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论文编号：	6361
作者编号：	1120100783
上传时间：	2014/6/9 11:13:02
中文题目：	地方政府治理、政治关联与民营企业投资
英文题目：	The Governance of Local Governments, Political Connection and Private Enterprises’ Investment
指导老师：	李维安
中文关键字：	民营企业；地方政府治理；政治关联；投资
英文关键字：	Private Enterprise; Governance of Local Governments; Political Connection; Investment
中文摘要：	改革开放30多年来，我国民营经济实现了跨越式发展，为国民经济增长做出了巨大贡献，在国民经济中的地位日益重要。而按照国际经验，我国的法律和金融制度并不发达，民营企业的快速发展并不符合法律——金融——增长的理论逻辑，法律、金融等正式制度之外的替代性机制成为理解“中国之谜”的关键。在政府主导经济发展和资源分配的转型环境中，政治关联是我国民营企业赖以生存和发展的重要机制，为民营企业应对资源配置扭曲、获得产权保护提供了重要依赖。 经济增长领域的研究表明，地方政府是理解我国经济发展和转型的核心，地方政府和官员在经济生活中的政治垄断地位使其掌握了关键的资源，其行为也成为解释企业行为的关键。民营企业政治关联普遍存在的重要诱因正是地方政府和官员掌握着支配民营企业生存和发展所需关键资源的行政裁量权，处于弱势地位的民营企业不得不通过政治关联、关系等非正式机制来克服正式制度的不足，以获得资源和政策上的平等甚至优惠待遇。因而，政治关联的研究同样印证了我国地方政府和官员主导地方经济发展和经济生活的现实。 本文的研究正是立足于以上现实，将地方政府治理与政治关联结合起来，主要讨论地方政府治理对民营企业特别是政治关联民营企业投资的影响。而企业家谋求政治身份是民营企业构建政治关联的形式之一，因而本文首先从民营企业家政治身份的角度分析了地方政府对企业家这种政治行为的影响。接着，本文从地方政府整体层面的政府压力和腐败以及政府官员个体层面的官员更替视角检验了地方政府治理对于民营企业投资的影响，并重点考察了政治关联在其中的作用，从而证实了地方政府治理和政治关联对于我国民营企业投资行为的重要影响。 全文共分为七章。第一章，主要介绍实践和理论背景以及研究意义，并对主要概念进行了界定，论述了本文的主要创新点。第二章，回顾了与本文研究主题相关的研究成果，并从理论上分析了地方政府治理影响民营企业投资行为的机理特别是政治关联在其中的作用。第三章，在梳理我国民营企业发展以及民营企业家政治地位变化的历史基础上，利用上市公司的数据样本实证检验了地方政府对民营企业家谋求政治身份政治行为的影响。第四章，采用政府压力与政治关联相匹配的数据样本实证检验了政府压力对于民营企业特别是政治关联民营企业投资的影响。第五章，利用腐败与政治关联匹配的数据样本实证讨论了政府腐败对于民营企业特别是政治关联民营企业投资的影响。第六章，采用市委书记更替与政治关联匹配的数据样本实证分析了官员更替对民营企业投资的影响以及政治关联在其中的作用。最后总结了主要研究结论，并据此提出了相应的对策建议，对未来的研究进行了展望。 本文的主要结论包括： 第一，地方政府主导了民营企业家政治身份的供给。我国民营经济的发展是强制性制度变迁和诱致性制度变迁的结果。而随着民营经济的发展和经济、法律以及政治地位的廓清，越来越多的民营企业家开始接受党和政府的政治安排，获得了政治身份。以2004-2011年民营上市公司的数据样本进行的实证分析结果表明，地方政府影响了民营企业家的政治行为，地方政府压力越大时，民营企业家获得政治身份、更高层级政治身份以及本地政治身份的可能性越大；而对于民营企业而言，在控制了内生性问题后，融资约束与企业家政治身份之间并不存在显著的关系。将政府供给与企业需求两个角度结合起来的研究表明，政府供给在民营企业家政治身份的获得问题上起了主导作用，且正是由于这种主导作用的存在，当地方政府面临较大压力时，实际控制人拥有政治身份的民营企业需要承担更多的税费负担；作为补偿，地方政府会将有限的银行贷款投向这些企业，进而有助于其改善经营业绩。 第二，政府压力影响政治关联民营企业的投资。以2004-2010年民营上市公司数据样本进行的实证分析结果表明，地方政府面临的压力越大，辖内民营企业的投资支出水平越高，且过度投资现象越严重，政府压力与企业投资支出之间的正向关系不受行业属性的影响。与非政治关联企业相比，政治关联民营企业有着更高的投资支出水平；地方政府面临较大的压力时，与非政治关联企业相比，政治关联民营企业的投资支出扩张的更为明显，过度投资更为严重。进一步的检验结果表明，地方政府面临较大的压力时，与非政治关联企业相比，政治关联民营企业能够获得更多的银行短期贷款和总贷款，且政治关联企业获得的信贷资源优势会导致其扩大投资规模和过度投资。 第三，腐败影响政治关联民营企业的投资。以2004-2008年民营上市公司数据样本进行的实证分析结果表明，腐败影响民营企业的投资，且腐败程度越高时，辖内民营企业的投资支出水平越高；腐败推高私有企业投资主要发生在与政府关系密切的政治关联企业中，腐败越严重时，政治关联企业投资支出扩张的越明显。进一步的研究还发现，腐败影响政治关联企业的信贷资源优势及其投资决策，是导致其在腐败较为严重时依然保持较高投资支出水平的主要原因。此外，处于管制行业的民营企业投资支出受腐败的影响更为明显，且腐败程度越高时，管制行业政治关联民营企业的投资支出增加的越明显；腐败一定程度上能够缓解非政治关联民营企业的投资不足。 第四，官员更替影响政治关联民营企业的投资。利用2004-2011年民营上市公司数据样本进行的实证分析结果表明，市委书记更替时，民营企业的投资支出会明显下降，且这种影响不会提前或滞后；政治关联企业特别是拥有人大代表、政协委员等政治身份的企业投资支出受官员更替的影响程度更大，但在官员更替完成之后，其投资支出水平要高于非政治关联企业。进一步的检验结果表明，当新任市委书记不具有本省工作经历时，企业投资支出缩减的更多；管制行业企业的投资支出受官员更替的影响更大；官员更替还会削弱政治关联企业的信贷资源优势，影响其投资支出。此外，政治关联民营企业的过度投资行为受官员更替的抑制作用更为显著；国有企业在面临法定政治权力转移时其投资支出也会明显下降。 本文结论的政策启示在于：首先，应完善地方政府治理。从根本上改变地方政府和官员晋升考评机制，通过构建科学的多维度考评指标，弱化地方政府和官员干预企业生产经营活动的动力；第二，适当延长官员尤其是地市级官员的任期，尽量保持地方政府官员任职和政策的持续性以使经济活动主体形成稳定的心理预期；第三，对于民营企业而言，与政府及官员维持良好关系的同时还应保持适当的距离，着重于维护企业的自主性和经济理性，练好企业的“内功”，避免与政府官员“过从甚密”；第四，充分发挥市场在资源配置中的决定性作用，完善金融、法律等制度建设，从根本上解决正式制度中存在的缺陷和漏洞；第五，在强调对私有产权法律保护、公平对待以及完善金融法律等制度的同时，不应忽视为民营企业的发展营造稳定的政治和政策环境；最后，应严格人大代表、政协委员等选举制度，充分发挥社会媒体、公众等的监督作用，严厉打击官员与企业之间的“权钱交易”等腐败行为，塑造和谐的政商关系。
英文摘要：	Since China’s reform and open-up policy was carried out about 30 years ago, great changes have taken place in China’s private economy, and private economy has made great contributions to and played an important role in the development of China’s economy. However, according to the international experience, the legal institution and the financial institution in China are weak, and the rapid development of private economy is not up to the logic of legal-finance-growth, the substituted mechanisms instead of formal institutions like legal or finance may be the core for understanding the “China’s puzzle”. In a transitional economy that the government has dominated the development of economy and the allocation of resources, political connection is a critical mechanism for the survival and development of private enterprises and has provided an important channel for them to deal with the distortive resources allocation and get property protection. The work in economy growth has suggested that the local government is the fundamental element for understanding the development and transition of China’s economy, the political monopoly position has made the local government and officials controlling critical resources and their behaviors have affected the behaviors of enterprises to great extent. The main reason for private enterprises to create political connection is that the local government and officials have controlled the administrative discretionary power which affects the allocation of critical resources for the survival and development of private enterprises. Private enterprises in weak position have to create informal mechanisms like political connection and guanxi to overcome the weakness of formal