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论文编号：	7411
作者编号：	2120132353
上传时间：	2015/6/9 16:15:39
中文题目：	考虑消费者行为的低碳供应链中政府与企业决策策略研究
英文题目：	Study of the Government and Enterprises’ Decision Strategies of the Low Carbon Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Behavior
指导老师：	方磊
中文关键字：	低碳供应链；低碳偏好；完全静态博弈；动态演化博弈；MATLAB仿真
英文关键字：	Low carbon supply chain; Low carbon preference; Static game of complete information; Dynamic evolutionary game; MATLAB simulation
中文摘要：	“两会”召开期间，李克强总理在政府工作报告中明确指出，2015年要做好节能减排和环境治理工作，二氧化碳排放强度要降低3.1%以上。在企业绿色供应链发展中考虑“低碳”因素，实施低碳供应链生产运营，对于促进低碳经济的发展具有重要意义。以制造业为主的企业是低碳供应链构建的主体，以政府为代表的相关部门是企业实施低碳供应链的监管方，由于低碳技术的高成本，企业出于投机心理，会消极进行低碳生产，此时需要政府部门的有效监管和引导；随着消费者低碳意识的增强，由此产生的低碳消费行为将会对政府与企业之间的博弈策略选择产生重要的影响。在这样的背景下，本文对考虑消费者行为的低碳供应链实施中政府与企业的决策策略选择进行系统的研究，在回顾国内外学者关于消费者低碳消费行为以及低碳供应链实施中政府与企业的博弈研究现状基础之上，结合现实实际，通过设置相应的参数，分别构建了政府、企业与消费者三方主体之间的完全静态博弈模型和动态演化博弈模型，并对模型的稳定状态做出了重点分析，来研究三者决策策略选择之间相互作用的影响；其次，通过数值设定，模型仿真来验证了博弈模型的有效性以及博弈平衡点的演化稳定路径，最后，根据博弈研究的结果，分别从政府、企业、消费者三个主体的角度出发，对于低碳供应链实施的策略选择提出了合理的对策和建议。本文的主要创新点在于将消费者低碳偏好因素加入到政府与企业的博弈决策当中，分别建立了完全理性与有限理性情形下政府、企业与消费者三方的博弈模型；并给出了演化博弈的一般稳定均衡条件，通过MATLAB仿真验证了模型的有效性，分析了博弈演化过程中政府监管概率、企业实施低碳供应链比例与消费者选择低碳产品比例之间的相互影响以及博弈演化路径。
英文摘要：	During the "NPC and CPPCC", premier Li Keqiang clearly points out in his government work report that in 2015, we should do a good job of energy conservation and environmental governance, CO2 emission intensity should be reduced above 3.1%. Considering the "low carbon" factors in the enterprises of green supply chain development, the implementation of low carbon supply chain in the production and operation has an important significance for promoting the development of low carbon economy. Manufacturing enterprises are the main body of low carbon supply chain construction, governments as the representative of relevant departments are the supervisor of the implementation of low carbon supply chain, due to the high cost of low carbon technologies, out of speculation enterprises will be negative to low carbon production, in this time, we need government departments’ effective supervision and guidance; with the increased low carbon awareness of consumers, low carbon consumption behavior will have an important impact on the game between government and enterprise. In this background, on the basis of consumer behavior, this thesis makes the systematic research of government and enterprises decision strategies in the low carbon supply chain, based on the review of domestic and foreign scholars’ research, combined with the reality, by setting the corresponding parameters, this thesis constructs the three parties’ fully static game model and dynamic evolutionary game model between the government, enterprises and consumers, makes key analysis about the steady states of models to study the effects of the interaction between the three; secondly, through numerical setting and model simulation, this paper verifies the effectiveness of the model and some evolutionary stable paths of game equilibrium; finally, according to the game results, from the different aspects of the governments, the enterprises and the consumers, this article puts forward reasonable countermeasures and suggestions on how to develop the low carbon supply chains. The main innovation of the thesis is to add consumers’ low carbon preference factor into the game between government and enterprises to establish three party game model under the situations of complete rationality and limited rationality, and the article gives the general equilibrium stability conditions of the evolutionary game and by MATLAB simulation tests the model’s effectiveness, and analyzes the game evolution path and interrelationships between the probability of government regulation, the proportion of low carbon supply chain implementation of enterprises and the proportion of consumers choosing low carbon products.
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