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论文编号：	6372
作者编号：	1120090688
上传时间：	2014/6/9 14:19:41
中文题目：	股东、经理、员工之间合作的复杂性——基于agent建模与模拟的计算实验
英文题目：	The Complexity of Cooperation Among Shareholders, Managers and Employees:Computational Experiments Used Agent-based Modeling and Simulation
指导老师：	程新生
中文关键字：	合作；复杂性；基于agent建模与模拟；计算实验
英文关键字：	cooperation；complexity；agent-based modeling and simulation；computational experiment
中文摘要：	本文从中国公司治理的理论与实践出发，提炼出股东、经理、员工之间存在利益冲突，能否实现利益均衡、走向合作的科学问题。在公司治理理论、博弈论、复杂性科学等理论视角的综合分析下，在多案例研究的基础上，采用基于agent建模与模拟的方法进行了科学严谨的计算实验。 本文一共分为八章。第一章为绪论，作者确定了股东、经理、员工之间如何解决利益冲突，实现利益均衡，走向合作的科学问题。利益冲突与合作既是解释变量又是自身的被解释变量，具有反馈、互为因果、递归的属性和行为特征。因此，本研究选择了基于agent建模与模拟的科学方法，制定了严谨可行的技术路线。第二章是文献回顾，作者分别对股东与经理、股东与员工、经理与员工之间的利益冲突与合作进行了文献梳理。第三章是理论分析，从公司治理理论、博弈论、复杂性科学等理论视角对上述本质问题进行了深入分析。第四章是多案例研究，针对中国企业的典型案例中利益冲突与合作问题，归纳出与公司治理理论、博弈论、复杂性科学有机融合的结论。第五章是股东与经理双方的计算实验，研究股东与经理双方地位平等；有误解噪音；加入宽容与后悔策略；地位不平等情况下双方的重复博弈过程和结果。第六章是股东、经理、员工三方共同交互作用的计算实验。第七章是在前面研究的基础上，嵌入神经网络、遗传算法，研究自适应和优化的利益冲突与合作问题。第八章是研究总结与研究展望。本文的主要结论包括： 1. 通过理论与案例的研究，股东、经理、员工之间是竞争与合作并存的利益博弈，股东和经理占有优势地位，是既得利益的受益者，员工往往是处于被动的地位。虽然有走向合作的趋势，但也存在利益冲突的恶化，难以实现利益均衡的局面。案例研究的结果与现在社会普遍存在的现象一致，贫富差距仍在不断扩大。股东、经理、员工之间自主的博弈难以实现利益的均衡与合作。 2. 在股东与经理双方的计算实验中，发现双方对等情况下“以眼还眼，以牙还牙”最优，与前人的结论一致。当股东与经理存在误解情况下，采取宽容与后悔的策略，使得修正后的“以眼还眼，以牙还牙”更优。股东与经理往往地位是不对等的，占有优势一方的策略比弱势一方获得更大的利益，这也是富者越富的原因之一。极端情况弱势一方背叛，短期会获得更大的收益，但长期看来不再重复博弈，会受到更大的损失。最后，地位不平等的股东采用“一怨还两报”策略，经理采用“两怨还一报”策略，经过重复博弈存在走向合作的趋势，实现共赢。 3．在股东、经理、员工三方的计算实验中，在一定时期内股东采取背叛策略的得分最高，经理采取合作策略的得分最低。股东为追求自身利益的最大化，直接背叛了经理与员工，侵占了经理和员工的利益。股东采取“以眼还眼，以牙还牙”策略，重复博弈最后的分值趋于一致，出现了股东、经理、员工利益均衡、走向合作的趋势。在一段时间范围内经理选择背叛策略的得分最高，这与理论和实践的结论是一致的。 4. 嵌入神经网络后股东背叛的得分下降的较快，整体上重复博弈的结果有所改观。嵌入遗传算法后股东背叛的得分下降的较快，结果得到了优化，整体上重复博弈的结果有所改观。 综上所述，计算实验的结果验证了公司治理等相关理论成果，同时与案例分析的结果得以对应。股东、经理、员工之间，由于股东或经理占有优势地位，采取背叛等策略时得益最高。相反地位处于劣势的员工更多选取合作策略、“三怨还一报”等策略，其得益远远低于股东或经理。出现了利益冲突严重，又无法协调实现利益均衡的局面。当股东或经理采取“以眼还眼，以牙还牙”策略时，经过重复博弈，股东、经理、员工的得益趋于一致，出现了利益冲突得以解决，实现了利益均衡，走向合作共赢的趋势。这与占有优势地位的股东或经理坚持采取“以眼还眼，以牙还牙”策略是分不开的，否则难以达成合作的局面。股东、经理、员工之间的重复博弈，会存在解决利益冲突，实现利益均衡，走向合作共赢的趋势。但是，在合作之外还存在背叛和控制，利益冲突加剧、无法实现合作的局面仍会长期存在。这充分反映了本研究的主题，即股东、经理、员工之间合作的复杂性。图52幅，表8个，参考文献208篇。
英文摘要：	In this thesis, the author extracts the scientific issues of conflicts of interest and balance of interests and cooperation among shareholders, managers, employees from the theory and practice of corporate governance in China. Then does rigorous scientific computational experiments used agent-based modeling and simulation based on multiple case studies in a comprehensive analysis under the theoretical perspective of corporate governance theory, game theory and complexity science. This thesis is divided into eight chapters altogether.The first chapter is the introduction, the author does the literature review on the scientific issues of conflicts of interest and cooperation among shareholder, manager and employees .Conflicts of interest and cooperation are both dependent variables and themselves' independent variables, those have the attributes and behavioral characteristics of feedback, reciprocal causation and recursion. Therefore, this thesis developes a rigorous and feasible technology roadmap using agent-based modeling and simulation .The second chapter is a literature review, the author reviewes the literature on conflicts of interest and cooperation between shareholder and manager, between manager and employees, between shareholder and employees respectively.The third chapter is the theoretical analysis, the author analyzes the nature of these scientific issues in-depth from the theoretical perspective of corporate governance theory, game theory and complexity science.The fourth chapter is a multi-case study,the author summarizes the organic integrational conclusions with corporate governance theory, game theory and complexity science on the conflict of interest and cooperation of typical chinese enterprises. The fifth chapter is the computational experiments between shareholder and manager, it studies the process and results of repeated games under such conditions: both shareholder and manager are equal status; misunderstanding noise; join tolerance and regret strategies; under unequal status between the two sides .The sixth chapter is computational experiments on the tripartite interaction of among shareholders, managers and employees. The seventh chapter researches on the adaptive and