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论文编号：	703
作者编号：	2120062109
上传时间：	2008/6/20 13:03:03
中文题目：	预测性信息披露的制度安排和当事
英文题目：	the experimental research on t
指导老师：	李建标教授
中文关键字：	预测性信息披露 比较制度分析
英文关键字：	Future information disclosure
中文摘要：	企业CEO所发布的未来财务信息往往比它所发布的历史信息具有更大的信息价值。然而，由于中国证券市场的预测性财务信息属于自愿性披露，因而预测性信息的披露非常不充分，甚至出现虚假财务信息的情形。因此，有关预测性财务信息的披露问题的制度设计就显得尤为重要，如在预测性财务信息披露当中的强制性、第三方惩罚制度安排的引入，强化第二方惩罚的力度等。本文以财务预测信息披露的强制性作为切入点，以上市公司信息披露各主体行为为核心，运用实验研究的方法，通过博弈分析的视角，考察不同制度框架对上市公司信息披露特别是预测性信息披露利益主体的行为影响。 论文设计了五组预测性信息披露实验室实验，利用比较制度实验分析（CIEA）的范式，通过对信息披露的逐步强制性公开，以及加入惩罚机制等措施，逐渐规范CEO信息披露的行为。实验室实验中边际改变设置变量，进而找寻出不同制度安排所表现出的效率以及对行为人偏好类型的影响。重点关注惩罚、约束与CEO的信息披露行为，在此基础上从时间向量上考察CEO信息披露中诚信机制的形成过程等。 实验结果表明，不同的制度框架会显著影响信息披露主体的行为，并且适当的制度约束会增加CEO不诚实披露的机会成本，促使CEO的自利型偏好向社会型偏好的转变，社会型偏好的形成有利于促进声誉机制的形成，并且使投资者产生极大的忠诚度，从而达到CEO诚实披露、投资者投资的精炼贝叶斯均衡。此时，CEO和投资者的收益最大化，并且市场效率和社会总福利得到显著提高。另外，实验结果还表明，适当的惩罚制度可以对CEO的行为进行有效的约束，但是过度的惩罚机制将会产生制度挤出效应，声誉机制将不再起作用，投资者自利型偏好显著强化，高惩罚成本和制度挤出直接导致社会总福利的降低，因此对惩罚机制设计时所把握的程度将是我们未来需要进一步研究的方向之一。 本研究的现实政策推论是，资本市场管理当局在继续规范上市公司财务信息披露的同时，同样应该强化上市公司预测性财务信息披露的制度安排，将上市公司预测性财务信息的自愿披露转化为强制披露，进而使资本市场的利益主体达致共赢。
英文摘要：	The future information disclosed has much more value that the historical one. We learn that the institution of information disclosure in China Capital market is voluntary, thus a big room need to be improved on future information, which even exists fraud financial information. Consequently, the institution designed for future information plays a significant role, such introducing compulsive regulation and the third party punishment, as well as reinforcing the penalty on the second party. This paper take the compulsive information disclosure as the beginning, employing the experimental and game theoretical analysis to investigate influence derived from different institutions on the future information disclosing subjects. For more details, this paper enhances 5 session experiments on the future financial information disclosure, which based on the institution evolution perspective, and gradually improving information transparency. Then we introduce the penalty mechanism to restrain the managements’ behaviors. From the evolution perspective, we investigate the CEOs’ behavior changing process and the effect derived from the penalty mechanism. In the long run, we assume that honest behavior would produce better results and see whether the evolution of institution would improve the market efficiency. The experimental results tell us that the disclosing behaviors are greatly affected by the institutions designed, and somewhat constrain would improve the opportunity cost on CEO’s dishonest behaviors, which make the CEO change its self-interested preference to the social preference boosting the reputation mechanism formation and enhance the investors confidence. All these lead to a “CEO honest, Investor invests” refined Bayesian equilibrium. At this time, we find the maximum return for investors as well as CEOs, however, the social welfare gets maximum value. Additionally, the experimental data show that appropriate penalty would produce constrain on CEOs, but excess punishment would lead to squeezing effect which eliminating reputation effect, and the high monitoring cost, as well as institution squeezing depress the social welfare. These results present us further research orientation. We learn the policy suggestion that when supervisory authorities advancing information disclosure for listed companies, the institutions designed for this should not be neglected, which should transfers the voluntary future information arrangement to the compulsive one, in order to make the mutual benefit for the concerning subjects.
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