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论文编号：	6539
作者编号：	1120090679
上传时间：	2014/6/16 22:13:22
中文题目：	供应链契约协调与社会偏好的影响研究——来自实验室的证据
英文题目：	Research on Supply Chain Contract Coordination and the Effect of Social Preferences——Evidences from Laboratory Experiments
指导老师：	林润辉
中文关键字：	供应链契约协调；社会偏好；回购契约；收益共享契约；实验经济学
英文关键字：	supply chain contract coordination; social preferences; buyback contract; revenue-sharing contract; experimental economics
中文摘要：	典型的供应链包含多个独立的个体，为了达到分散决策和集中决策的统一，提高供应链的效率，各类契约机制被广泛应用。理论研究表明能够达到协调效果的契约有很多种，然而基于实验室的证据及实地研究却发现零售商即使在最简单的背景设定下也很难做出最优的决策，理论上更加复杂的契约设定是否能在实际中实现很难有定论。因此本文关注的第一个问题就是协调契约的实际效果。首先选取回购契约作为研究对象，设计可控的实验来检验其实际效果。通过控制实验观察成员的决策结果，并且应用收集到的数据来分析他们的决策行为，找出能够解释协调失效现象的原因。但是，回购契约只是协调契约的一种，其研究结果和研究结论的普适性还有待论证，因此在此基础上继续选取收益共享契约为研究对象，以同样的方法和思路对其进行实验室的检验。通过对两种契约的深入分析和探讨，得到描述契约协调实际效果和失效原因的研究结论。 针对契约协调的研究中，通常将决策者假设为单纯追求自身经济利益最大化的个体，但是行为经济学的研究已经发现个体在经济活动中并不像假设的那样自利，他们除了关注自己的利益还会对对方的收益表示关心，由此表现出不同形式的社会偏好。作为供应链上下游的成员，供应商和零售商在实际中是分开决策、追求各自利益的个体；但是供应链是一个整体，市场和成员的决策共同决定着他们之间的利润分配。所以上下游的成员们在分开决策的过程合作与竞争的关系是并存的，因此互惠偏好和地位追求偏好如何影响契约协调的实际效果和成员的决策行为是本文研究的第二个问题。协调契约的种类有很多，本文的研究不可能将每一种契约都涉及到，首先以回购契约为例，分别探讨互惠偏好和地位追求偏好对其的影响机理：提出社会偏好影响交易行为的理论假设，在此基础上设计可控的实验来检验理论预测结果。将理论推导和实验研究相结合，得到更具有说服力的研究结论。但是一种契约的研究结果又不足以代表全部的协调契约，因此将同样的研究模式扩展到收益共享契约，希望做到既有针对性又不失全面，针对第二个研究问题得到普适性的研究结论。 本文得到的主要研究结论如下：（1）协调契约的实际效果偏离理论预测。首先，批发价和回购价格的相关关系不满足达到协调的条件，订购量显著低于协调基准值，从而表明回购契约协调失效。对收益共享契约的研究表明，供应商对批发价和共享收益的决策结果显著偏离了理论预测值，而订购量同样低于协调的基准值。因此协调契约在实际中的效果是偏离理论预测值的，并且协调契约的失效并不是偶然的现象，也并不依赖于契约类型。（2）互惠偏好和地位追求偏好导致契约协调失效。以回购契约为例，通过分析成员的决策行为，发现零售商前一期的订购量、前一期的收益差距显著影响供应商的批发价和回购价格；供应商前一期的批发价和回购价格、前一期的收益差距显著影响零售商的订购量。因此，零售商和供应商都表现出对对方行为动机和物质结果差异的关心；对收益共享契约的研究发现前一期的订购量、前一期的收益差距显著影响批发价和共享收益；前一期的批发价和共享收益、前一期的收益差距显著影响零售商的订购量，成员们的互惠偏好和地位追求偏好在决策过程中表现明显，并且显著影响个体的决策值。（3）个体的目标函数和决策值发生了变化，并且是持续性的。具体来讲，在回购契约的支付机制下，供应商和零售商的目标函数均包含了对友好关系的关心和地位领先的追求。对成员决策行为的动态分析则表明，社会偏好带来的这种变化不是暂时性的，他们在整个决策过程中一直存在，并且持续在发生变化。因此，回购价格与批发价格正相关，与前一期的订购量、前一期收益差距正相关；订购量与当期和前一期的批发价格负相关，与当期和前一期的回购价格正相关，与前一期收益差距正相关。而在收益共享契约的支付机制下，共享收益与批发价格、前一期的订购量负相关，与前一期的收益差距正相关；订购量与当期和前一期的批发价和共享收益负相关，与前一期收益差距负相关。（4）不同类型的社会偏好在决策过程中的表现各不相同。通过对偏好参数动态变化过程的回归分析，本文发现在不同的契约背景下，个体表现出的偏好特征也各不相同。 本文的研究贡献主要体现在：（1）为供应链契约协调的理论研究提供实验结果的反馈。本文对回购契约进行实验室检验，发现分散决策的订购量低于集中决策的订购量，供应链并没有达到协调状态，回购契约协调失效，这有悖于理论预测结果；对收益共享契约的实验室检验也发现了类似的现象，说明协调契约在实际应用中存在失效的现象，而且这种失效现象并不是某一种契约特有的，也不是偶然发生的。因此，研究结果不仅检验理论模型，并且通过数据和实验分析提供反馈，有助于未来对理论研究的修正和改进。（2）从社会偏好理论的角度解释契约协调失效的原因。契约协调的失效并不是偶然的结果，因此需要找到出现这种现象的原因。本文从社会偏好理论的视角进行分析，鉴别和发现个体的社会属性，认为由于互惠偏好和地位追求偏好的存在，成员的目标函数也相应的发生了变化，现有的理论模型不能预测和解释决策个体的行为，合理的解释了协调失效的现象。（3）基于社会偏好理论对回购契约和收益共享契约模型进行扩展。由于社会偏好的存在，契约协调失效，因此有必要对契约协调的理论模型进行改进和修正。分别对回购契约和收益共享契约的理论模型进行扩展，将个体对友好关系的关心和地位领先的追求进行模型化，认为它们也是个体决策时的目标，由此重新预测个体的决策行为。实验室研究的数据结果支持本文的研究假设，说明建立的模型符合实际，并且具有理论意义。（4）总结社会偏好对契约协调的影响规律。本文探讨需求不确定时，社会偏好对协调契约的影响，与前人研究结果不同，互惠偏好和地位追求偏好都没有提升整体和个体的效率，反而使得绩效变差，降低了分散决策的订购量，出现协调失效。当然，本文也发现了与前人研究相一致的结论，这主要表现在个体偏好参数的动态变化特征上。（5）发现不同偏好类型的独特变化特征，丰富社会偏好理论。针对不同契约和不同的偏好类型，通过对个体决策行为的分析，发现了一些比较有趣的现象：虽然个体在交易过程希望维持友好的关系和保持地位上的领先，但是这些目标和个体的经济利益混合在一起，具体表现是有所区别的。本文深入分析和描述了个体的社会偏好在交易过程中的变化规律，这既是对供应链契约协调理论的丰富，也是对社会偏好理论的补充和扩展。
英文摘要：	A typical supply chain includes several independent agents, thus various contracts are widely used to align system decisions and achieve full efficiency. Theoretically, there are a lot of coordination contracts, but recent evidence based on laboratory experiments as well as some field studies showed that retailers have difficulty making optimal decisions even in the simplest settings. Furthermore, it is hard to guarantee practical results for more complex contracts. So the result of coordination contract in practice is our first research question. Buyback contract was first selected to test its practical effect through controlled experiments. Besides, in order to find the explanation for coordination failure, we observed individuals’ decision results and also analyzed their decision behavior based on collected data. However, buyback contract is only one kind of coordination contract, the universality of findings and conclusions still