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论文编号：	7268
作者编号：	1120110746
上传时间：	2015/6/4 10:04:12
中文题目：	企业应用众包模式创新的策略研究
英文题目：	Research on the Strategy of Enterprise’s Innovation with the Crowdsourcing Mode
指导老师：	侯文华
中文关键字：	众包模式；企业创新；诚信保障机制；损失规避；知识共享
英文关键字：	Crowdsourcing model; enterprises innovation; integrity safeguard mechanism; loss aversion; Knowledge sharing
中文摘要：	宝洁公司将传统商业模式转向“联发创新”的众包模式，突破创新瓶颈，获得高额利润，小米公司充分整合外界资源，利用发烧友的参与热情实现系统自动升级，以低价格高配置的产品获得巨大成功。由此看来，商业模式的创新对企业的发展起着至关重要的作用。而众包这一商业模式具有公开性、公平性、社会差异性、多元化等特点，能够快速、充分的整合企业内外部创新资源，并凭借其创新能力强、成本资源低、传播速度快、影响范围广等优势而颇受关注，鉴于众包模式的特点及优势，很多企业都在积极尝试采用该模式来实现核心竞争力、创新能力的提升及成本的降低等目的。众包模式的实施将对企业的研发、生产、销售等各个环节产生影响，它能以较低的成本、较快的速率、较高的质量集中群体大众的智慧和力量，解决企业仅依靠内部力量进行研发或技术创新时存在的风险高，耗资大，时效差等的问题，并有助于企业均衡协调内部和外部资源进行创新，提升企业核心竞争力，也有助于企业快速把创新思想变为现实产品与利润，在当今激烈的竞争环境下获得先机和优势。因此，企业应用众包模式实施创新的策略有待深入研究。有关众包模式的研究，国内外学者进行了大量的实验、实证和案例研究，综合分析，主要是从行为学和心理学角度对众包模式中参与者的行为动机、参与诚信及众包竞赛设计等方面进行了研究，但关于企业应用众包模式实施各项创新的策略研究还处于探索阶段。因此，基于委托代理、资源依赖、激励理论及博弈方法等相关理论知识对企业应用众包模式创新过程中各项决策的制定、措施的变革等作出了深入研究，具体工作如下： 1.研究了众包模式下参与双方的诚信交易问题。首先，通过分析各成员参与众包虚拟社区的动机，发现利益冲突会引起成员间欺诈现象的出现；其次，运用长期利益大于短期收益的机理，在惩罚机制模型构建的基础上，考虑了道德风险因素，应用博弈理论分别建立了诚信保障机制和信誉评价机制两种模型，以达到约束单方或双方交易中的欺诈行为，保障良好交易环境的目的；最后，分析比较了两种机制对众包参与成员各方收益的影响，结果表明：当解答者的努力水平确定时，诚信保障机制下解答者的收益总是大于信誉评价机制下的收益，当申诉费用过高时，信誉评价机制下解答者的收益总是大于诚信保障机制下的收益。 2.研究了众包模式下解答者存在损失规避心理影响企业创新的问题。针对解答者存在损失规避心理这一现象，运用博弈理论针对创意型和专业型两种创新竞赛分别构建了损失规避情况下的博弈模型，求得解答者的最优努力水平、发起者的最优奖金设定及发起者的最大收益，并将损失规避情况存在与否的结果进行了比较，结果表明：两种不同类型竞赛中解答者为了规避损失，都相应降低了努力水平，而发起者为了保障竞赛的持续进行并未降低奖金的设定。另外，考虑了损失规避逆转情况下参与者的行为决策，并与不存在损失规避情况下的值进行了比较，结果表明：两种不同类型竞赛中解答者因实现自我挑战，忽视物质奖励，反而提升了努力水平。 3. 研究了众包模式下企业创新过程中解答者服务质量低下的问题。众包模式多以众包竞赛的模式开展，其中解答者之间是竞争关系，彼此之间缺乏交流互动，造成了整体解答方案质量不高及资源浪费的问题。然而，构建虚拟社区促进解答者之间的知识共享行为能够提高众包竞赛模式效率、节约成本。因此，发起者设计合理的激励机制以促进解答者之间的知识共享行为是众包竞赛模式的重要研究问题。针对该问题，基于博弈方法设计了解答者知识共享的激励机制，建立了解答者之间的Nash博弈模型及发起者与解答者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型，求得解答者的最优努力程度、最优知识共享水平和双方的最大化收益。 4. 研究了企业研发创新能力不足的问题。企业R&D创新需要有效利用内外部创新资源，而众包模式能够充分挖掘和激发大众的智慧，助力企业R&D创新，已受到企业界的广泛重视。考虑R&D创新模式溢出效应的不同情况下，针对企业创新模式及其投入策略选择，以及众包竞赛模式下企业间完全竞争和合作时的决策问题，建立了相应的博弈模型，分析了企业的决策对R&D创新水平的影响。研究表明：较仅依靠内部资源的R&D创新（A策略）收益，企业通过设置合理的奖金并结合内部创新和众包竞赛模式（B策略）是占优策略；B策略下，企业间处于完全竞争或合作的状态时，溢出效应的不同对众包竞赛模式创新能力的贡献度造成了影响；此外，企业收益、R&D创新水平、消费者剩余及社会福利均与众包竞赛模式的贡献度正相关。 5. 研究了企业销售滞缓的问题。随着网络的发展，大众成为创新的主流，众包模式凭借携手用户协同创新的理念迅速崛起。通过对iStockphoto、P&G、Threadless等众包案例的研究发现，众包模式有助于企业的营销创新，该模式的采用将影响企业激励措施的实施、产品的定价和营销的手段等。另外，企业通过众包参与人与一般用户的互动来传播、共享产品的信息，从而树立营销口碑，并通过用户反馈改善产品、扩大销售渠道。针对该现象，考虑当新产品具有信息差距时，分别构建了批量销售、边际销售、团购销售、预购销售、推荐销售五种营销模式下的优化模型，研究不同营销策略下企业的最优激励措施、产品的最优定价策略等问题。最后，对于众包模式下参与双方的诚信保障问题、企业R&D研发创新和营销模式创新的问题分别给出了猪八戒网站、宝洁公司等的具体案例分析，对于解答者存在损失规避心理、资源创新能力匮乏的问题给出了具体算例分析，并通过相应结果分析阐述了其管理学意义，使其更贴近实践，更容易理解。
英文摘要：	P&G has to change business mode to the "the development innovation"of crowdsourcing mode, the aim to breakthrough the bottleneck and obtain high profits. Millet mobile phone with the low-price and high-profile products has a great success，because it can fully integrate external resources and use of enthusiasts participation to realize the system automatically upgraded. So business model innovation plays an important role in the development of the enterprises. Specially, crowdsourcing business model has the characteristics of openness, fairness, social difference, diversity which able to quickly and fully integrated enterprise internal and external innovation resources. The model also can focus the public wisdom and strength of the group to solve the innovation problems which only rely on internal forces of enterprise for R&D or technological innovation through lower costs, faster speed, higher quality. In view of the characteristics and advantages of the crowdsourcing model, many enterprises