×

联系我们

方式一(推荐):点击跳转至留言建议,您的留言将以短信方式发送至管理员,回复更快

方式二:发送邮件至 nktanglan@163.com

学生论文

论文查询结果

返回搜索

论文编号:6431 
作者编号:2120122560 
上传时间:2014/6/10 11:59:13 
中文题目:关联方交易对审计师选择及审计收费的影响研究 
英文题目:Research on Related Party Transaction’ Effect on Auditor Choice and Audit Fee 
指导老师:张继勋 
中文关键字:关联方交易;审计师选择;审计收费 
英文关键字: Related Party Transactions;Auditor Choice;Audit Fee 
中文摘要:由于我国经济体制的特殊性,大部分的上市公司是国有企业在改制过程中,通过剥离“优质资产”成立并发展起来的。因此,上市公司与其母体的企业集团之间存在着千丝万缕的联系。据年报所披露的数据显示,上市公司普遍存在关联方交易,关联方交易不仅发生的频率高,而且手段繁多、规模巨大。关联方交易有很多优势,如可以降低交易成本,提高经济效率。但许多研究证据表明控股股东会通过关联方交易进行“掏空”,侵害中小股东的利益。 审计作为一种重要的监管制度安排,引入到现代公司治理中。审计师负有对财务报告进行审核、鉴证,公开发表审计意见的责任,并据此向被审计单位收取一定的审计费用。关联交易水平较高的上市公司可能会存在不公允的关联方交易,其在选择会计师事务所和支付审计费用中会加以考虑。会计师事务所对该风险的识别也会体现在审计收费上。 本文采用2008—2012年沪深A股主板上市公司的数据,实证检验了关联方交易水平对审计师选择以及对审计收费的影响。并将样本分类,进一步研究了公司不同的负债水平、经营状况、控股股东的持股比例这些特征,会对上市公司关联方交易水平与审计收费的关系产生何种影响。实证结果表明,关联方交易水平较高的公司,通常会选择非四大会计师事务所来为其提供年度财务报告鉴证服务,并且所支付的审计费用也更高。关联方交易水平与审计收费的这种正相关关系,在高资产负债率的公司,亏损公司,以及控股股东持股比例较低的公司更为显著。本文最后提出一些完善关联方交易监管的建议,首先要完善关联方交易的信息披露制度,其次加强审计师第三方中介的监督作用,最后要健全上市公司的法人治理机制。 
英文摘要:Due to the special nature of our economic system, most listed companies are established and developed by stripping "quality assets" in the restructuring process of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, there is a natural link between the listed company and the original enterprise group.According to the data disclosed in the annual reports, ‘related party transactions (RPT)’ is prevalent in listed companies. Apart from its high frequency, RPT is varied in methods and huge in scale. Although RPT helps to reduce transaction costs and improve transaction efficiency, many research evidences show that, through RPT, the controlling shareholder may ‘tunneling’ the companies’ asset, which harms the minority shareholders’ interest. As an important regulatory institutional arrangement, auditing is introduced to modern corporate governance. Auditor bears the responsibility of auditing financial statements and announcing audit opinion publicly, and accordingly charges the audited party a certain amount of audit fee.Listed companies with higher RPT level may have unfair RPT, which will be considered in their choice of accounting firms and payment of audit fees. On the other hand, the accounting firms’ identification of risks is also reflected in the audit fees they charged. This paper adopts the data of 2008 - 2012 A-share Main Board listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, and conducts empirical tests of RPT level’s effects on the choice of auditing firm and audit fees.This paper also classifies these samples, and further studies company characters such as levels of debt, operating conditions, stake of controlling shareholders, will have what kind of impact on the correlation between the company’s RPT level and audit fees.The empirical results show that, companies with higher RPT level tend to choose non-Big Four accounting firms to provide annual report audit services and the audit fees they paid are also higher. This positive correlation between RPT level and audit fees, is more significant in companies with high gearing ratio, operation losses and low stake of controlling shareholders.This paper concludes with some proposals for perfecting RPT regulation. We must first improve the information disclosure system of RPT, followed by the strengthening the supervisory role of a third-party auditor, and the last perfect the corporate governance mechanism of listed companies.As an important regulatory institutional arrangement, audit is introduced to modern corporate governance. Auditor bears the responsibility of auditing financial statements and giving audit opinion publicly, and accordingly charges the audited party a certain amount of audit fee.Listed companies with higher RPT level may have unfair RPT, which will be considered in their choice of accounting firms and payment of audit fees. On the other hand, the accounting firms’ identification of risks is also reflected in the audit fees they charged. This paper adopts the data of 2008 - 2012 A-share Main Board listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, and conducts empirical tests of RPT level’s effects on the choice of auditing firm and audit fees.This paper also classifies these samples, and further studies company characters such as levels of debt, operating conditions, stake of controlling shareholders, will have what kind of impact on the correlation between the company’s RPT level and audit fees.The empirical results show that, companies with higher RPT level tend to choose non-Big Four accounting firms to provide annual report audit services and the audit fees they paid are also higher. This positive correlation between RPT level and audit fees, is more significant in companies with high gearing ratio, operation losses and low stake of controlling shareholdersThis paper concludes with some proposals for perfecting RPT regulation. We must first improve the information disclosure system of RPT, followed by the strengthening the supervisory role of a third-party auditor, and the last perfect the corporate governance mechanism of listed companies. 
查看全文:预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)