needs to be discussed. Therefore, revenue-sharing contract was tested in the same way. Through deep analysis and investigation for these two contracts, we achieved conclusions about the results of coordination contracts as well as the reason for their failure. Most supply chain contracting models are based on the assumption that agents only pursed the optimization of their own interest. However, studies in behavioral economics showed that individuals are not as selfish as assumed. They not only care about their own interest, also express concern for others’. Hence, different kinds of social preferences would manifest. As members in the supply chain, suppliers and retailers make decisions separately and purse their own profits. While in an entire supply chain, their decision and the market condition affect allocation profits between them. Members in supply chain need cooperation, but also compete with each other. Thus, our second issue is to investigate the effect of both reciprocity and status seeking on coordination results and decision behaviors. There are many types of coordination contract. We couldnot involve every kind of contract, so buyback contract was selected. Based on the decision model, hypothesis about the effect of social preferences on trading behaviors were achieved. Then, controlled experiments were designed to test theoretical predictions. The combination of theoretical derivation and empirical research made conclusion more persuasive. However, findings only based on one contract couldnot represent all kinds of coordination contracts. In order to make this study comprehensive and targeted, above research was repeated based on revenue-sharing contract. The ultimate aim was to obtain universal conclusions about the second issue. The main conclusions obtained in this paper are as follows: (1) The practical results of coordination contract deviated from theoretical predictions. First, the correlation between wholesale price and buyback price does not satisfy conditions to achieve coordination. Besides, the order quantity decided by retailers is significantly lower than coordination benchmark, which means buyback contract failed to coordinate supply chain system. Studies based on revenue-sharing contract showed wholesale price as well as shared revenue significantly deviate from the theoretical predictions. The order quantity decided by retailers is also significantly lower than coordination benchmark. Thus, in practice, the results of coordination contract deviated from theoretical prediction. Also it is concluded that coordination failure is neither an accidental phenomenon nor dependent on the type of contract. (2) The preferences of reciprocity and status seeking caused failure of contract coordination. According to investigate members’ decision behavior under buyback contract, it was found that both retailers’ order and profit gap in last period significantly affected wholesale price as well as buyback price. The order quantity was affected by the previous wholesale price, previous buyback price and their profit gap in last period. Therefore, individuals both showed concern for others’ motivation and material differences. Under revenue-sharing contract, wholesale price and shared revenue were significantly affected by retailers’ order and profit gap in last period. The previous wholesale price, previous shared revenue and profit gap affected the decision on order quantity together. (3) Members’ objective function and decisions have changed, and this kind of change was continuous. Specifically, under buyback contract, their objective functions included concern for relationship and the pursuit for leading. Dynamic analysis about decision behaviors indicated that the change brought by social preferences was not temporary. It existed during the whole process and changed continuously. Therefore, buyback price positively correlated with current wholesale price, previous order and previous profit gap. The order quantity