are actively trying to use the model to realize the core competitive ability, innovation ability promotion and cost reduction. In addition, the model not only can balance the coordination of internal and external resources to innovate of enterprises and can enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises, but also it can help companies rapidly turn innovative ideas into reality products and profits. The advantages of this model can help companies access to opportunity and advantage in today's competitive environment. Therefore, the enterprises apply the crowdsourcing model to implement innovative strategies will need further research. Scholars have done a lot of experiments, empirical and case studies about the crowdsourcing model. However, We find these studies which include motivation of participants, the integrity and crowdsourcing contest design mainly from the perspective of behavior and psychology. In addition, few studies research to the strategy of enterprise application the crowdsourcing mode innovation. So we study this issue based on the knowledge and methods: principal-agent theory, resource dependence theory, incentive theory and game theory. The specific research work in this chapter are as follows: 1.In this text, we have studied the problem of the integrity of the transaction between the participants in crowdsourcing model. Firstly, by analyzing the members’ participation motivation and interest in virtual community, we spot the fraud motivation of participants. Secondly, based on the principle that long-term interests weigh more than short-term gains and the sanctioning mechanism model, we contend that design integrity safeguards mechanism and reputation evaluation mechanism, and using the game theory method we establish game model of integrity safeguards mechanism and reputation evaluation mechanism respectively which considering the moral hazard. The purpose is to employ the two mechanisms to constraint unilateral or bilateral fraud and to ensure good trading environment. Thirdly, through the two mechanisms’ comparative analysis, the study shows that the profits of solver are always greater in integrity safeguard mechanism than in reputation evaluation mechanism when the level of solver’s effort has been offered. However, the profits of solver are always greater in reputation evaluation mechanism than in integrity safeguard mechanism when the cost of appeal is too high. 2.In this text, we have studied the problem of loss aversion which affect enterprise innovation in crowdsourcing model. Firstly, to solve the phenomenon of loss aversion problem, we develop two game models for idea contest and expertise-based contest respectively . In addition, we got the solutions of solvers’ effort level and the sponsor’s award amount. Secondly, for these two kinds of innovation contests, we made a comparison of the solutions of the game models considering loss-aversion and the results of the models without loss aversion. The comparison indicated that the solvers’ effort levels of the two different types of innovation contest were reduced accordingly due to their avoid losses preference, while the sponsor could not reduce the award amount in order to ensure the continuity of the contest. Thirdly, we considered the behavior of participants in the decision-making under loss aversion reversed and made a comparison of the solutions of the game models with the results of the models without loss aversion. The comparison indicated that the solvers would ignore material reward because of achieving self-challenge and their effort levels were increased in the two different types of innovation contest. 