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论文编号：	6356
作者编号：	2120122554
上传时间：	2014/6/9 10:38:22
中文题目：	市场竞争、EVA业绩评价与过度投资
英文题目：	Market Competition, EVA Performance Evaluation and Over-investment
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	经济附加值(EVA)；过度投资；市场竞争；政府扶持
英文关键字：	EVA; Over-investment; Market competition; Government support
中文摘要：	企业的投资行为对企业的发展至关重要，不仅能决定其自身价值创造、业绩表现与可持续发展能力，并对整个国家的宏观经济发展起着至关重要的作用。因此，企业的投资行为与投资效率一直是理论界与实务界关注的焦点。所谓过度投资，是指企业投资于净现值为负的项目，导致企业实际投资支出超出预期新增投资和维持性支出，并进一步损害企业的价值。近年来，我国企业急于扩张、盲目投资的现象屡见不鲜，这无疑会导致企业损失惨重，甚至危及整个国家的宏观经济，出现产能过剩、能源紧张、结构扭曲等问题。而中央企业由于其规模大、垄断性强等特征，在我国经济中占有举足轻重的地位。为了促进中央企业提高投资效率，必须进一步严格规范中央企业经营者的行为，建立完善的业绩考核与评价体系引导其理性投资。基于此，国资委从2010年率先在中央企业全面实行经济附加值（EVA）业绩评价制度。本文回顾了以往研究过度投资影响因素的文献，发现关于EVA业绩评价体系对过度投资行为的抑制作用的文献较为缺乏，因此本文则侧重于研究经济附加值（EVA）业绩评价制度的实施是否会对企业过度投资行为产生影响，并进一步划分了高低市场竞争度组与高低政府扶持度组来分别检验EVA业绩评价制度对过度投资的抑制作用，最终提出央企改善投资行为，提高投资效率的政策建议。本文首先对以往文献进行回顾，并在理论分析的基础上提出三个研究假设，运用了四个回归模型。本文选取的样本来自于我国沪深两市上市的101家中央企业2008-2011年的数据。本文对各个变量的数据进行描述性统计，并利用主要变量的分布情况、均值检验等方式把央企样本组与地方国企样本组进行比较分析。接着，对央企样本做了相关性和回归分析，并与地方国企组进行对比。最后本研究得到以下结论：在纵向上，实施EVA业绩评价体系后，央企的过度投资水平降低，明显改善了投资效率。在横向上，与未实施EVA业绩评价体系的公司相比，央企的过度投资行为也有了明显改善，说明EVA业绩评价体系会抑制中央企业的过度投资行为，即实施EVA与企业过度投资负相关。同时还发现，越处于高竞争的市场环境下，EVA业绩评价体系越能够起到抑制企业过度投资行为的作用；政府扶持程度越高，EVA业绩评价体系越能够起到抑制企业过度投资行为的作用。
英文摘要：	Corporate investment behavior is very important to the development of the corporate. It not only determines its value creation, performance and sustainable development, but also plays a crucial role in the development of a country’s macroeconomics. Therefore, corporate investment behavior and efficiency has always been a hot topic for theory and practice cycle. As for over-investment, it’s caused by the investment in projects which have a negative NPV (net present value) and excessive investment beyond expected new investments and maintenance expenditures. In recent years, China’s enterprises’ expansion and blind investment lead to the losses of the value of the corporate and even damage the whole country’s economics, which represented in the following aspects: overcapacity, energy shortages and structural distortion. China’s central enterprises play a vital role in socio-economic because of its large scale and monopoly status. In order to improve central enterprises’ investment efficiency, since 2010, the SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) began to fully implement EVA as its core business performance evaluation system in the central enterprises. This paper reviews previous studies about EVA performance evaluation system and investment behavior and efficiency, finds that previous studies were separate, that is to say, the former studies focused on the economic consequences of the implement of EVA and influencing factors of the over-investment respectively, but whether a causal relationship between the two lacks deep discussion. This paper hopes to study about the effect of the implement of EVA performance evaluation system on corporate investment efficiency and further more the effect of the degree of market competition intensity and government support on EVA performance evaluation system. Finally proposes policies and recommendations about improving investment efficiency. This paper presents three hypotheses, four models, analyzes the implement of EVA and corporate over-investment. The paper selects samples from China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 101 central enterprises listed companies from 2008-2011. In this paper, the data of each variable descriptive statistics on the main variables quintile, and use the listed distribution, analysis of variance, mean inspection sample group for the sample group of central enterprises and local state-owned enterprises sample group comparative analysis. Then, there are sample correlation and regression analysis. Finally, this paper reaches the following conclusions, in the verticals ways, central enterprises’ over-investment has been reduced after the implement of EVA. In the lateral ways, compared to corporate which did not use EVA, the central enterprises investment behavior has been improved, which means the implement of EVA can restrain corporate over-investment. This paper also finds out higher degree of market competition intensity and government support help the implement of the EVA performance evaluation system.
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