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论文编号：	7242
作者编号：	1120110781
上传时间：	2015/6/3 13:18:26
中文题目：	PP冲突对中国民营上市公司非效率投资的影响研究——基于战略决策资本中介效应的分析
英文题目：	The Study on the Influence of PP Conflict on Chinese Private Listed Companies’ Inefficient Investment——Based on the Mediating Effect of Strategic Decision Capital
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	PP冲突；非效率投资；战略决策资本；战略决策机制；IPO超募资金
英文关键字：	PP conflict; inefficient investment; strategic decision capital; strategic decision mechanism; IPO super raising funds
中文摘要：	中国民营上市公司一般处于由创始人控股股东主导向专业管理机制主导的转型阶段，非效率投资问题一直以来都是关系民营上市公司在能够顺利转型，进入快速成长阶段的关键战略问题。非效率投资研究的主流理论融资约束理论、自由现金流假说以及新近发展的行为金融学视角，均基于英美模式分散型股权结构下PA冲突主导公司治理的制度情景。相对成熟完善的外部治理机制，能够有效保护英美模式下的股权利益，进而形成了分散型股权结构在英美模式下普遍存在的特点。在这种情况下，股东和经理人之间的PA冲突成为了英美模式公司治理的核心矛盾。然而在典型新兴经济特征的中国情境下，弱式的外部治理环境缺乏有效保护中国民营上市公司创始人股权利益的机制，由此民营上市公司一般采用集中股权的形式替代弱式的外部治理机制，对创始人控股股东股权利益加以保护。创始人控股股东集中股权的自我保护行为诱发了其与中小股东之间的PP冲突，由此PP冲突代替了英美模式的PA冲突，成为了集中型股权结构下中国民营上市公司治理的核心矛盾。公司治理核心矛盾的差异在一定程度上降低了源于英美模式PA冲突主导形成的融资约束理论、自由现金流假说以及行为金融学视角的研究结论，对于PP冲突主导的中国民营上市公司非效率投资问题研究解释力度。鉴于此，基于典型新兴经济特征的中国情景下，研究作为公司治理核心矛盾的PP冲突形成中国民营上市公司非效率投资的影响机制，将是一个十分有意义的研究议题。 本文遵循非效率投资主流研究理论融资约束理论、自由现金流假说以及行为金融学视角下以战略决策为基础探讨非效率投资问题的研究思路，以作为中国民营企业进行上市融资首选渠道的中国创业板市场为样本来源。鉴于中国创业板IPO超募现象形成了公司巨额的自由现金流，极大地考验着民营上市公司战略决策的有效性，进而极易诱发公司非效率投资的问题，因此创业板IPO超募资金的出现，为本文以战略决策为基础考量PP冲突形成非效率投资的过程提供了十分丰富和便利的样本条件。鉴于此，本文选取了IPO超募现象较为严重的2009年10月~2012年10月在创业板上市的民营上市公司为样本公司，以样本公司2009年~2013年的股权结构数据、财务数据、公司治理数据，分析了创始人控股股东和作为中小股东代表的战略投资者主体风险资本之间的PP冲突形成民营上市公司非效率投资的影响机制。 本文综合借鉴融资约束理论、自由现金流假说以及行为金融学视角下以战略决策为基础的研究思路，以委托代理理论和资源依赖理论为理论基础，结合以往关于新兴经济情境下PP冲突的研究成果，提出和构建了战略决策资本模型，测度中国民营上市公司战略决策能力的资源基础，并以战略决策资本模型为基础系统分析了创始人控股股东和作为中小股东代表的战略投资者主体风险资本之间的PP冲突，通过战略决策资本形成战略决策机制，从而影响中国民营上市公司非效率投资程度的作用机制。 本文的主要研究结论如下： 第一，处于典型新兴经济特征的中国情景下，民营上市公司的创始人普遍采用集中股权的形式规避弱式的外部治理机制不能有效保护股权利益的问题。创始人控股股东通过集中股权和战略决策权力的形式，对民营上市公司的战略决策实施强有力的控制，以此保护自身股权利益。然而创始人控股股东集中股权和战略决策权力的行为，同时还为其侵占其他中下股东利益提供了巨大的动力和能力，由此形成了创始人控股股东和中小股东之间的PP冲突代替了英美模式分散型股权结构下的PA冲突，成为中国民营上市公司治理的核心矛盾。 第二，本文提出了战略决策资本模型，考量中国民营上市公司PP冲突主导下的战略决策能力的资源基础。战略决策资本模型的构建基于委托代理理论和资源依赖理论的融合，考察了作为中国民营上市公司战略决策主体的董事会中，由于受托对象的PP冲突形成的董事之间效用目标异质情况下，公司战略决策能力的资源基础。战略决策资本中代表创始人控股股东利益的董事形成的创始人资本，和代表风险资本利益的董事形成的外部董事资本之间即存在相互排斥，又具有相互依赖的特点，这两类资本共同构成了中国民营上市公司的战略决策资本。即随着创始人控股股东持股比例的提升，其追求公司战略决策权力的动机会驱使其不断提高创始人资本在战略决策资本中的主导地位，并且还会不断削弱外部董事资本对战略决策资本的影响，以此保证创始人控股股东对创业板民营上市公司战略决策的主导地位；出于保护股权利益的动机，随着风险资本持股比例的提升，创业板民营上市公司的外部董事资本水平会不断增强，以此制衡创始人资本对战略决策资本的主导和控制；尽管出于PP冲突的驱使，创始人控股股东会保证创始人资本在战略决策资本中的主导地位，然而当创始人资本处于较低水平时，创始人控股股东还是会在一定程度上降低创始人资本对战略决策资本的主导程度，以此提升外部董事资本对战略决策资本的资源供给作用，保证民营上市公司获得足够的战略决策能力资源基础。 第三，当面对IPO超募资金形成的巨额自由现金流时，民营上市公司战略决策资本水平的提高会强化其应对IPO超募资金的战略决策能力，进而有效降低了民营上市公司的非效率投资程度。在这一过程中，创始人控股股东追求战略决策权力的行为通过其不断强化创始人资本在战略决策资本中的主导地位而形成的，然而创始人控股股东强化创始人资本主导地位的行为，会不断降低公司战略决策资本的整体水平，削弱了战略决策资源供给机制对民营上市公司战略决策能力的资源供给水平，从而随着创始人CEO权力的不断提升，民营上市公司面对巨额IPO超募资金时的非效率投资程度会被不断加剧。来自风险资本所形成的外部董事资本是形成民营上市公司战略决策监督机制的资源基础，外部董事资本的提高，能够促进董事会有效监督创始人CEO权力的活动范围，进而降低了民营上市公司非效率投资的程度。 第四，战略决策资本在PP冲突与民营上市公司的非效率投资关系中发挥中介效应，即随着创始人控股股东和作为战略投资者主体的风险资本之间PP冲突强度的不断提高，民营上市公司的战略决策资本会不断得到强化，从而提升了公司面对巨额IPO超募资金时的战略决策能力，进而降低了民营上市公司的非效率投资程度。
英文摘要：	Chinese private listed companies are generally at the stage of transition from the founder controlling shareholder’s domination to professional management mechanisms domination. During this period, inefficient investment has always been the key strategic issue related to whether private listed companies are able to go through the transition smoothly to enter the stage of rapid growth. The mainstream theories of inefficient investment research like financing constraint theory, free cash flow hypothesis and the newly developed perspective of behavioral finance are all based on PA conflict of the dispersed ownership structure under the Anglo-American model leading corporate governance system. Relatively perfect mature external governance mechanism can effectively protect the interests of the equity under British and American mode, thus form the characteristics of the dispersed ownership structure which are common in British and American mode. In this case, the PA conflict between shareholders and managers becomes the core contradiction of corporate governance under Anglo-American model. However, in Chinese typical emerging economic characteristics situation, the weak type external governance environment is lack of effective mechanism of protection on Chinese private listed companies’ founder equity interests. Therefore, the private listed company usually takes the form of concentrated equity instead of the weak external governance mechanism to protect founder controlling shareholder’s equity interests. Founder controlling shareholder’s concentrated equity self-protection behaviors induce with PP conflict between it and small or medium shareholders. This kind of PP conflict instead of the Anglo-American model of PA conflict becomes the core conflict under concentrated ownership structure of Chinese private listed company governance. Core contradictory differences of corporate governance, from the conclusion of PA dominant form of financing constraints theory originated from Anglo-American model, free cash flow hypothesis and the perspective of behavioral finance, to a certain extent, reduce the inefficient investment research explanation of Chinese private listed companies with the domination of PP conflict. In view of this, basing on the typical emerging economic characteristics of Chinese situation, the research of the influence of PP conflict, the core corporate governance problem, forming the inefficient investment mechanism of Chinese private listed companies will be a very meaningful research subject. This study follows the mainstream of inefficient investment theory like financing constraints theory, free cash flow hypothesis and perspective of behavioral finance, basing on the strategic decision to discuss the problem of inefficient investment and taking Chinese GEM market, the listing finance channel preferred by Chinese private enterprises, as the sample source. As super raise phenomenon of Chinese GEM IPO forming the companies’ vast amounts of free cash flow greatly tests the effectiveness of private listed companies’ strategic decision, the emergence of the GEM IPO super raise funds provides the inefficient investment process basing on strategic decision to measure PP conflict, with a quite rich and convenient sample condition. Given this, the paper selects Chinese private listed companies listed on the GEM from October 2009 to October 2012 taking serious IPO super raise phenomenon as samples, with the sample companies’ equity structure of data, financial data, corporate governance data from 2009 to 2013 to analyze the influential mechanism of private listed companies’ inefficient investment formed by PP conflict between the main venture capital of founder controlling shareholder and the representative of the small and medium-sized shareholders. This paper comprehensively uses the research theory of strategic decision basing on financing constraints theory, free cash flow hypothesis and perspective of behavioral finance for reference, considering principal-agent theory and resource dependency theory as the theoretical basis and combining with previous research achievements about emerging economic situation PP conflicts, to put forward and form the strategic decision capital model as well as measure the resource basis of Chinese private listed companies’ ability of strategic decision. Besides, this paper, on the basis of strategic decision capital model, analyzes the PP conflict of risk capital between founder controlling shareholder and strategic investors as the representative of small and medium-sized shareholders, to form strategic decision mechanism through strategic decision capital, thus influencing the mechanism of action of Chinese private listed companies’ inefficient investment level. In this paper, the main research conclusions are as follows: First, in the situation of Chinese typical emerging economic characteristics, the founders of the private listed companies generally taking the form of concentrated equity to circumvent weak external governance mechanism can’t effectively protect the interests of equity. The Founder controlling shareholders strongly control the private listed companies’ strategic decision by centralizing equity and the form of strategic decision power to protect their own equity interests. However, the behavior of founder controlling shareholders' equity and strategic decision power provides enormous power and ability for their occupation of other middle and lower shareholders' interests, thus forms the PP conflict between founder of controlling shareholders and middle and lower shareholders instead of PA conflict of