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论文编号:65 
作者编号:2120052032 
上传时间:2007/6/21 14:26:07 
中文题目:管理层激励对中国上市公司多元化  
英文题目:Impact of Management Incentive  
指导老师:薛有志 
中文关键字:多元化经营 管理层激励 公司治理 
英文关键字:Diversification Management In 
中文摘要:多元化战略能够给企业带来利益,同时也为企业制造了成本。而近年来越来越多的研究表明,实施多元化战略不能有效地提升公司价值,反而会损害股东的利益。这是因为随着上市公司股权结构的分散,公司的所有权和经营权逐渐分离。掌握上市公司实际控制权的管理层往往处于个人利益最大化而非股东利益最大化的目的而进行战略决策。而多元化战略恰好是能够满足管理层个人私利有效手段,通过多元化战略他们可以提高报酬、增长能力以及分散风险。因此管理层的激励情况对于他们是否实施多元化战略有着重要的影响。 本文基于多元化研究的委托代理视角,选取沪市2001至2004年的制造型企业作为研究对象,通过回归分析的方法就管理层激励对于上市公司多元化战略的影响问题进行了实证性研究。通过研究发现,多元化程度较低的中国制造业上市公司中的管理层激励对于多元化经营没有显著影响。在实施多元化程度较高的中国制造业上市公司中,多元化战略的实施对于公司业绩没有显著影响,且作为长期激励形式的管理层以及CEO的持股比例与多元化水平没有关系。而上市公司中管理层薪酬与多元化水平之间存在正向关系,上市公司的多元化水平越高,管理者得到的现金报酬越高;同时管理者报酬高的企业多元化的水平也较高。因此,中国上市公司应合理规划管理层报酬体系,使之达到有效激励与约束高管层的效果;并进一步加强公司治理要素的建设,通过公司治理机制的发挥防止管理层道德风险的发生。 
英文摘要:Diversification strategy not only brings the benefit to enterprises, but also introduces cost. More scholarly literature has well illustrated that implementing diversification strategy can not effectively enhance company value, but leads to damage to shareholders’ interest. We believe that this kind of phenomenon is derived from the disperse ownership structure for the listed companies whose owner rights and operation rights separate with each other. Thus the management who have the actual control right product strategy from their interests, which we called the self-interest behavior. However, diversification strategy is well employed to satisfy this subjective requirement as an effective mean. We know that diversification strategy would increase the management’s compensation and its growth ability, and what is more, to disperse the risk. Consequently we believe that management would exert significant influence on diversification strategy. Based on the agent-principle classic theoretical framework, we introduce management compensation and do its regression on diversification strategy. Empirical research presents the following results. Firstly, the management compensation of the low diversified manufacturing listed companies has no significant influence on diversification strategy. However, the diversification strategy of the high diversified manufacturing listed companies also has no significant influence on firm performance. And interestingly, the CEO and management holding share, which seemed as the long term incentive, also have no relation with the diversification strategy. Secondly, the management compensation exists positive relation to the diversified level, for more detail, higher diversified level leads to more management compensation. And at the same time, higher management compensation companies also have higher diversified level. So we can conclude that the Chinese listed companies should reasonably construct their management compensation system thus achieving the effective constraint result, and we should also emphasize the enhancement of corporate governance thus preventing the moral risk behaviors of top management.  
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