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论文编号：	6551
作者编号：	2120122550
上传时间：	2014/6/18 13:11:19
中文题目：	是否应强制上市公司现金分红——基于投资者保护的视角
英文题目：	WHETHER LISTED COMPANIES SHOULD BE FORCED TO DELIVER CASH DIVIDENDS ——FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INVESTOR PROTECTION
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	强制分红；事件研究法；股利信号理论；股利代理成本理论
英文关键字：	mandatory cash dividend, Event Study Methods, the Signaling Theory, the Agency Cost Theory
中文摘要：	2011年11月9日中国证监会通过出面讲话的形式，要求所有上市公司继续完善分红政策及其决策机制，实质为进一步强化要求上市公司现金分红行为，一经公布即引起了学术界和资本市场的巨大反响。 一方面，股利分配权是股东最重要的权利之一，有利于培养投资者长期投资思路，同时会在一定程度上减少公司的自有现金流，从而减少公司管理层因过度投资或过度消费带来的两权分离而造成的代理成本，间接保护了投资者利益。另一方面，股利政策也是公司一项重要的财务政策，如果政府强加干涉，势必会影响公司的原本经营策略和股利分配政策，无法实现公司内部的相关信号发布。所以以上争议使得是否应强制上市公司进行现金分红这一问题存在较大研究价值。 本文拟采用事件研究法，从投资者保护的角度出发，考察是否应强制上市公司进行现金分红。基于股利政策的两大经典理论，即股利信号理论和股利代理成本理论，提出相关假设，从而比较两者对中国资本市场上股利作用的解释力度。通过实证研究可以看到：第一类型事件研究法中，没有明显证据表明对于未预期的股利，市场会给予显著反应，进而无法对信号理论予以显著证明；第二类型事件研究法中，在事件窗口期，市场会有明显的正向反应，且对于现金流问题严重成长性差的企业，市场也会给予明显的正向反应。由此可见，股利代理成本理论能更好地解释股利作用，而强制上市公司现金分红能增强这一作用。所以从保护投资者的角度，目前证据支持强制现金分红政策。
英文摘要：	On November 9th 2011,China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)required all listed companies to complete their policy of cash dividend and decision-making mechanism. The announcement was aimed at strengthening the impletion of distributing cash dividend, which caused much attention from researchers in theoretical field and participants in capital markets. On one hand, receiving dividends act as shareholders’ primary rights. It facilitates investors to form along-term investment habit instead of purely pursuing capital gains. Declaring dividend decreases the amounts of company-controlled cash flows and further lowers agency cost originating from over-heated investment and consumption. On the other hand, dividend allocation belongs to primary financial policy. Abusive government intervention to operating strategy distorts corporates’ internal information utilized by investors in open market. What’s worse, issuing cash dividend against the interests of capital-seeking companies that already experience cash flow scarcity. Hence it is essential to conduct a research about the rationale of mandatory cash dividend. The paper would use two research methods to check the availability of mandatory cash dividend policy from investors’ perspective. Based on the classical theories of dividend policy, which are the Signaling Theory and the Agency Cost Theory, a satisfactory explanation would be given concerning the impact of mandatory cash dividend policy on China’s capital market. From empirical testing results we could draw the following conclusions. According to Announcement Study Methods, no clear evident supports the view that market significantly response to signals conveying bydividend policy, which could not testify the efficiency of the Signaling Theory. While based on Event Study Methods, capital market positively reacts to dividend policythroughout window period. Even for financial-scary companies that lack growthpotential, market would gave significant positive response. Hence the Agency Cost Theory could explain the availability of government-promoted mandatory cash dividend policy for the sake of protecting investors’ interests.
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