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论文编号：	6403
作者编号：	2120122555
上传时间：	2014/6/9 21:58:41
中文题目：	金字塔控制结构下两权分离与上市公司债务融资——基于创始家族的研究
英文题目：	Separation of Control and Ownership in Pyramid Structure and Debt Financing of Chinese Listed Companies: A Study on the Founding Family
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	创始家族；金字塔结构；两权分离；债务融资成本；债务期限结构
英文关键字：	Founding Family; Pyramid Structure；Separation between Control and Ownership; Debt Financing Cost; Debt Maturity Structure
中文摘要：	目前许多国家的企业普遍采用金字塔控制结构控制上市公司，我国上市公司亦然。金字塔控制结构下的所有权和控制权分离使上市公司实际控制人有更强的能力和动机采取损害债权人利益的行为，因此现有研究认为两权分离度越高，债务融资成本也往往越高，债务期限也受到更多限制。同时，不同产权性质的企业其承担的债务融资成本与债务期限结构也存有差异。随着我国鼓励民营公司上市发行，创始家族上市企业数量迅速增加并受到资本市场热烈追捧。那么，创始家族性质是否会影响两权分离度与债务融资之间的关系呢？创始家族企业的债务融资条件较其他类型企业有何不同？ 本文以2009-2012年我国沪深两市A股的4016个上市公司年度数据为研究样本，以两权分离度衡量金字塔控制结构，关注债务融资中的债务融资成本与债务期限结构，检验了两权分离对上市公司债务融资的影响。为了进一步考察产权性质对上市公司债务融资的影响，尤其在创始家族企业中两权分离对上市公司债务融资的影响有何差异，本文在整理定义了创始家族企业，检验了两权分离、创始家族与债务融资成本、债务期限结构四者之间的关系。 本文主要得出以下四个研究结论：（1）对于金字塔控制结构下的上市公司，其两权分离度越高，债务融资成本也越高，债务期限则越低；（2）创始家族企业这一性质会削弱两权分离度与债务融资成本之间的正相关关系、两权分离度与债务期限结构之间的负相关关系；（3）民营企业中，创始家族企业债务融资条件要优于其他民营企业；（4）相对于同时期创始家族企业，国有企业公司治理效应更弱，其两权分离度对债务融资条件的影响并不显著。 本文的贡献主要在于：（1）本文站在债权人的视角，研究不同产权性质企业金字塔控制结构下两权分离对债务融资的影响。（2）本文在考察上市公司债务融资行为时同时将债务融资成本与债务期限结构进行研究，并对其指标计算方法加以改进，使衡量更加准确。（3）不同于以往研究结果，本文发现了产权性质对金字塔控制结构下两权分离经济后果的影响差异，具有中国特色；进一步研究得出创始家族性质对促进上市公司治理机制发展的推动作用。
英文摘要：	Pyramid structure, which makes the separation between voting rights and cash-flow rights, is currently used by enterprises worldwide to control their listed companies, so does in China. By the structure the motivation and ability of the ultimate controlling shareholder to damage creditors rises. Therefore, the higher the degree of separation between control and ownership is, the higher the debt financing cost, and the lower the debt maturity，the studies suggest. Meanwhile different natures of ownership generate different debt financing cost and different types of debt maturity structure. As there is a great of number of private ownership companies go public, founding family companies are under hot pursuit in capital markets. So, does founding family impact the effect between the separation between control and ownership and debt financing? What’s the difference in debt financing between founding family companies and others? Using China A-share listed companies’ annual data, 4016 during 2009-2012, this paper examines the influence of the separation between control and ownership to the debt financing including cost and maturity structure. To further investigate the influence of the nature of property to debt financing, and of the separation between control and ownership to debt financing especially in founding family companies, this paper renews the definitions of founding family companies, and examines the relationship among the separation between control and ownership, founding family companies, debt financing cost and debt financing maturity structure. The results indicate that: (1) in the listed companies with a pyramid structure, the separation of ownership and control has a positive and significant effect on debt financing cost, but a negative and significant effect on debt maturity;(2) the nature of founding family company weakens the effects discovered above;(3)the nature of founding family will ease the agency conflict with creditors, which makes the companies’ financing conditions better;(4) in state-owned enterprises, the separation of ownership and control has an insignificant effect on debt financing cost as well as debt maturity structure. The contribution of this paper lies in 3 aspects: (1) based on the creditor’s perspective， this paper makes a study on how separation of control and ownership in pyramid structure with different natures of ownership impacting on the debt financing; (2) this paper examines companies’ debt financing using both of debt financing cost and debt maturity structure, and meanwhile improved variables design; (3) this paper gets some new findings that with Chinese characteristics the economic consequences of separation between control and ownership differ in property rights, that the character of founding family can weaken the agency conflict with creditors, and that the founding family companies’ financing conditions are better than other private enterprises.
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