optimized problem about conflicts of interest and cooperation based on the previous research after embedded neural networks and genetic algorithms .The eighth chapter is a summary of research and research prospects. The main conclusions of this paper include: 1.Through theory and case studies, it is the game of interests coexisting both competition and cooperation among shareholder, manager and employees. shareholder and manager occupy a dominant position, has a vested interest beneficiaries, employees tend to be in a passive position.The trend toward cooperation exists, but there is also the situation that conflict of interest is worsening and the balance of interests is difficult to achieve. Case study results are consistent with a common phenomenon in society today, the gap between rich and poor continues to widen. It is difficult that to achieve balance of interest and cooperation among shareholder, manager and employees by autonomy game . 2.The results of computational experiments between shareholder and manager show that, it the best optimal tactics of "tit for tat",consistent with previous conclusions, under the equality in both sides. It is a better strategy that amended "tit for tat" with tolerance and regret when there is a misunderstanding between shareholder and manager. There are often unequal status between Shareholder and manager, the advantage party gain more benefits than the weak, which is one reason why the rich is getting richer. When the weak party betrayed under extreme cases, it will gains in short-term , but loss more in the long term. Finally, there are the trend towards cooperation and win-win situation when unequal status of shareholders adopted "two tits for one tat" strategy and the manager used "one tit for two tats" strategy through repeated game. 3.During the tripartite computational experiments among shareholder, manager, and employees, in a given period, shareholder gets the highest score by betrayal strategy, as well as manager gets the lowest score by cooperative strategy. Shareholder directly betrays manager and employees, and invades the interests of them for his own interest.When Shareholder takes "tit for tat" strategy, the final score of repeat game tends to the same, there are benefit balance among shareholder, manager and employees, and there is a trend toward cooperation. During a period , manager get the highest score by select the betrayal strategy, which consistents with the theory and practice . 4.After embedding neural networks, the score of shareholder' betrayal strategy decreased rapidly, the overall results of repeated game has changed. After embedding genetic algorithm, the score of shareholder' betrayal strategy decreased rapidly too , the result has been optimized, the overall results of repeated game have been improved. In summary, the results of computational experiments verify the theories related to corporate governance, which correspond with the case study. Shareholder and manager with dominant position take the maximum benefit by betray among shareholders, managers and employees.On the contrary, employees with disadvantage position always select cooperative strategy or "tit for three tat" strategy, which is far less benefit than that of shareholders or managers. There is a serious conflict of interest and can not be coordinated to the balance of interests. When shareholder or manager take "tit for tat" strategy, there is benefit consistent among shareholder, manager and employees after repeated games, the conflicts of interests have been resolved to achieve a balance of interests, the trend towards win-win cooperation appears. It is necessary that shareholder or manager with dominant position insist on "tit for tat" , or else the cooperation can not be achieved. Conflicts of interest among shareholders, managers and employees can be resolved by repeated games, the balance of interests and win-win cooperation can also be achieved. While there are betray and control besides cooperation, there are the long-standing situation that conflicts of interest be exacerbated and the cooperation can not be achieved. This fully reflects the theme of this thesis, namely the complexity of cooperation among shareholders, managers and employees. 52 Figures, 8 Tables, 208 References.
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