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论文编号：	6413
作者编号：	2120122601
上传时间：	2014/6/10 0:35:56
中文题目：	政府补贴对高科技企业债务融资的影响研究——基于信息不对称的中介效应分析
英文题目：	A Research on the Influence of the Government Subsidies to the High-tech Enterprise Debt Financing——Based on the Mediation Effect Analysis of Information Asymmetry
指导老师：	李莉
中文关键字：	政府补贴;高科技企业;债务融资;信息不对称
英文关键字：	Government subsidies;Hi-tech enterprise;Debt financing;Information asymmetry.
中文摘要：	我国当前的重要发展战略是构建创新型国家，创新的重要基础是发展高科技企业。而资金是研发活动所需的重要基础，是发展高科技企业的重要前提。政府扶持高科技企业的各项补贴措施有利于直接帮助高科技企业缓解融资困境，也有利于起到信号传递作用间接帮助企业融资。关于企业，影响其债务融资的因素非常多，如：企业规模、成长速度、盈利能力、行业特征、公司治理情况等；对高科技企业来讲，较高的经营风险是高科技企业与一般传统企业区别的重要特点，本文试图研究政府补贴是否会影响企业获得债务融资。同时信息不对称水平是企业融资约束的重要影响因素，当前我国面临市场失灵，企业不愿披露有关自身技术研发的相关信息，这造成了高科技企业与外部资金提供者之间的信息不对称。在此基础上，文章试图解释，在政府向企业提供补贴的情况下，高科技企业会不会更愿披露自身的相关信息，企业与外部资金提供者之间的信息不对称程度是否会获得缓解；并进一步研究信息不对称水平降低对企业在获得银行等金融机构的债务融资有什么影响。基于以上问题，本文首先分析政府补贴与信息不对称的关系，其次分析信息不对称与高科技企业债务融资之间的关系，在此基础上传导出政府补贴与高科技企业债务融资之间的关系。本文认为政府补贴是通过信息不对称来影响高科技企业债务融资的，即政府补贴影响信息不对称，进而影响债务融资。在这一条路径中，信息不对称水平是政府补贴影响债务融资的中介变量。通过构建模型进行实证检验，本文验证假设。本文以公司财务学和政治经济学相交叉的方式，将政府补贴因素引入公司融资问题的研究，丰富了相关融资理论，为加强政府对高科技企业的扶持、加快我国高科技产业发展提供了理论和决策依据。
英文摘要：	China's current development strategy is to build a major innovation-oriented country, and an important foundation of this strategy is the development of high-tech enterprises. Funding is an important foundation needed to research and development activities and is an important prerequisite for the development of high-tech enterprises. Various government subsidies to support high-tech enterprises serve as direct financing to help ease the plight of high-tech enterprises, and are also conducive to play a role in signal transduction indirect support to help corporate finance. Various factors have impact on the enterprise’s debt financing, such as: firm size, growth rate, profitability, industry characteristics, corporate governance, etc. For high-tech enterprises, higher business risk is an important feature of high-tech enterprises and traditional enterprises distinction. This paper attempts to examine whether government subsidies will affect access to debt financing. At the same time, the level of information asymmetry is an important factor in corporate finance constraints. China is facing the current market failure. Companies are reluctant to disclose information about their technology research and development, which resulted in the high-tech enterprise and external information asymmetry between funding. On this basis, the article tries to explain, in the case of government subsidies to enterprises, whether the high-tech companies will be more willing to disclose information about them and whether corporate and external information asymmetry between capital providers will receive remission. This paper also studies what impact will the reducing the level of information asymmetry brings on corporate banking and other financial institutions in obtaining debt financing. Based on the above issues, this paper analyzes the relationship between government subsidies and asymmetric information, followed by analysis of the relationship between information asymmetry and high-tech corporate debt financing and finally concludes the relationship between government subsidies and high-tech corporate debt financing. This paper argues that government subsidies are affected by information asymmetry to debt financing of high-tech companies, i.e., government subsidies affects information asymmetry, thereby affecting the debt financing. In this method, the level of information asymmetry serves as the mediator parameter between government subsidies and its impact on debt financing. This paper verifies the hypothesis by building model to conduct empirical tests. In this paper, corporate finance and political economics intersect a way that will introduce factors of corporate finance government subsidies issue, enriching the related financing theory, to accelerate the development of China's high-tech industry, to strengthen corporate support for the government, to support high-tech enterprise development and to provide a theoretical basis for decision making.
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