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论文编号：	6516
作者编号：	2120122651
上传时间：	2014/6/13 0:09:11
中文题目：	私有产权的福利效应——基于公共池博弈的实验研究
英文题目：	The Welfare Effects of Private Property——Experiment Study on Common-Pool Resources Game
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	私有产权；公共池博弈；比较制度实验
英文关键字：	Private Property；Common-Pool Resources Game；Laboratory Experiment
中文摘要：	公有产权和私有产权的效率问题一直是国内外经济学家讨论的焦点问题。公共产权所带来的资源低效率配置是各派别经济学家一致认可的，资源的公共占有会导致资源的租金耗散或者完全耗散，进而导致社会福利的极大损失。公有产权的公共资源因为具有使用的非排他性和消费的竞争性，会导致人们从个人理性出发带来的过度利用而非集体理性条件下的合理利用，进而使公共资源趋于低效率利用或者完全被浪费掉，最终酿成“公地悲剧”。 本文认为，清晰地界定产权具有重要的社会背景和现实意义。改革开放三十六年，中国的发展取得了举世瞩目的成就，社会经济迅速发展，经济制度发生了翻天覆的变化，其中，企业产权制度改革作为经济制度改革的核心，受到各界人士的广泛关注。产权制度改革作为经济制度改革的先决条件，建立界定明晰的产权制度是发挥市场配置资源效率，更好地激发组织和人的积极性的重要保障。 本研究运用公共池博弈理论和实验经济学方法，考察了不同产权界定设置下个体投资水平和社会福利的差异。在本研究的模型系列中，我们首先构建了一个无产权界定的可损毁公共池博弈模型，然后扩展到模糊产权设置，再到模糊产权加惩罚设置和最终的产权清晰设置，依次考察对比了不同设置下公共池资源的利用水平、社会福利水平的变化和影响当事人行为决策的主要因素。 本研究的实验设置以产权是否界定清晰和惩罚为制度向量，设计并实施了四种不同设置的实验，实验结果表明：第一，在无产权界定条件下，个体投资水平确实出现过度投资行为，公共池循环地发生崩溃，市场运行结果很难预测，公共池资源的利用效率不高；第二，在模糊产权设置下，公共池崩溃的现象同无产权界定下的情况基本相似，但是模糊产权界定对部分个体的投资行为产生了一定约束，个体投资水平有向最优投资数量收敛的趋势；第三，在模糊产权加惩罚设置下，我们发现惩罚机制的介入对大部分的被试构成了一定威胁，个体在大多数情况下会选择合作性的投资策略，但仍存在一定比例的个体继续选择不合作的策略，由此引致的市场崩溃和惩罚造成了很大的收益净损失；第四，产权明晰设置下，总体社会福利水平接近理论最优，证明了清晰界定的产权有助于社会福利水平的提高。 本研究在以下几个方面可能有所创新：第一，本文在借鉴奥斯特罗姆的CPR模型的基础上，对这一模型的内涵进行了延展，提出了适合本研究的CPR模型，并创新性地提出了四种不同机制设计，有力地刻画了现实情境；第二，首次在中国情境下通过比较制度的方法检验公共池博弈，通过比较制度实验刻画资源占有者之间的博弈关系，对国内理论方面和实验方面的研究做了一定的补充；第三，首次尝试将产权界定融入CPR博弈实验中，补充了以往克服CPR困境方法中没有涉及产权界定方面的实验研究。
英文摘要：	Efficiency of common property and private property has always been the focus issue of international and domestic economists. Resource inefficiencies brought by common property has been recognized by factions economists, common possession of resources will cause rent dissipation of resources or completely dissipated, henceforth, leading to a great loss of social welfare. Common-pool resources, with the characteristics of non-exclusive and competitive, will result in personal over-use from the perspective of individual rationality rather than reasonable-use from the perspective of collective rationality, henceforth, making the common resources tend to be low efficiency or completely be wasted, ultimately lead to "tragedy of the commons". This study argues that clearly defined property rights has important social background and practical significance. Thirty-six years of reform and opening up, China has made remarkable achievements and the social economy develops rapidly. During the process, the economic system has undergone enormous changes, among them, as the core part of the change process, the reform of property rights system has aroused much concern. Reform of property rights system as a prerequisite for the economic system reform, the establishment of a clear-definition of property rights system could guarantee the efficiency in allocation of market resources and better stimulate the enthusiasm of the people in the organization. With the methods of the common-pool game theory and experimental economics, this study investigates whether the clear definition of property rights has an impact on social welfare. In the sequential models of this study, we first construct a non-property common-pool treatment that may be damaged, and then extended to the ambiguous property treatment, then the treatment of ambiguous property with punishment, ultimately, clearly-defined property treatment. In turn, we examine the resources utilization of common-pool resources, social welfare changes and the main factors that affecting the decision-making of the subjects. Sequential experiments defines property rights and punishment as a vector system, this study designs and implements a set of four different experiment treatments. Experimental results show that: firstly, in the absence of clearly-defined property, subjects do make excessive use of common-pool resources and common-pool resources collapse circularly, leading to poor efficiency; secondly, the result of ambiguous treatment is similar to the first treatment , but ambiguous property do some constraint on the individual investment behaviors; thirdly, under the treatment of ambiguous property with punishment, we find that punishment pose a threat to most subjects, subjects tend to choose cooperative strategies, but there always exist some subjects choosing uncooperative strategies, net loss caused by these over-investment behaviors is enormous; fourthly, under clearly-defined property treatment, the social welfare level is close to optimal, the result proves that clearly-defined property does contribute to the improvement of social welfare level. There may be several aspects of innovation in this study: firstly, based on the Osrtom’s CPR model, we extend the connotation of this model, putting forward an adapted CPR model which is suitable to our study and innovatively designing four different treatment; secondly, we firstly examine the common-pool resources game in the Chinese context through the means of comparative institutional experiment, which depict the game relationship of CPR model, making a complement to the domestic theoretical and experimental study; thirdly, for the first time，we attempt to define private property right in the laboratory experiment, which has not yet appear in the domestic and foreign literatures.
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