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论文编号：	6409
作者编号：	2120122638
上传时间：	2014/6/9 23:21:49
中文题目：	中国上市银行特许权价值与风险承担——基于董事会治理调节效应的研究
英文题目：	The Empirical Research about Franchise Value and Risk-taking in China’s Listed Banks：Based on the Research of the Regulating Effect of Board Governance
指导老师：	张耀伟
中文关键字：	特许权价值；银行；风险承担；董事会治理；调节效应
英文关键字：	Franchise value; Risk-taking; Board governance; Regulation effect
中文摘要：	金融危机的屡次发生使人们不断探索如何更好地完善银行的风险管控体系。20世纪30年代大萧条的发生，使众多学者逐渐达成共识：大萧条在很大程度上是由银行危机导致的，银行体系稳定有序才利于全球金融繁荣。我国银行业兴起带有浓厚的政治色彩，我国的商业银行特别是国有银行，长期处于政府的严密监督之下，政府往往通过银行进行宏观经济调控。同时，银行以经营货币作为主营业务，可以借助于资本杠杆从事高风险投资，其经营特点和重要性决定了政府必须对银行进行严格的监管，银行牌照的申请也必须经过严格的审核。另一方面，银行也只有获得了政府授予的特许权证才能进行经营，因此，这个特许权证往往具有一定的价值，这就是所谓的“特许权价值”（FV）。理论上讲，在特许权保护下，银行可以获得超额收益，本质上来讲，特许权价值来自银行业的垄断租金。特许权价值可以视为银行破产的机会成本，特许权价值越高，相应的机会成本就越大，银行就越有动力维持正常经营，“道德风险”和“逆向选择”发生的可能性就会降低。如果银行经营不善倒闭，就意味着银行将失去由特许权价值带来的超额利润，从这个意义上讲，银行特许权价值具有自律效应。本文选取了16家上市银行2008年-2012年五年期间的数据，用托宾Q衡量特许权价值的大小，验证了特许权价值的自律效应在我国的存在性，并研究了董事会治理状况对银行特许权价值自律效应的调节作用。文章通过实证研究发现，特许权价值的自律效应在我国现阶段并不存在，这一方面可能是由于市场竞争的加剧，导致银行特许权价值下降，不能对银行形成约束作用；另一方面是因为我国实行隐性存款保险制度，削弱了特许权价值自律效应。在对董事会治理调节效应的研究中，发现董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事职业背景对特许权价值的发挥有正向调节作用，适当提高董事会规模，增大独立董事比例，聘请具有金融职业背景的董事有利于特许权价值的自律效应的发挥。而董事长/副董事长与行长是否两职合一、董事会专业委员会设置情况对特许权价值自律效应的影响并不显著。
英文摘要：	The financial crisis occurs frequently make people continuously explore how to better improve the bank risk control system. The happening of the great depression during 1930 s, many scholars have made gradually reached a consensus: the great depression was largely caused by the banking crisis, the banking system stability and orderly is conducive to the global financial prosperity. China's banking industry accompany with strong political color, especially state-owned Banks, our commercial Banks under the close supervision of the government for a long time, the government often carry out macroeconomic regulation and control through banks. At the same time, money is the main business of the bank, the bank can use capital leverage for risky investments. Operation characteristics and importance of decided the government must to heavily regulate banks, banking license application must go through strict review. Banks, on the other hand, only won the government awarded franchise license to conduct business, as a result, the concession card often has a certain value, this is the so-called "franchise value" (FV). In theory, under the aegis of the franchise Banks can get excess returns, essentially, franchise value from banking monopoly rent. Franchise value can be thought of as the opportunity cost of bank failures, the higher the franchise value, the greater the opportunity cost of the corresponding, Banks have higher power maintaining business, "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" will reduce. If bank collapse, means that the bank will lose excess profits brought in by the franchise value, in this sense, the bank franchise value with self-discipline effect. This article selects 16 listed Banks in 2008-2012, five years of data, using tobin Q to measure the size of the franchise value, verify the self-discipline effect of franchise value existence in our country, and studied the situation of board governance self-discipline effect on bank franchise value. In this paper, through the empirical research, the franchise value of self-discipline effect does not exist at present in our country, this could be due to market competition intensified, resulting in a decline in bank franchise value; On the other hand , because the recessive deposit insurance system in our country, weakened the effect of self-discipline of the franchise value. In the study of the regulating effect of board governance, found that board size, the proportion of independent director, director of the professional background of the franchise value play a role of positive adjustment, and appropriately increase the board size, increase the proportion of independent director, hired a financial professional background of directors play in favor of the self-discipline effect of franchise value. And whether or vice chairman and President, chairman of the joining together of two job situation, the professional committee of the board, there is no significant effect of self-discipline of franchise value.
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