirical research literature of the property right change field. And we can see the after property changes how enterprises’ R&D changes after the property changes, and furthermore, it points out change of the executive incentive role. It has certain reference significance for understanding the effect of the property right change, promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises, and improving the system of property right changed enterprise.
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