联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	643
作者编号：	2120062058
上传时间：	2008/6/20 10:01:06
中文题目：	上市公司终极控制权特征对公司绩
英文题目：	An Empirical Research on the E
指导老师：	薛有志
中文关键字：	终极控制权 现金流权 金字塔结
英文关键字：	Ultimate Control Right Cash F
中文摘要：	La Porta等人研究认为大多数国家都存在终极控制股东。控制股东常常利用金字塔结构等方式来构建一个复杂的控制链。国内学者研究结果显示，我国的上市公司中大都存在终极控制人现象，而金字塔股权结构是我国终极控制股东普遍采用的控制方式。 本文结合上市公司样本数据，对终极控制权特征对公司绩效的影响进行了研究，认为国有和民营两类上市公司的终极控制权特征及其对公司绩效的影响存在差异，本文从不同终极控制股东的金字塔结构构建动因的角度分析了此种差异存在的原因。 本文认为民营上市公司的终极控制股东利用金字塔股权结构实现了控制权与现金流权较大程度的偏离，国有上市公司两权偏离度较低。在适度的金字塔层级内，国有上市公司控制权层级与公司绩效显著正相关，民营上市公司控制权层级与公司绩效显著负相关。当终极控制股东的控制权比例较低时，国有上市公司终极控制股东的控制权比例与公司绩效正相关，民营上市公司终极控制股东的控制权比例与公司绩效负相关。国有上市公司的控制权与现金流权偏离度与绩效存在显著的正相关关系，偏离度越高，绩效越高；民营上市公司的控制权与现金流权偏离度与公司绩效存在显著的负相关关系，偏离度越高，绩效越低。 结合对终极控制权和金字塔结构的研究，本文认为这一差异产生的原因是：民营上市公司的金字塔结构主要是企业自发性选择的结果，终极控制股东倾向于利用金字塔结构实现控制权与现金流权的高度偏离，从而实现控制权私人收益，对公司绩效产生了不利影响。相反，国有上市公司复杂金字塔结构的形成更大程度上受国有企业分权改革以及国家组建企业集团等行政性推动的影响，更高的金字塔层级以及更高的控制权与现金流权偏离度意味着高度的分权以及较少的政府干预，从而使得国有上市公司终极控制股东的控制权与现金流权的偏离度越高绩效越高。
英文摘要：	La Porta’s research shows that there are ultimate controlling shareholders in most countries. The controlling shareholders often make use of such ways as Pyramid Structure etc. to establish a complicated control chain. The research of domestic scholars shows that there are ultimate controlling shareholders in most listed companies in China. Combining with the sample data of listed companies, the thesis researches on the impact of the characteristics of ultimate controlling right on company’s performance. There are differences with the characteristics of ultimate controlling right between state-owned listed companies and private listed companies and its impact on the performance. The thesis analyses the reason of the difference from the perspective of the cause of the establishment of Pyramid Structure in state-owned listed companies and private listed companies. In appropriate Pyramid levels, the level of the control right has positive correlation with the performance in state-owned companies, while the correlation is negative in private companies. At low level of control right proportion, the proportion of control right has positive correlation with the performance in state-owned companies, while the correlation is negative in private companies. The seperation of control right and cash flow right has positive correlation in state-owned companies, and the correlation is negative in private companies. The thesis thinks that the reason of the differences is the cause of the establishment of Pyramid Structure in state-owned companies and private companies. The Pyramid Structure in private companies is a result of enterprise's spontaneity choice for the private income of control right. Oppositely, the establishment of Pyramid Structure in state-owned companies is mainly promoted by the decentralization reform. The seperation of control right and cash flow right means the decentralization of the power and the reduction of government interference.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)