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论文编号：	6483
作者编号：	2120122538
上传时间：	2014/6/11 16:00:10
中文题目：	上市公司管理权力与非效率投资研究
英文题目：	Study on the Relation between Managerial power and Inefficient investment in listed companies
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	管理层权力，非效率投资，投资过度，投资不足
英文关键字：	managerial power; inefficient investment; overinvestment
中文摘要：	投资活动是企业三大财务决策行为之一，投资效率更是决定企业价值的最直接最重要的因素，其直接关系到企业能否实现价值最大化，同时也关系着股东能否获得利益最大化。由于资源和政策等影响，我国许多行业和地区出现重复投资现象，投资效率低下。非效率的投资行为给我国经济发展带来了隐患，不但浪费人力财力物力，还将严重影响资本市场的有效运行。非效率投资问题也因此成为近年来学术界和实务界研究的热点问题。 现代企业的典型特征是两权分离。作为企业各种契约关系的枢纽，管理层拥有权力的大小决定了其与股东、债权人等利益相关者博弈的能力。而管理层作为有限理性经济人，可能会运用其手中的权力攫取私有收益，这将影响到企业的投资效率以及企业价值。然而，目前国内从管理层权力角度来研究非效率投资的文献较少。因此，本文试图从管理层权力角度解读企业的非效率投资。 本文共分为五部分，第一部分绪论，包括研究背景、研究内容和研究创新点。第二部分是理论基础与文献综述，包括基本概念的界定、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和管理层权力理论，并分国外国内两部分对管理层权力与非效率投资关系的文献进行了梳理。第三部分，利用适度投资模型得出非效率投资。第四部分，在理论分析的基础上提出研究假设，将第三章的实证结果作为被解释变量，设计变量及构建管理层权力与非效率投资关系模型，并进行了实证分析。第五部分是研究结论及展望，对研究结果进行总结并提出政策建议。 　　本文通过对国内外有关管理层权力与非效率投资的文献进行回顾，在委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和管理层权力理论的基础上，以2010-2012年间深沪两市A股上市公司为样本，并结合我国国有企业特殊的制度背景，考察了管理层权力与非效率投资的关系。通过将样本公司分为国有与非国有，考察了最终控制人类型对管理层权力与非效率投资关系的影响。 　　研究结果显示：（1）管理层权力越大，非效率投资越严重；（2）与国有制企业相比，非国有制企业更容易出现管理层权力膨胀导致的非效率投资行为。 　　为抑制非效率投资，保护投资者权益，增加企业价值，本文提出以下建议： 　 （1） 限制董事长与总经理两职合一，提高董事会的独立性； 　 （2） 完善公司治理，强化董事会对公司的控制权； （3） 加强股东对公司的直接干预。
英文摘要：	Investment is one of the three most important finance decision-making behaviors in an enterprise, and even the investment efficiency is the supreme factor directly affecting the value of an enterprise which has the direct bearing on the maximum benefit of the enterprise and its shareholders. Problems such as poor investment efficiency and over-investment arise in a great many of industries and regions because of the influence of resource and consumers’ demand. Inefficient investment has brought the hidden danger to China's economic development, at the same time been the obstacle for the effective use of capital assets. At present, inefficient investment become the focus of the academia and practical circle. The separation of two rights is the typical characteristic of modern enterprises. Management is the hub of various kinds of contract relationships in an enterprise whose power represents their ability in the game with the stakeholders. As bounded rationality “economic man”, management may use their power to obtain private benefits which will consequently affect the efficiency of the enterprise investment and the enterprise value. Few literatures focus on the inefficient investment from the perspective of management, so the paper tries to reveal the relationship between management and inefficient investment. The paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction, including the research background, research ideas and methods and the innovation points. Chapter two is theoretical foundation and literature review, including the definition of basic concepts, the introduction of the principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory and management power theory, and the list of related literatures at home and abroad. Chapter three is the empirical test of the Richardson model, and the result is the efficiency of investment. The fourth part, on the basis of theoretical analysis , we put forward research hypothesis. We take the empirical results from the third chapter as explained variable, design variables and build the model between management power and the efficiency of investment, and has carried on the empirical analysis. The fifth part is the conclusion and outlook, summarizes the research results and put forward policy Suggestions. This paper first reviews the domestic and international literatures about the relationship between the management power and inefficient investment. And then test the relationship based on the principal-agent theory and management power theory, combining with the unique system background in China, putting companies that are listed in Chinese A-stock market in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples. These sample companies are distinguished as state-owned and non-state in order to investigate whether the controller type will influence the relationship between inefficient investment and management power. The results show that: 1)The more management power, the more inefficient investment. 2)Compared with state-owned enterprises, it is easier for non-stated companies to face inefficient investment caused by the expansion of management power. In order to reduce the inefficient investment, protect investors' interests and increase the enterprises’ value, suggestions are put forward as follows: 1) Restrict the combination of director and general manager, and raise the independence of the board of directors. 2) Perfect the corporate governance, strengthen the board of directors for control of the company. 3) Strengthen the shareholders’ direct intervention in the company.
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