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论文编号：	680
作者编号：	2120061979
上传时间：	2008/6/20 11:07:51
中文题目：	代理成本视角下现金股利政策的影
英文题目：	A Research on the Impact of Ca
指导老师：	宗先臻
中文关键字：	现金股利;代理成本;自由现金流量
英文关键字：	Agency cost problem;cash divid
中文摘要：	代理成本问题伴随着股份制公司的产生而出现，最初研究重点在于解决管理层和股东间的利益冲突所引起的代理成本。随着对该问题的深入探讨，一些研究发现这一问题同样也存在于公司的控股股东和中小股东间。我国上市公司特殊的股权结构造成了代理成本问题的复杂化，管理层与股东、大股东与小股东之间普遍存在着委托代理问题，这给公司的发展带来了负面的影响。正确的认识和处理这一问题有助于提高我国上市公司企业价值、保护投资者利益，对于维护我国资本市场的健康发展也具有重要意义。 代理成本理论认为，股利政策决定了公司税后利润如何分配，因此是委托代理关系中各利益团体展开博弈的焦点，故而最终现金股利的分派就在一定程度上反映出了公司中存在的代理成本问题。本文从现金股利政策与代理问题的关系入手，采用规范和实证相结合的研究方法。首先建立起理论框架，分析了我国上市公司存在的两类代理成本问题，继而对股利政策与两类代理成本间的关系进行了系统的论述，通过两种理论观点“自由现金流假说”和“利益侵占假说”来解释代理成本视角下现金股利的影响。其次，根据相关的理论分析，提出假设，并从2005年、2006年A股市场的上市公司中筛选出样本公司，选取其财务和市场交易的相关数据，对假设进行检验。结果表明，我国上市公司的股利政策揭示出管理层与股东、大股东与小股东两类不同代理问题同时存在，但相比较而言，大小股东间的代理问题是我国上市公司面临的主要代理成本问题。 由于我国在2005年启动了股权分置改革，这使得我国上市公司的股权结构发生变化。依据委托代理理论，股权结构的变化必然会引起代理成本问题发生相应的改变，从而导致上市股利政策发生相应的变化。本文在这种背景下研究这一问题，将对后股权分置时期研究我国上市公司代理成本与现金股利政策的问题提供一些有意义的参考。
英文摘要：	Agency cost problem emerges by the formation of joint-stock companies. The points of initial researches focused on how to address the agency cost caused by the interest conflict between the management and shareholders. With the study of the issue developed, it is found that the agency cost also existed between controlling shareholders and other investors. The unique equity ownership of the listed companies in China causes the complexity of agency cost, which widely exists between management and shareholders, controlling shareholders and small holders. This problem has a negative impact on the development of company. Understanding and handling this issue correctly will protect the interests of investors and improve the competitiveness of listed companies, and help to keep capital market develop smoothly in our country. According to agency cost theory, the ultimate dividends will reflect the agency costs of the companies to some degree. This thesis researches the relationship between the cash dividends policy and agency cost problem on the basis of previous research with normal and empirical research. Firstly, we establish theoretical framework to analysis of the relationship between two types of agency cost and dividends policy in listed company, and then discuss the issue systematically through the viewpoints of “Free Cash Flow Hypothesis” and “Tunneling Hypothesis”. Secondly, we give some assumptions, and then utilize the data of sample which are selected from the listed company in 2005 and 2006 to test whether the dividends represent the agency problem and the two hypotheses can explain the issue appropriately. At last, we draw the conclusion that dividends policy of the company reflects that two types of agency cost problem exists at the same time. But relatively speaking, the type of the agency problem between different shareholders is the main problem. Because of the reform of non-tradable shares launched in 2005 by the government, the equity ownership structure changes heavily in the listed companies, which would be cause a corresponding change of agency cost problem and the dividends policy. Under this background, the thesis on the issue will provide something useful to further research after the reform.
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