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论文编号：	649
作者编号：	2120061967
上传时间：	2008/6/20 10:14:11
中文题目：	控股股东、财务支持与盈余质量的
英文题目：	The Research on the Relationsh
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	控股股东 财务支持 盈余质量
英文关键字：	Controlling Shareholder Proppi
中文摘要：	近年来，国内外资本市场出现的一个个“股市神话”的破灭和财务造假案件都与盈余管理或利润操纵有关，会计盈余受到了干扰，盈余质量受到了质疑。相比于以前更多地关注上市公司的会计盈余，投资者、分析师和监管者开始更多地关心上市公司的盈余质量，盈余质量成为国内外学术界、实务界、政策制定者和市场监管者共同关心的重要研究议题。针对这一热点问题，本文运用了规范和实证的研究方法，将控股股东、财务支持行为和盈余质量纳入一个分析框架，从控股股东凭借其所有权通过某些手段影响盈余质量，以及控股股东通过财务支持行为影响盈余质量两个方面，结合起来研究上市公司控股股东所有权与盈余质量以及控股股东财务支持行为与盈余质量之间的关系。 本文基于2005、2006年我国沪、深两市1930家上市公司的研究样本进行多元回归检验，研究发现，股权过度集中或过度分散都不利于盈余质量的提高，只有适度的股权集中度才能保证良好的盈余质量，控股股东股权集中度与盈余质量之间是一种倒“U”型的关系；实际控制人类型对盈余质量有显著的正方向影响，当实际控制人为国有股东时，盈余质量更高；在不同持股比例下，支持行为对盈余质量的影响是不同的，控股股东持股比例较低时，由于其他股东的制衡能力较强使得其提供的财务支持的私人收益动机减弱，从而提高了盈余质量；控股股东持股比例较高时偏好控制权分享收益，此时提供的支持将会提高盈余质量；同时出于“保壳”和“保配”动机下的支持对盈余质量有负方向的影响。最后，本文在总结全文的基础上提出了政策性建议，这些建议有助于上市公司盈余质量的提高。
英文摘要：	In recent years, both the emergences of many broken “stock market myths” and financial false cases are linked to the earnings management or profit manipulation in the capital market. The accounting earnings are interfered and the earnings quality is doubted. Compared to more focus on the accounting earnings of listed companies previously, investors, analysts and regulatory agencies now begin to pay more attention to the earnings quality of listed companies. Thus, earnings quality becomes an important research issue that academe, practice field, regulatory agencies and market supervisors all focus on. Aimed at this issue, this thesis uses both normal and empirical research methods, and puts controlling shareholder, financial propping actions and earnings quality into one analysis frame to synthetically research on both the relationship between controlling shareholder and earnings quality and the relationship between propping and earnings quality from one facet that controlling shareholder influences earnings quality by way of using some methods through their ownerships and the other facet that propping influences earnings quality. This thesis is based on the multiple regression examination on the 1930 research samples from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Market in year 2005 and 2006. The result shows that the concentrated or dispersed ownership structure is not good for the improvement of earnings quality. Only the moderate ownership concentration can ensure good earnings quality, and there is a converse “U” relationship between controlling shareholder's ownership and earnings quality. The type of actual controller has a significant positive influence on earnings quality, that is, when the actual controller is the national shareholder, earnings quality is higher. The propping has different influence on the earnings quality under different ownership proportion. When the controlling shareholder’s ownership proportion is low, the other shareholders can restrict the controlling shareholder’s motivation for private benefits of control and the propping will improve the earnings quality. When the controlling shareholder’s ownership proportion is high, they will appreciate the shared benefits of control and their propping actions will improve the earnings quality. Meanwhile, the propping under the motivation to maintain listing status or qualify for rights issues has a negative influence on earnings quality. At last, this thesis proposes some political suggestions based on the summary of the whole thesis, which are helpful to the improvement of the earnings quality of listed companies.
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