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论文编号：	6478
作者编号：	2120122646
上传时间：	2014/6/11 14:05:06
中文题目：	财富约束、信息不对称与企业融资结构的实验研究
英文题目：	Experimental Study on Wealth Constraint，Asymmetric Information and Corporate Financial Structure
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	财富约束；信息不对称；融资结构；实验研究
英文关键字：	Wealth constraints；Information Asymmetry；Corporate Financial Structure；Experimental Study
中文摘要：	经济增长与企业发展离不开资金这一生产要素。企业以不同方式、从不同渠道筹集的资金分布状况表现为一个企业的融资结构。 企业家是否受到财富约束，是企业家能否进行内源融资的一个重要影响因素，直接影响到企业的融资结构；信息同样也是影响企业融资结构的重要因素。一方面,信息不对称会导致外源融资成本高于内源融资，影响了企业融资结构，另一方面，信息不对称也造成了企业家与投资者之间的委托代理问题。 结合我国企业融资的实际情况，考虑到我国企业在进行融资活动时信息不对称程度较难进行实证检验的问题，本文运用实验室实验的方法，针对有无财富约束、有无信息不对称，分别观察在四种实验设置下企业对债务融资和股权融资这两种基本的直接融资方式选择情况。通过比较两种融资方案的成本、收益以及企业控制权配置方面的差异，在策略互动过程中研究财富约束、信息不对称对企业融资方案选择的影响；通过分析不同情境下融资方案的选择，进一步考察不同情境下企业控制权的配置状况。 本文的研究将为减弱信息不对称给我国企业融资方案的选择及投融资双方中控制权配置问题所带来的负面影响提供参考建议，也为解决信息不对称、财富约束等问题导致的我国企业融资难问题、控制权配置问题提供理论依据。 研究结果表明，财富约束对企业融资结构有显著影响：当企业家不存在财富约束时，企业家偏好于股权融资；当企业家存在财富约束时，企业家偏好于债务融资。实验还发现，信息不对称也对企业融资结构有显著影响：当企业家有私人信息并且是坏消息时，企业家偏好于股权融资；当企业家有私人信息并且是好消息时，企业家偏好于债务融资。财富约束对信息不对称造成影响：当企业家不存在财富约束时，信息不对称程度较高时，企业家偏好于债务融资；信息不对称程度较低时，企业家偏好于股权融资。当企业家存在财富约束时，信息不对称程度较高时，企业家偏好于股权融资；信息不对称程度较低时，企业家偏好于债务融资。 本文主要有以下两个创新点： 第一，采用实验室实验的方法，通过研究被试不同条件设置下对不同融资方案的决策情况，从财富约束、信息不对称两个角度，对已有理论进行验证。 第二，运用实验室实验的方法，通过对不同类型融资方案的具体刻画，结合被试相关因素的测度和分析，进一步发现了财富约束、信息不对称与企业融资结构之间的内在联系。
英文摘要：	Capital is one of the principal factors of production in economic growth and company development. The capital distribution from different channels and by different means represents the financial structure of a company. Whether the entrepreneurs are constrained by the wealth is an important factor of financing. Information is also an important factor affecting the structure of corporate finance. On the one hand, information asymmetry can lead to higher financing costs foreign aid financing. On the other hand, information asymmetry also caused a principal-agent problem between entrepreneurs and investors. Combined with the actual situation of corporation finance, this paper takes into account the problem of difficulty in measuring the degree of information asymmetry when corporate financing in empirical tests and applies the methods of laboratory experiments. For the presence or absence of wealth constraints and information asymmetry, the choices to equity financing or debt financing are respectively observed in four experiments under different experimental settings. By comparing the differences of cost, return and corporation control of two financing methods, I study in the influence of wealth constraints and information asymmetry in corporation financing choices in the process of strategic interaction. By analyzing the selection of financing plans under different circumstances, I further investigate the configuration status of corporate control. This study will provide a reference to decrease the negative effects of information asymmetry when selecting corporation financing methods and configurating the control rights between investors and financiers. It also provides a theoretical basis to deal with the difficulty in corporate financing and corporate control in Chinese companies. Several conclusions could be drawn. (1) The wealth constraint has a significant impact on corporate financing structure. When the entrepreneurs constrained by the wealth, entrepreneurs prefer equity financing; when the entrepreneurs are not subject to the wealth constraint, entrepreneurs prefer debt financing. (2) It was also found that the information asymmetry also have a significant impact on corporate financing structure. When entrepreneurs have private information and the information is bad, entrepreneurs prefer equity financing; when entrepreneurs have private information and the information is good news, entrepreneurs prefer debt financing. (3) Wealth constraints affect the information asymmetry: When there is no wealth constraints, when the degree of information asymmetry is high, entrepreneurs prefer debt financing; on the other hand, entrepreneurs prefer equity financing. (4) When there is wealth constraints, when the degree of information asymmetry is high, entrepreneurs prefer equity financing; on the other hand, entrepreneurs prefer debt financing. This paper mainly has two innovations: Firstly, the method of laboratory experiment is applied. By analyzing the decision on financing plans under different experimental settings, the existing theory is verified from the perspective of wealth constraint and information asymmetry. Secondly, different types of financing plans are specifically described. Combined with the measurement and analysis of dependent factors, such as risk preference and fairness preferences, the inner correlation between corporation financing structure and constraint and information asymmetry is fully investigated.
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