negatively correlated with current and previous wholesale price, and positively correlated with current and previous buyback price as well as profit gap in last period. Under revenue-sharing contract, shared revenue correlated with wholesale price and previous order quantity negatively. It also positively correlated with previous profit gap. The order quantity negatively correlated with both wholesale prices as well as shared revenue in current and previous period. Besides, it correlated with previous profit gap positively. (4) Different kinds of social preferences performanced variously during decision process. Through regression analysis of parameters’ dynamic, it was found individuals’ preferences showed different characteristics under various kinds of contracts. With the above findings, this research has generally made the following contributions: (1) We provided experimental results as feedback for theoretical studies on supply chain coordination. From laboratory test on buyback contract, order quantity in decentralized decision-making system is less than the amount under centralized condition. Thus buyback contract failed to coordinate supply chain system, which deviated from theoretical predictions. The similar phenomenon happened again in the empirical test for revenue-sharing contract. Hence, in practical, coordination contract failed to coordinate supply chain system and the failure is not accidental. Therefore, according to data results and experimental analysis, we not only test the theoretical models but also provide helpful feedback for future improvement on theoretical research. (2) The reason for coordination failure was explained from the perspective of social preferences theory. Since the failure of contract coordination is not accidental, we need to find its cause. From the perspective of social preferences theory, we identified individuals’ social attributes during decision process. It was concluded that their objective function changed due to the preferences of reciprocity and status seeking. Based on these, the existing theoretical models couldnot predict and explain individuals’ behavior. We got a reasonable explanation for coordination failure. (3) Based on the theory of social preferences, models of buyback contract and revenue-sharing contract were extended. Because of the failure, it is essential to modify and improve theoretical models for contract coordination. We extended both models for buyback contract and revenue-sharing contract by introducing the concern for relationship and leading status into members’ objective function. From which, the modified predictions for individual’s behavior were achieved and supported by empirical results. Thus the extended models made sense and also have theoretical significance. (4) The influence of social preferences on contract coordination was summarized. With uncertainty demand, we discussed the impact of social preferences on contract coordination. Unlike previous results, neither reciprocity nor status seeking improve efficiency for the system and individuals. They made the performance worse, decreased decentralized order and failed to coordinate the whole supply chain. But we still got some conclusions consistent with previous research, which were mainly reflected in the dynamic of preference parameters. (5) The theory of social preferences was enriched through finding the unique dynamic characteristics of different preferences. For different contracts and different social preferences, we got interesting findings from analyzing individuals’ behavior. Although individuals purse relationship and leading status during the transaction process, these goals mixed with material results. Thus they would show different performance in practical. We described the dynamic characteristics for individuals’ preferences, which enriched the theory of contract coordination and provided complement for social preferences theory.
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