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论文编号：	7246
作者编号：	1120110743
上传时间：	2015/6/3 15:15:47
中文题目：	运营中断风险下制造商风险转移和供应链风险分担策略研究
英文题目：	Research on risk transfer of manufacturer and risk-sharing strategies in supply chain with business disruption risk
指导老师：	李勇建
中文关键字：	供应链中断；成本分摊激励；风险转移；融资援助；生产/产能恢复
英文关键字：	Supply Chain Disruption; Cost-sharing Incentive；Risk Transfer；Financial Assistance；Production/Capacity Restoration
中文摘要：	全球化、外包、追求高效等使得供应链越来越复杂，而近几年突发事件又频繁发生，导致企业生产与运营的中断，甚至致使全球供应链处于瘫痪状态，故供应链中断管理受到了业界和学术界的广泛关注。实践中，各种运营和风险管理工具被应用于中断风险的管理和应对，比如多供应商采购、应急（后备）生产或供应、库存管理、保险购买等。此外，随着供应链之间竞争的加剧，供应链企业之间合作共同分担、应对中断风险成为一种趋势。在此背景下，本文采用博弈论、运筹学、保险学、金融学等理论和方法，考虑制造商的生产恢复特点、资金约束、银行风险偏好等，研究了制造商购买营业中断保险和贸易信用保险转移运营中断风险，以及供应链上零售商如何采用融资援助和成本分摊激励分担中断风险，并分析了不同策略组合下，制造商的运营中断风险应对以及零售商的策略选择问题。最后，本文还探讨了中断风险下零售商是否可以通过合同制定缺货惩罚协调供应链的问题。具体讲，本文主要研究了以下几个方面的内容： 1） 运营中断风险下制造商购买保险和融资研究首先，研究了制造商购买营业中断保险转移突发事件造成企业生产中断造成的利润损失风险。构建了生产中断情况下制造商的生产恢复以及营业中断保险赔偿模型，考虑中断事件发生后，制造商组织生产恢复的同时可以采用后备生产以降低收益损失，研究了四种情况下，即未购买保险（基本策略）、购买保险（保险策略）、后备生产（后备生产策略）、既购买保险又进行后备生产（混合策略），制造商的保险购买、生产恢复、后备生产等决策，进一步对比了不同策略下制造商策略选择和最优决策。研究发现如果保险费率高于中断概率，制造商不会购买保险。此外，如果制造商以利润损失最小为目标，混合策略是最优策略；如果以生产恢复最快为目标，营业中断保险策略最好。营业中断保险的购买可以提高制造商的生产恢复努力水平，进而缩短生产恢复时间，而后备生产能够降低制造商的利润损失，但却会降低制造商的生产恢复努力水平。然后，考虑制造商因为赊销而面临资金中断风险和资金约束问题，可以通过购买贸易信用保险转移资金中断风险，通过向银行贷款解决资金约束，采用Stackelberg博弈理论和前景理论，研究了制造商的贸易信用保险购买和融资决策以及不同风险偏好下银行的利率决策。研究发现损失规避银行的利率等于或大于风险中性银行制定的利率且贸易信用保险不仅可以保证制造商增大生产和销售，而且能够极大的降低资金中断风险。制造商和银行都从贸易信用保险的购买中获益。但是与人们的直觉相反，贸易信用保险的购买并不一定能够帮助制造商获得较低的利率，因为贸易信用降低了制造商违约风险，逐利的银行会为了获得更高的利润而提高利率。 2) 运营中断风险下预防性投资和产能恢复成本共担研究考虑制造商可以通过事前预防和事后应对的方式管理中断风险，即在突发事件发生前进行预防性投资以降低突发事件对其生产能力的影响，而突发事件一旦发生，则进行生产能力恢复努力，研究了零售商分摊预防性投资和分摊产能恢复努力成本两种激励策略下，制造商的预防性投资和产能恢复决策和零售商的分摊比例决策以及策略选择问题。研究发现与无任何激励策略相比，预防性投资激励策略可以提高制造商和零售商的期望利润，而产能恢复激励策略会提高制造商的期望利润，但并不一定对提高零售商的期望利润有帮助。此外，当产能恢复系数都非常低时，大多数情况下制造商和零售商的策略选择不同；当产能恢复系数较大时，大多数情况下，预防性投资激励策略是双赢的策略，即制造商和零售商都愿意采用预防性投资激励策略。 3) 运营中断风险下融资援助和供应链协调研究考虑零售商通过事前契约惩罚迫使制造商进行生产恢复以降低由缺货而造成的利润损失，或突发事件发生后通过贷款给面临资金约束制造商的方式进行融资援助，帮助其进行生产恢复，研究了不同策略下双方的最优决策和策略选择问题。研究发现当制造商资金充足时，缺货惩罚可以有效的促使制造商进行生产恢复，但是当制造商存在资金约束时，融资援助和缺货惩罚同时采用对制造商和零售商都有利。制造商面临生产中断风险时，可以通过制定缺货惩罚系数实现供应链协调。此外，发现集中决策下的最优交货量小于集中决策下的最优交货量，而且集中决策下的缺货惩罚也低于分散决策下的缺货惩罚。
英文摘要：	Globalization, outsourcing, the pursuit of efficiency makes the supply chain more and more complex. In recent years, the frequent occurrence of unexpected events leads to disruption of production and operation of enterprises, and even results in paralysis of global supply chain, so the supply chain disruption management has received wide attention in the industry and academia. In practice, a variety of operations and risk management tools are applied to manage and treat disruption risk, such as multi-sourcing, emergency (backup) production or sourcing, inventory management, insurance etc.. In addition, as the competition between supply chains intensifies, cooperating between enterprises in supply chain to cope with the disruption risk has become a trend. Under this background, considering the manufacturer's production recovery, capital constraints and bank’s risk attitudes, this dissertation uses game theory, operations research, insurance, finance and other theories and methods to study how the manufacturer purchases business interruption insurance and trade credit insurance to transfer operation interruption risk, and how the retailer in supply chain use financing assistance and cost sharing incentive to share disruption risk with the manufacturer. Finally, strategy selection problem is investigated from the manufacturer and the retailer’s perspective. This dissertation also discuss how to achieve supply chain coordination through quantity-discount contract with non-delivery penalty in the presence of disruption risk. Specifically, this dissertation mainly studies the following contents: 1) Research on insurance purchase and financing in the presence of business disruption First, purchasing business interruption insurance to transfer profit loss risk from production disruption is studied. After a disruption, the manufacturer exerts efforts to recover production and may use backup production, while the insurance company compensates the profit loss of the manufacturer based on BI insurance policy. Considering the uncertainty of the production cost in the recovery process, a model with a production recovery and insurance compensation is established to investigate four strategies, namely, basic strategy (no BI insurance), BI insurance strategy (purchasing BI insurance), backup production strategy (backup production), and mixed strategy (integration of BI insurance and backup production). The manufacturer’s decisions of insurance purchase, production recovery and backup production are characterized before the strategy preference is analyzed. Our study finds that the manufacturer does not purchase the BI insurance if the probability of a disruption is lower than the premium rate. The BI insurance strategy is the best one if the goal of the manufacturer is to minimize the recovery time. However, if the manufacturer seeks the minimum profit loss, the mixed strategy dominates all other three strategies. The use of BI insurance does always result in a high effort level, which indicates that BI insurance and ex post operational measures are complements. Backup production reduces the manufacturer’s profit loss but slows down the production recovery. Second, the manufacturer who allows customers to delay payment for goods already delivered purchases trade credit insurance to transfer and reduce capital disruption risk and borrows money from a bank to accommodate the capital constraint problem. The Stackelberg game and loss-averse theory are used to investigate the optimal insurance coverage and total sales of the manufacturer. Subsequently, the interest rate decision of the bank under different risk-averse situations is also characterized. The study find that the interest rate set by a loss-averse bank is equal to or greater than that given by a risk-neutral bank. The use of trade credit insurance can help the manufacturer expand sales and dramatically reduce its default risk. Both the bank and the manufacturer are better off due to the use of trade credit insurance, but contrary to what one might expect, the bank prefers giving a higher interest rate to the manufacturer when the premium rate is in a reasonable region, which indicates that the manufacturer cannot use the insurance to negotiate better financing terms. 2) Research on prevention investment and cost sharing in the presence of business disruption The manufacturer can invest in prevention to reduce the impact of disruption on capacity and can exert effort to recover capacity destroyed by disruption, while the retailer may offer cost sharing incentive in two ways: sharing prevention investment, which is called prevention investment incentive, or sharing capacity recovery cost, which is called capacity recovery incentive. After investigating the manufacturer’s prevention investment decision and capacity recovery decision as well as the retailer’s cost sharing rate decision under different cost sharing incentive strategies, we find that comparing with the situation where there is no any incentive, prevention investment incentive can enhance the profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer, but the capacity recovery incentive may just benefit the manufacturer. If the capacity recovery coefficient is very low, in most cases the manufacturer and the retailer have different incentive preferences; if the capacity recovery coefficient is high, in most situations prevention investment incentive is a win-win strategy. 3) Research on financial assistance and supply chain coordination in the presence of business disruption As part of the procurement contract, the buyer can set up a penalty term, preventing the profit loss caused by the supplier’s delivery shortage. Once a supply disruption happens, if the manufacturer who exerts efforts to recover his production suffers from capital constraint, the buyer can offer financial assistance to the supplier by loaning money to the supplier. we study the manufacturer and the retailer’s optimal decisions, as well as the supply chain coordination problem, and find that when the supplier has sufficient capital, demanding a penalty for the supply shortage is effective in ensuring the supplier to resume production. However, when the supplier is capital constrained, using a single penalty term is not effective; instead, the buyer can manipulate a mixed strategy by demanding a penalty on any supply shortage and at the same time offering financial assistance to the supplier. Supply chain can be coordinated by setting non-delivery penalty. Furthermore, the optimal delivery quantity and unit penalty under centralized decision-making are less than that under decentralized decision-making.
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