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论文编号：	7048
作者编号：	1120100786
上传时间：	2014/12/10 22:26:37
中文题目：	银行贷款、大股东行为与上市公司扭亏——基于中国上市公司的实证分析
英文题目：	Bank Loan, Large Shareholder’s Behavior and Turnaround of Listed Firms——Based on the Empirical Analysis of China’s Listed Firms
指导老师：	李维安 陈清泰
中文关键字：	大股东行为；掏空与支持；亏损上市公司；银行贷款；盈余管理
英文关键字：	large shareholder behavior; tunneling and propping; loss-making firm; bank loan; earnings management
中文摘要：	在我国当前新兴加转轨的市场经济背景下，上市公司普遍具有控制性的大股东，其行为会对上市公司的融资行为产生重要的影响。而当上市公司由于亏损而无法进行股权融资和发行债券时，银行贷款则成为亏损上市公司最主要的外部融资渠道。本文遵循大股东行为的掏空与支持研究范式，对大股东掏空与支持行为如何影响亏损上市公司获得银行贷款，大股东支持与掏空上市公司的方式，以及这些行为对上市公司扭亏产生的影响进行了系统分析和研究。 论文首先阐明了研究问题的背景和意义，确立了研究的思路和框架。在此基础之上，对于本文研究主题相关的理论和文献进行了梳理和评述，既为论文的创新方向奠定了理论基础，同时也为实证研究部分的研究设计（模型设计和变量选择）提供了文献支持。首先，文章从委托代理理论的视角分析了大股东的掏空与支持行为，进而结合现代契约理论分析了大股东支持行为对银行贷款契约的保护机制。上述两个方面构成了文章的主要理论基础。在之后的文献综述部分，分别对于研究主题相关的大股东掏空与支持、预算软约束、盈余管理与真实盈余管理以及公司治理结构对绩效的影响等领域的文献进行了梳理和评述，在此基础之上形成了论文的研究框架。 在对相关理论和文献进行了系统回顾的基础上，以我国亏损上市公司近年来的银行贷款数据作为研究对象，按照“动机—行为—结果”的逻辑主线，运用单变量检验、普通最小二乘、Logit回归、联立方程与三阶段最小二乘方法等多种计量分析方法，对于影响亏损上市公司大股东支持行为以及银行贷款行为的因素（动机）、大股东支持与掏空上市公司的方式（行为）和大股东掏空行为对上市公司扭亏的影响（结果）进行了实证检验。 通过理论分析与实证检验，本文的主要研究结论如下： 对于理性的银行和大股东而言，在面临上市公司亏损的情况下，是否选择贷款和支持行为取决于上市公司可能为其带来的期望收益。实证结果显示，影响银行贷款行为的最主要的因素依然是亏损上市公司当前的收益状况，银行将选择亏损程度较低的上市公司进行贷款，以尽量降低亏损上市公司未来出现违约的风险。影响大股东支持行为的主要因素是上市公司目前的债务结构，大股东会选择银行债务比例较低的亏损上市公司进行支持，从而尽量提高其剩余索取权的价值。 银行贷款行为加剧了上市公司大股东经营性资金占用。受外部市场监管压力不断增加的影响，近年来我国亏损上市公司大股东资金占用行为以经营性资金占用方式为主。亏损上市公司银行贷款行为明显地加剧了上市公司大股东对公司的经营性资金占用，这种资金占用行为主要是以销售业务真实盈余管理和应计盈余管理的方式实现的。而基于大股东资金占用期限的考虑，长期银行贷款对大股东资金占用行为的影响作用更为明显。 银行贷款行为与盈余管理行为都有助于亏损上市公司实现扭亏。首先，银行贷款行为对亏损上市公司扭亏具有正向的影响，获得银行贷款的亏损上市公司实现扭亏的可能性要高于没有获得银行贷款的亏损上市公司。其次，亏损上市公司的盈余管理行为对上市公司的扭亏也具有正向的影响。盈余管理行为又具体表现为销售业务真实盈余管理和应计盈余管理两种，其中应计盈余管理行为对亏损上市公司扭亏的影响更为显著。然后综合银行贷款与盈余管理两方面因素的影响，上市公司在获得银行贷款之后，其大股东通过销售业务真实盈余管理和应计盈余管理两种方式实现对上市公司的经营性资金占用。同时，这两种盈余管理活动又会对上市公司扭亏产生正向的影响。 针对上述研究结论，本文提出了相应的政策建议，包括加快推进利率市场化改革，修订现行的上市公司退市制度，加强对上市公司关联交易的监管，以及在银行对亏损上市公司的贷款审批过程中应注意上市公司的公司治理结构因素等。 本文的主要创新点体现在以下几方面： 第一，将双重委托代理理论框架下的大股东掏空与支持的研究范式应用于亏损上市公司银行贷款问题的研究之中，为这一“预算软约束”问题的研究提供了新的研究视角和理论解释，同时也将对“预算软约束”问题的研究进一步深化到大股东行为研究的微观层面。 第二，在研究大股东支持行为与亏损上市公司银行贷款的关系问题的部分，通过构建大股东与银行的博弈模型，分析了二者行为之间的相互影响。这部分的研究内容也在一定程度上弥补了之前的相关研究中将银行的贷款行为视为外生来研究大股东行为的研究方法的局限性。 第三，基于亏损上市公司面临的股权融资约束，在对大股东支持行为的动机分析部分引入了债务融资动机的内容，是对以往大股东支持行为的股权融资动机研究的一定程度的拓展，丰富了大股东支持行为研究的空间和范围。 第四，结合近年来针对大股东资金占用行为的证券监管的实践，分析了市场监管压力对上市公司大股东资金占用行为的影响，并通过实证检验证明了上市公司大股东资金占用行为由非经营资金占用向经营性资金占用的转变，而这一研究结论也是有别于已有研究的新的发现。 第五，将销售业务真实盈余管理产生的经营活动异常现金流量和操纵性应计作为衡量上市公司大股东经营性资金占用行为的代理变量的做法，也是对大股东行为的实证研究领域的一种新的尝试。
英文摘要：	On the background of China’s emerging and transitional market economy, most of listed firms have a controlling large shareholder, which behavior will deeply impact the financing behavior of listed firms. When the listed firm can not season equity offerings and issue bond because of loss, bank loan is the most important external financing channel. Following the research paradigm of tunneling and propping, this thesis systematically analyze the tunneling and propping behavior how to influence the loss-making listed firms to obtain bank loan, the pattern of large shareholder’s tunneling and propping behavior, and the effect of these behavior on the listed firms turn from deficits to profit. At first, this thesis clarifies the background and significance, and establish a framework for ideas and research. On this basis of the analysis and comments on the relevant theory and literature to the subject, it builds the foundation for the innovation, but also provides literature support of empirical model design and variables selections. Specifically, from the perspective of the principal-agent theory , this thesis analyze the large shareholder’s tunneling and propping behavior, then using the modern contract theory, this thesis analyze the large shareholder propping behavior’s protection mechanism of the bank loan covenants. And then the relevant literature focus on tunneling and propping, the soft budget constraints, earnings management and real earnings management, and the corporate governance structure factors’ influence to performance are combed and commented, and the framework of the thesis is formed. On the basis of a systematic review of relevant theory and literature, this thesis makes empirical analysis based on China’s loss-making listed firms’ bank loan data in recent years according to the logic of the motivation-behavior-result. Using univariate testing methods, OLS, Logit regression，Simultaneous equations and Three-stage least squares regression methods, the thesis empirically test the influence factors of large shareholders’ propping and bank lending behavior(motivation), the pattern of large shareholders’ tunneling and propping(behavior),and the effect of large shareholders’ tunneling on the loss-making firms’ turning from deficits to profit(result). Using case study method, typical case is selected to verify the conclusion of the empirical test. Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, the research conclusion is as follows: For a rational bank and large shareholder which faced to the loss-making firm, whether to choose lend and prop up depends on the expected return from the listed firm. The empirical results indicate that the most important factor affecting the bank lending is still the revenue of the loss-making firm. The bank will choose the lower degree of loss-making listed firm to lend in order to minimize the future risk of default. And the main factor which influences large shareholder’s propping behavior is the current debt structure of the loss-making firm. The large shareholder will choose firm with lower proportion of bank loan to support in order to maximize the value of its residual claims. Bank lending behavior exacerbates the operating capital embezzlement of large shareholder. Affected by the increasing pressure of external market regulation, the large shareholder’s capital embezzlement behavior is mainly in operating capital way in recent years. This embezzlement behavior is manifested in sales real earnings management and accrual earnings management. And based on the considerations of embezzlement period, the long-term bank loan affects the large shareholder’s embezzlement behavior more significantly. Bank lending behavior and earnings management behavior can help loss-making listed firms realize the turn round. First, bank lending behavior has a positive influence on loss-making listed firms’ turn round, the possibility of turn round of loss-making listed firms which get a bank loan is higher than that firms which did not get a bank loan. Second, the loss-making listed firms’ earnings management behavior also has a positive influence on the turn round. Earnings management behavior is embodied in the business of sales real earnings management and accrual earnings management, and the accrual earnings management behavior affects the turn round more significantly. And then integrated bank loans and earnings management factors, when the listed firms get a bank loan, the large shareholder will embezzle the operating capital by the sales real earnings management and accrual earnings management ways. At the same time, these two kinds of earnings management behaviors will positively influence the listed firms’ turn round. The policy recommendations are put forward corresponding to the conclusion of the study, including accelerating the market-oriented reform of interest rates, amendmenting to the existing delisting institution, strengthening the supervision of related party transactions of listed firms. And the bank should concerned about the corporate governance structure factors during the bank loan approval process. The main innovation of this research is reflected in the following aspects: Under the framework of dual principal-agent theory, the large shareholder tunneling and propping paradigm is applied to research the loss-making firm’s bank loan subject. The study provides a new perspective and theoretic interpretation for “soft budget constraints” and depeen it into the micro-level study of large shareholder behavior. Be different from the past literature about the behavior of large shareholder which viewed bank behavior as exogenous, this thesis analysis the interaction of the behavior of both bank and large shareholder by constructing the game model between bank and large shareholder. Based on the equity financing constraint of loss-making firms, the study introduce the debt financing motivation of large shareholder’s propping behavior, which is different with the past literature that focus on the equity financing motivation and broaden the research space of large shareholder behavior. Combined with the recent years of security supervision practice, this thesis analyzed the supervision influence on the large shareholder capital embezzlement behavior, and through the empirical test proved that the large shareholder’s capital embezzlement behavior has changed from non-operating capital embezzlement to operating capital embezzlement. This research conclusion is also different from the existing literatures. In this thesis, the agency variables of large shareholder’s operating capital embezzlement behavior are the abnormal operating cash flow and discretionary accrual, which are popular in real earnings management and accrual earnings management literature. The usage of these variables in the shareholder behavior research is also a new attempt.
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