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论文编号：	6524
作者编号：	2120122536
上传时间：	2014/6/13 14:29:24
中文题目：	股票期权激励与盈余管理： 基于行权业绩条件的视角
英文题目：	Stock Option Incentives and Earnings Management: Perspective from Vesting Performance requirements
指导老师：	曾亚敏
中文关键字：	期权激励；盈余管理；业绩条件
英文关键字：	option incentive, earnings management, performance requirement
中文摘要：	自证监会在2006年1月1日推出《上市公司股权激励管理办法》以来，股票期权激励在我国得到了广泛应用和发展。现有的研究主要从授权和行权两个时点研究期权激励与盈余管理的关系，研究表明期权激励会导致管理者的机会主义行为，即管理者通过盈余管理追求自身利益。而根据《上市公司股权激励管理办法（试行）》管理者获得期权激励的行权条件是有业绩要求的，那么管理层是否在行权期前的考核期为了达到行权的业绩条件而进行盈余管理？ 因此，本文选取2006年至2012年实施股票期权激励计划的上市公司作为研究样本，比较样本公司在股票期权计划公告中规定的行权业绩条件与样本公司报告的业绩数据，探讨实施期权激励的公司行权业绩考核期是否存在盈余管理现象、管理层是否为期权的顺利行权管理盈余以及期权激励对应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理之间相互作用的影响。通过多元回归分析，本文发现实施期权激励的公司行权业绩考核期的盈余管理水平高于未进行期权激励的公司，尤其是真实盈余管理。进一步的分析表明，那些已经达到业绩条件的公司，其应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理都高于配对公司。与配对公司相比，其中，选择真实盈余管理来实现行权的业绩条件的公司，其实际业绩会远远超过业绩条件，而那些通过应计盈余管理方式来实现业绩条件的公司，其实际业绩会刚刚达到业绩条件。 本文研究表明，期权激励的行权条件不仅影响公司盈余管理程度，而且影响管理层盈余管理方式的选择。
英文摘要：	Stock options incentive have been widely used in our country since the " Equity Incentive Management of Listed Companies (Trial)（EIMLC）" been launched on January 1, 2006. Existing research on option incentive and earnings management relations are mainly from point of granted and exercise. Studies have shown that option incentive will lead to opportunistic behavior of managers, namely managers pursue their own interests through earnings management. According to EIMLC, companies are required to meet certain performance requirements in order to exercise options. Whether this provision will make for behavior of earnings management? In this paper ,we selected listed companies which implement Stock Option Incentive Plan from 2006 to 2012 as study sample and compared reported performance data in the sample company to prescribed performance data to exercise in order to study: whether there is the phenomenon of earnings management in companies with option incentive plan ,whether existing manipulation of management for the purpose of options exercise , whether there is interaction between the accrued earnings management and real earnings management after option incentive. By multiple regression analysis, we found that real earnings management level in company with the implementation of option incentive is higher than that without incentive. Accrued earnings management and real earnings management levels in companies whose actual performance meet the required special conditions were significantly higher than those did not meet the required performance. Companies whose actual performance just meet special conditions to exercise have higher accrued earnings management level than those actual performance far reach actual performance conditions. Companies implementing option incentive are more likely to using real earnings management to achieve right to exercise. This study shows that incentive options vesting conditions not only affect the company's earnings management, but also influence the choice of management earnings management approaches.
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