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论文编号：	728
作者编号：	2120062043
上传时间：	2008/6/21 9:20:23
中文题目：	基于风险投资视角的创业企业治理
英文题目：	The Research on the Venture En
指导老师：	李亚
中文关键字：	风险投资;委托代理;创业企业;公<
英文关键字：	Venture Capital;Principal-Agen
中文摘要：	风险投资是一种向新兴的、迅速发展并有巨大增长潜力的企业提供股权投资以获取高资本收益的投资行为。风险投资作为一种创新型的投融资制度，不仅为促进高科技创业企业的发展起到了积极的作用，对于整个社会经济的发展也具有重要意义。深入研究风险投资过程中的委托代理关系是改革开放和社会主义市场经济的迫切需要。 创业企业也称风险投资企业，本文定义的创业企业指的是得到风险资本支持的企业，也就是风险投资对象的企业。创业企业的成功与否，很大程度上取决于其与风险投资家之间的委托代理关系的运行。 本文通过对风险投资家与创业家之间的委托代理关系的分析，得出由于信息不对称的存在，两个主体之间存在严重的代理风险，包括逆向选择和道德风险。在此基础上，研究了风险投资家如何通过对创业企业进行公司治理，充分降低其投资风险，并最终获得资本收益。本文首先研究了风险投资家与创业企业之间的公司治理问题，得出创业企业的治理问题实质上就是风险投资家与创业企业之间的责权利分配上的相互关系，包括投资工具的选择，控制权与所有权的分配。其次，对创业企业的内部治理机制进行了分析，认为创业企业的监控机制、激励机制和合作投资机制，都能有效地降低创业企业的代理风险，从而使得企业价值最大化。最后，研究了风险投资如何从创业企业成功退出，使风险投资家获得资本增值或降低其投资损失。 本文从风险投资的视角研究了创业企业的治理问题，在此基础上研究了我国风险投资与创业企业的治理现状，并提出了适合我国创业企业发展的建议和对策，从而完善了我国的风险投资体系。
英文摘要：	Venture capital is one of the investment vehicles that provide newly-emerging and fast developing enterprises with share investment, in order to reap high capital gains. As an innovative financing and investing system, venture capital plays an active role in the development to high-tech small and medium business, and has great significance on a nation’s economy. In the market-oriented economy, venture capital is a strong impetus to the development of market economy, so the in-dept research upon the principle-agent of the venture capital is indispensable. Venture enterprises, which are also called venture capital enterprises, refer to enterprises those benefit from venture capital. They are characterized with high risk and high returns. The venture enterprise, being successful or failed, mainly depends on the operation of principal-agent chain among venture capitalist and venture enterprise. Based on the analysis of the principal-agent relationship between venture capitalists and enterprises, the paper concludes the principal-agent problem becomes more serious under the information asymmetry condition. The agent risk consists of adverse selection and moral hazard. Then the paper does some research on how the capitalists reduce the invest risk and increase the revenue through the corporate governance of the venture enterprises. First, the paper analyzes the problem of the corporate governance between the venture capitalists and venture enterprises, suggests that the management of venture enterprises is fundamentally the assignment of responsibilities, rights and benefits among venture capitalists and venture enterprises. The content includes the choice of the financial instrument; the arrangement of the control rights and ownership. Second, the paper analyzes the internal governance mechanisms, concludes that the administration mechanisms, incentive mechanisms and the corporation of two participations will help the venture capitalists control risk and inspire the entrepreneur of the venture enterprises to fulfill the objective of firm value. The third, the paper analyzes the withdrawal mechanism of the venture capital in order to conclude how the capitalists get revenue and reduce the loss. After the analysis of the venture enterprises' corporate governance from the angle of venture capital, the paper contented the problem of China’s venture enterprises. Besides the lack of supporting from venture capital, the weakness of governance mechanisms by themselves is also influence the development of the enterprises. Relating to the reality of China, the paper proposes improving methods on governance environment, internal governance capability and withdrawal channel to enhance the survive capability of venture enterprises and improve the venture capital system in China.
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