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论文编号：	638
作者编号：	2120061994
上传时间：	2008/6/20 9:52:36
中文题目：	基于非消耗性禀赋的政府招商引资
英文题目：	Experimental Research on Busin
指导老师：	李建标
中文关键字：	非消费性禀赋、地方政府招商引资
英文关键字：	unconsuming endowment busines
中文摘要：	对于市场经济体制下的中国地方政府来说，招商引资既是衡量官员绩效，考查官员能力的重要指标，又是推动当地经济发展，提高地区经济实力及全民福利的不可或缺的重要因素。具有独立决策与行为能力的同级地方政府对稀缺招商引资机会的过度竞争，产生的直接后果是招商引资本身利益价值的大大缩水。 本文从行为主体行为与决策的角度出发，将参与招商引资竞争的同级地方政府抽象为追求自身利益最大化的行为主体，构建了同级地方政府间招商引资竞争博弈模型，在理论分析的基础上，通过实验室实验研究，进一步验证了理论假设，并在对实验数据分析的基础上，发现了一些超越理论假设的问题，并进行了推论。 禀赋是指已经拥有且对自己有用的资源。根据禀赋在使用时是否会发生消耗，本文将禀赋分为非消耗性禀赋和消耗性禀赋。在模型中，非消耗性禀赋代表了政府的竞争势力，消耗性禀赋代表了政府的竞争策略。基础模型与实验研究了在短期和长期两种不同情境下政府竞争策略，并对比了非消耗性禀赋差异与保留效应差异对政府竞争行为的影响是否不同。研究发现，在短期，政府绝大部分情况下都会采取利益收割策略。在长期内，政府间可以通过利益探测策略发出合作邀请，一旦非协议合作达成，双方获得的收益将比未达成非协议合作的政府明显高出许多。 在扩展模型中，本文分别考虑了存在转移支付、先进技术转移支付、发展效应、场外谈判等不同辅助制度对长期序贯博弈政府竞争的影响。与理论分析不同的是，在普通转移支付制度下，劣势政府的收益降低，优势政府的收益显著提高，而在先进技术转移支付制度下，这种情况则相反。考虑发展效应情况下，无论是帕累托实现率，还是各个政府的收益，都有明显地提高。场外谈判制度使得帕累托实现率达到了100%，但劣势优势政府收益比却有了明显地下降。最后将帕累托实现率和劣势优势政府收益比两项指标进行加权综合衡量，本研究认为存在场外谈判的长期序贯博弈制度是一项最佳的制度选择。
英文摘要：	To local governments under the market economy system, inviting business and attracting investment are not only important guidelines of weighing government officers’ performance and abilities but also indispensable factors of driving local economic development and improving area economic power and residents’ welfares. The direct aftereffect of overage competition of the rare business and investment opportunities between local governments who are with the same class and have the ablities to make decisions independently is that the values of businesses and investments themself are reduced. Local governments were abstracted as behavior persons from the aspect of behavior decision making. Local governments competing for business and investment model was established at the basic of unconsuming endowment. By theory analysis and experiment research, this paper brings forward several new viewpoints and deductions. Endowment is the useful resources that one has. In this paper, endowment is divided into consuming endowment and unconsuming endowment according whether it was consumed when being used. In the model, uncosuming endowment represents governments’ competing power and consuming endowment makes up competition strategies. Basic models and experiments are about different strategies choosed in short time period and long time period. This paper also compares whether the differences of unconsuming endowment and the differences of retaining effect influence local government competing behavior differently. Actually governments will take interest reaping strategy mostly in short period. In long period governments can send out cooperative invitation by interest detecting strategy. Once noncontract cooperation is formed, both sides will receive a much higher income. In the expending models research, this paper considers how several assistant systems that including transfer payment, development affect, contract cooperation effects local governments competing for business and investment in long period. Completely different with the theory analyse results, ordinary transfer payment reduces inferior position government’s income and notably increases the superior position government’s income, while the advance technology transfer payment system do the opposite. Considering the development effect, both the Pareto realizing ratio and the incomes of governments are obviously increased. Contract cooperation provides 100% Pareto realizing ratio, but the ratio of incomes of governments falls. Put both Pareto realizing ratio and the ratio of incomes of governments into consider, after a systematicly deal, this paper think that contract cooperation in dynamicly competing in long period between governments is the best system for the deal of overage of competing for business and investment.
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