the dispersed ownership structure under the Anglo-American model, and becomes the core contradiction of Chinese private listed companies governance. Second, the paper puts forward the strategic decision model of capital, considering the resource basis of strategic decision ability dominated by the PP conflict of Chinese private listed companies. The construction of strategic decision model of capital bases on the fusion of principal-agent theory and resource dependency theory and investigates, in the board of directors, as the main part of Chinese private listed companies’ strategic decision, under the situation of directors’ heterogeneous goals forming because of trustees’ PP conflict, the resource basis of the companies’ strategic decision ability. In strategic decision capital, the founder capital on behalf of the founder controlling shareholder’s interests and the external director capital on behalf of directors’ venture capital interests have the characteristics of rejection and dependency, forming the strategic decision capital of Chinese private listed company capital together. Namely as the proportion of the founder controlling shareholder's stake increases, the motivation of pursuing the company strategic decision power drives it to improve the leading position of founder strategic decision capital, and weakens the influence of external director capital on the strategic decision capital to ensure the founder controlling shareholder’s domination of private listed companies in the GEM. With the motivation of protecting the interests of the equity and the increase of the proportion of venture capital holdings, the external director capital levels of Chinese private listed companies in the GEM will continue to improve, in order to balance the founder capital’s dominance and control on the strategic decision capital. Despite of PP conflict, the founder controlling shareholders will ensure the leading position of founder capital in the strategic decision capital. However, when the founder capital is at a lower level, the founder controlling shareholder will, to a certain extent, lower founder capital’s leading level in strategic decision capital, to enhance the resource supply of external director capital to strategic decision capital and make sure private listed companies obtain adequate resource basis of strategic decision ability. Third, when private listed companies face a huge free cash flow formed by IPO super raising funds, the improvement of their strategic decision capital level will strengthen its strategic decision ability in response to IPO super raising funds, and will effectively reduce the inefficient investment of private listed companies. In this process, the behavior of the founder controlling shareholder’s pursuit of strategic decision power is formed through its continuous reinforcement of the dominant position of founder capital in the strategic decision capital. However, founder controlling shareholder’s behavior of enhancing the dominant position of founder capital will continue to reduce the overall level of the companies’ strategic decision capital as well as weaken the strategic decision resource supply mechanism on private listed companies’ strategic decision ability. Therefore, with the improvement of the founder CEO’s power, facing huge IPO super raising funds, the private listed companies will increase the inefficient investment level. External director capital from venture capital is the resource basis forming private listed companies’ strategic decision supervision mechanism. External director capital can promote the board of directors’ supervision on the founder CEO’s power range, in turn, reduce the inefficient investment of private listed companies. Fourth, strategic decision capital plays intermediary role in PP conflict and the inefficient investment of private listed companies. Namely with the constant improvement of PP conflict between founder controlling shareholder and venture capital of the subject of a strategic investors, private listed companies’ strategic decision capital will be continuously strengthened, so as to enhance the strategic decision ability when companies face huge IPO super raising funds, thereby lowering the degree of the inefficient investment of private listed companies.
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