institutions to get equal even preferential treatment on resources and policies. Therefore, the work in political connection has also proved the practice that the local government and officials dominate the development of local economy and economic activities. Based on above practices, this dissertation combines the governance of local governments and political connection, and examines the effects of the governance of local governments on private enterprises’ especially the politically connected enterprises’ investment. Since the identity of private entrepreneurs is one of the types of political connections for private enterprises, the effects of local government on this political behavior is discussed at first. Then, this study investigates the effects of the governance of local governments on private enterprises’ investment from the views of local government pressure, corruption and the turnover of local officials, while the role of political connection is examined in detail, which could prove the important effects of the governance of local governments and political connection on private enterprises’ investment. The dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the practical and theoretical background as well as the significance, in addition, the main concepts are defined and the possible innovations are discussed. In Chapter two, the related work is reviewed and the influential mechanism is analyzed for the effects of the governance of local governments on private enterprises’ investment especially the role of political connection. In Chapter three, based on the analysis of the history of the development of private enterprises and the changes of political position of private entrepreneurs, this chapter makes an empirical study to examine the effects of the local government on the political behavior of private entrepreneurs by adopting the sample of listed companies. Chapter four examines the effects of government pressure on the investment of private enterprises especially the politically connected private enterprises by adopting the sample of listed companies matching the government pressure and political connection. Chapter five investigates the effects of political corruption on the investment of private enterprises especially the politically connected private enterprises by adopting the sample of listed companies matching the political corruption and political connection. In Chapter six, this study examines the effects of official’s turnover on private enterprises’ investment as well as the role of political connection by adopting the sample of listed companies matching the turnover of the secretary of municipal committee and political connection. In the last Chapter, the study summarizes the main results and provides some suggestions and the future research directions are discussed as well. The main results are as follows. First, the local government has dominated the supply of political identity of private entrepreneurs. The development of private economy is the result of mandatory institutional change and induced institutional change, with the development of private economy as well as the economic, legal and political status becoming clear, more and more private entrepreneurs begin to accept the political arrangement of the party and government, getting the political identity. By adopting a sample of private listed companies from 2004 to 2011, the empirical results suggest that the political behavior of private entrepreneurs is affected by the local government significantly, the probability of getting political identity for private entrepreneurs is higher as well as the class of the identity and the local identity if the local government is confronted with more pressure; however, the probability is not affected by the financial constraint of the enterprise taking the problem of endogeneity into account. These results indicate that the government has played a predominant role as for the political identity of private entrepreneurs. Moreover, when the local government is facing with more pressure, the enterprises with political identity have to bear more tax, as for compensation, the local government would direct limited loans to these enterprises which is good for the promotion of operational performance. Second, the government pressure affects the investment scale and behaviors of politically connected private enterprises. By adopting a sample of private listed companies from 2004 to 2010, the empirical results suggest that the investment scale is higher when the local government is confronted with more pressure, and the phenomena of overinvestment are more severe. And the positive relationship between the government pressure and the investment scale is not affected by the characteristics of industries, that is, whether the industry is the regulated industry or non-regulated industry. Comparing with