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论文编号：	6360
作者编号：	1120100790
上传时间：	2014/6/9 11:08:29
中文题目：	外部经理人市场、产品市场竞争与公司治理有效性
英文题目：	External Manager Market, Product Market Competition and Corporate Governance Effectiveness
指导老师：	马连福
中文关键字：	经理人市场；产品市场竞争；公司治理有效性；经理层治理
英文关键字：	manager market; product market competition; corporate governance effectiveness; management governance
中文摘要：	我国经济体制改革的推进凸显了市场对于资源配置的重要性。外部市场机制贯穿于经济体系的所有环节，与企业之间存在着各种直接或间接的联系。市场通过与企业的联系对企业的活动发挥引导和治理的效应，规范公司运作，弥补内部治理的不足之处。经理人市场作为劳动力市场的重要组成部分，在优化经理人人力资本配置、改善公司经营业绩等方面具有显著的作用。此外，充分竞争的产品市场也具有明显的治理效应。本研究立足于经济转型时期我国经理人市场和产品市场竞争的特点，尝试揭示经理人市场影响公司治理有效性的机理，及其与产品市场竞争之间的互动关系。 本文以我国A股非金融上市公司为研究样本，通过构建综合指数对外部经理人市场的发育程度加以度量，并依次检验了外部经理人市场发育程度对代理成本、代理效率、高管薪酬契约和总经理变更的影响；随后将产品市场竞争纳入分析框架，并实证检验了不同产品市场竞争环境下，外部经理人市场发育程度对代理成本和代理效率的影响。根据实证分析结果，本研究的主要结论如下： （一）外部经理人市场发育程度越高，代理成本越高；发育良好的外部经理人市场会显著提高公司的代理效率。这一结果表明，外部经理人市场的资源配置功能得到了基本实现；但是由于社会文化和制度环境的原因，聘任职业经理人在提升经营效率的同时，也带来了较高的代理成本。 （二）发育良好的外部经理人市场会显著提高经理人的薪酬水平，同时也增强了薪酬对业绩的敏感度；外部经理人市场对总经理变更以及变更对业绩的敏感度没有显著的影响。这意味着外部经理人市场对经理层治理的影响路径之一是改善激励机制，而非变更业绩不佳的总经理。 （三）产品市场竞争能够有效降低代理成本和提高代理效率；当产品市场竞争激烈时，经理人市场发育程度对代理成本的影响较小，经理人市场对代理效率的作用有所增强。 上述研究结果阐明了经理人市场对公司治理有效性的作用机理，并进一步证实产品市场竞争对两者间关系的改善作用。本文的研究结论对我国经理人市场和产品市场建设以及公司治理机制的选择具有重要的启示意义。
英文摘要：	During the process of economic system reform in China, the markets’ resource allocation function becomes more significant. External market mechanisms those throughout all sectors of economic system have all kinds of direct or indirect connections with the enterprises. Though those connections, the market could guide and govern the activities of the companies, standardize the operation and make up for the deficiency of internal governance. As an important part of the labor market, manager market plays a significant role in optimizing manager human capital allocation and improving the operating performance of the company. In addition, the competition of product market is considered as effective solution to handle agency problems between owners and managers. Based on the characteristics of manager market and product market in economic transition period of China, this research tries to reveal the impact mechanism of manager market on governance effectiveness and the interaction between manager market and product market. Taking the non-financial A-share listed companies as the research sample, this paper constructs the manager market index, and examines the effects of external manager market supply on agency cost, agency efficiency, executive compensation contract and top manager turnover, successively and respectively. And then, the study investigates the impacts of manager market on the agency cost and agency efficiency by considering the interaction effect of product market competition. Based on the empirical analysis, the main results are as followings: 1. The external manager market development degree has a positive correlation with the agency cost and the agency efficiency. The results indicate that the resource allocation function of manager market has been basicallyrealized, but due to the social culture and institutional environment, external recruitment could not only increase the operating efficiency but also monitoring cost. 2. A well-developed external manager market has positive effect both of the executive compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity, but no significant influence on top manager turnover. The results show that the external market plays a part in the executive governance by improving the incentive mechanism rather than changing top manger. 3. The product market competition could decrease agency cost and increase agency efficiency effectively. And intense competition could weaken the impact of manager market on agency cost and strengthen its influence on agency efficiency. The results demonstrate the function mechanism of manager market on corporate governance, the passive effect on agency cost due to the deficiency of manager market, and the relations could be improved on account of the existence of product market competition. The research findings have important implications for the constructions of both manager market and product market and the choice of governance mechanisms, which may provide significance of theoretical value and practical implications.
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