联系我们

论文查询结果	返回搜索

论文编号：	6401
作者编号：	2120122542
上传时间：	2014/6/9 21:49:21
中文题目：	机构投资者对我国上市公司信息披露质量的影响研究
英文题目：	Research on the Impact of Institutional Investor Holding on Information Disclosure Quality of Listed Companies in China
指导老师：	周晓苏
中文关键字：	机构投资者；信息披露质量；公司治理；异质机构投资者；股权性质
英文关键字：	Institutional investor; Quality of information disclosure; Corporate governance; Different type of institutional investor; Ownership property
中文摘要：	本文首先进行理论分析部分，通过委托代理理论、股权结构理论和投资者关系管理理论对机构投资者对信息披露质量的影响动机进行了理论分析。之后又研究了机构投资者对于信息披露质量的内外部两类影响路径，其中内部途径包括行使股东投票权、征集代理投票权、提交股东提案、进入董事会以及施加非正式影响，外部途径则包括股价机制和公司控制权机制。最后梳理了近年来我国制度和法规方面的变迁。通过上述理论上的分析本文提出了基本假设，随后进入实证检验部分，得到的基本结论是在中国的上市公司中机构投资者持股所占比例越高其信息披露质量越高。接下来，本文又做了进一步的研究，将机构投资者按照持股时间分为长期和短期投资型两种，对比这两种异质机构投资者对信息披露质量的影响情况是否存在差异。实证研究结果表明只有长期机构投资者能够产生提升作用，而短期机构投资者无法达到预期效果。随后，结合对异质机构投资者的分析，本文又加入股权性质形成交叉项，通过双重分类将研究对象划分为四个不同类别，比较和检验了长期和短期的机构投资者对国有和非国有这两种不同股权性质的企业产生的影响差异。实证研究得到的结论是相对于国有控股公司，长期机构投资者对于非国有上市公司信息披露质量有一个更加积极的影响，而短期机构投资者无论对于国有还是非国有上市公司在信息披露质量上均不会有任何显著影响。在之后的稳健性检验中采用三分位数分类方法对机构投资者进行重新划分，并将全样本划分为国有和非国有两个子样本进行对比分析，结果均与上述检验相一致，使本文研究结论的可靠性得到了很好的验证。
英文摘要：	First is the theoretical researches part of this paper. Through the principle-agent theory、equity structure theory and investor relationship management theory, this paper analyzes the motivation of institutional investor’s influence on company information disclosure quality. Then studies two ways of institutional investor effects on information disclosure quality, the internal way includes exercise the shareholders' voting rights、solicitation agent for the voting rights、submit a shareholder proposal、enter the board of directors and exert informal influences, while the external way concludes stock prices mechanisms and corporate control mechanisms. After that, this paper teases the changes of the laws and regulations on institution investor in China. With these theoretical researches above, we proposed the basic hypothesis, and turn to empirical tests. It shows that the proportion of institutional investor holding has significant positive correlation on company information disclosure quality. Next, this article makes further studies. According to the holding time, we divide the institutional investors into two different types, the long-term institutional investors and the short-term ones, and to analyze whether there is any different effect on the company information disclosure quality. The empirical results indicate that, only the long-term institutional investors could make positive impact on the quality of information disclosure, while the short-term ones cannot work effectively. After that, combined with the analysis of different types of institutional investors, the ownership property was added to form the cross terms, and the objects are divided into four different categories through the dual classification, in order to compare and examine the different effects of long-term and short-term institutional investors produce on the state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. As a conclusion, the long-term institutional investors could exert a stronger positive impact on the information disclosure quality for non-state-owned companies than the state-owned ones, while the short-term institutional investors cannot have a significant impact neither for the state-owned companies nor the non-state-owned ones. In the robustness test, the third quantile method is used to reclassification the institutional investors, and the whole sample was divided into state-owned and non-state-owned two subsamples, the results are consistent with the above inspection, which confirmed the reliability of this article’s conclusion.
查看全文：	预览  下载(下载需要进行登录)