non-politically connected companies, the investments of politically connected private enterprises are higher, and they have more severe overinvestment especially when the local government is confronted with great pressure. Moreover, when the local government is facing great pressure, comparing with non-politically connected companies, politically connected private enterprises can get more short-bank-loans and overall bank loans, while this advantage would lead to the expansion of the investment and severe overinvestment. Third, the political corruption affects the investment of politically connected private enterprises. By adopting a sample of private listed companies from 2004 to 2008, the empirical results indicate that the investment of private enterprises is affected by political corruption and the scale of investment is increasing with the high level corruprion. However, the positive effect of political corruption on the investment of private enterprises is occurred only in politically connected companies, their investments are increasing when the plitcial corruption is at higher level. Moreover, the political corruption affected the loan resources and the investment of policially connected companies which is also the reason that political connected enterprise have more investment with the high level corruprion. The investments of private enterprises in regulated industry are prone to be affected by political corruption while politically connected enterprises in regulated industry have more investments when the level of polical corruption is higher, in addition, the political corruption can be helpful for alleviating the under-invesment of non-politically connected companies to some extent. Fourth, official’s turnover affects the investment of politically connected private enterprises. By adopting a sample of private listed companies from 2004 to 2011, the empirical results suggest that the investment may be lower significantly when facing the turnover of the secretary of municipal committee, and the negative relationship is not in advance or lag; comparing with non-politically connected enterprises, the decrease of investments is more significant for those politically connected enterprises especially for enterprises with executive who is a current or former member of the People’s Congress or the People’s Political Consultative Conference, however, after the turnover, the investment of politically connected enterprises is significant higher. Moreover, the results also indicate that the decrease of investments is more significant when the newer secretary has no working experience in the province while the investments of private enterprises in regulated industry are prone to be affected, and the turnover may weaken the loan resources of politically connected enterprises and affect their investments. In addition, the overinvestment of politically connected enterprises is affected by the turnover more significantly, and the investments of state-owned enterprises would decrease when facing the transfer of de jure political power. The policy recommendations are as follows. Firstly, the governance of local governments should be promoted. The systems for evaluating the performance of local government and officials should be revised fundamentally, the incentives of local governments and officials to intervene enterprises could be weaken by constructing indicators system including scientific and multi-dimensional indicators. Secondly, the tenure of local officials should be prolonged properly, and it is necessary to keep the persistence of the current officials and policies to provide the economic subjects with stable psychological expectations. Thirdly, as for private enterprises, they should keep proper distance with the local government and officials when keeping good relationship with them, and constructing the independency and economic ration, avoiding too tight relation with officials. Fourthly, giving market a decisive role in resource allocation, improving the formal institutions like finance and legal, and solving the weaknesses and loopholes of the institutions should be the critical issue for the development of enterprises. Fifthly, when emphasizing the legal protection of private property and equal treatment and improving the formal institutions like finance and legal, it is should not be ignored that constructing stable political and policy environment for the development of private enterprises. Finally, the systems for electing the members of the People’s Congress and the People’s Political Consultative Conference should be stricter, the supervision role of the media and the public should be played, and the corruption behaviors because of the relationship between officials and enterprises should be fought, thus the harmonious relationship could be created.
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