3. In this text, we have studied the problem of solver’s poor quality of service which affect enterprise innovation in crowdsourcing model. In crowdsourcing contest, the solution providers (solvers) compete with each other to win the contest award, thus there is limited knowledge sharing among them. Knowledge sharing in crowdsourcing contest can improve the efficiency of solving problem and reduce the cost. So how to design a mechanism to promote the knowledge sharing in crowdsourcing contest is an important research question. For solving this problem, firstly, this text designs an incentive mechanism to improve knowledge sharing based on game theory. Secondly, we respectively improve the Nash game model among solvers and Stackelberg game model between seekers and solvers. Thirdly, we obtain the optimal level of effort and knowledge sharing, and get the maximizing revenue. 4. In this text, we study the problem of shortage of the research and development of enterprise innovation ability. Enterprises' R&D innovation require effective use of internal and external resources. As a new mode of innovation, crowdsourcing contest has drawn a widely public attention due to its full use of the public intelligence for enterprises' R&D innovation. Considering the existence of spillover effects, we developed a game model to analyze the optimal innovation mode and enterprises’ investment policy. When crowdsourcing contest is selected, we further discuss the corresponding decisions under conditions that the relationship of enterprises is competitive or cooperative, and analyze the influence of these decisions on R&D innovation. The result shows that, when a reasonable bonus was set, the strategy that combining use of internal innovation and crowdsourcing contest innovation (B strategy) was better than that solely relying on the internal innovation (A strategy). Given B strategy, the effect of different spillover will affect the level of R&D innovation of crowdsourcing contest mode under both competition and cooperation situation. Meanwhile, the contribution of the crowdsourcing contest is positively related to many factors, such as enterprise income, the level of R&D innovation, consumer surplus and social welfare. 5. In this text, we study the problem of the enterprise sluggish sales. With the development of the network, the public have become the mainstream of innovation, crowdsourcing model has rapidly rise because of the collaborative innovation concept. This text found that crowdsourcing model not only can be applied to R&D innovation, it can also be implemented marketing innovation by Gospotcheck, IStockphoto, P&G, Threadless and other crowdsourcing case. However, the application of crowdsourcing model in enterprises’ marketing will affect the enterprises’ incentive measures, product pricing and sales mode. Enterprises can spread and share the product information through participating the crowdsourcing, interacting with the general users, and establish a oral marketing. In addition, enterprises can also get the product feedback information from the users and external sales channels. Aiming to study the enterprise’s the optimal incentives under different marketing strategy, product, the optimal pricing strategy and other issues, we respectively construct five optimization models which include bulk sales, marginal sales, buy sales, pre-order sales, recommended sales. Finally, we give the case analysis of "zhubajie", "P&G" and the numerical examples for illustrating the effectiveness of the model for the five problems. The aim to provide a theoretical guidance for the success of crowdsourcing contest.
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