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论文编号：	6350
作者编号：	2120122551
上传时间：	2014/6/9 8:43:35
中文题目：	福利型和激励型股票期权影响因素和经济后果的实证分析
英文题目：	The empirical research for influence factors and economic consequence of welfare-oriented and incentive stock option
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	股票期权；福利型股票期权；绩效考核条件；激励期限
英文关键字：	stock option; welfare; performance standards; incentive period
中文摘要：	随着现代企业两权分离的发展，委托代理问题逐渐产生，而股票期权作为一种新的长期激励机制受到人们的广泛关注。根据委托代理理论，股票期权计划会促使管理者努力工作，有效地提升公司业绩；但是我国福利型的股票期权屡见不鲜，不能起到降低代理成本的作用。本文通过研究2006-2013年公布股权激励计划的上市公司，从股票期权业绩条件和激励期限两个维度建立评分标准对约束强度进行分析，划分出福利型和激励型的股票期权。也探讨不同划分标准下福利型和激励型股票期权的影响因素，是公司治理因素还是公司财务状况等，也进一步探讨了哪些因素导致两种福利型和激励型股票期权分类的不同。本文通过研究发现，公司治理结构不完善的公司更可能采用福利型的绩效考核条件，董事长兼任CEO和国有控股上市公司更可能采用较长期的激励期限和宽松的业绩考核条件。在这个基础上，本文综合之前的评分将股票期权进一步细分成了福利型股票期权、正常激励型股票期权和强激励型股票期权。通过配对样本法来分析不同激励强度对上市公司的业绩影响有什么不同。福利型股票期权的对上市公司业绩增长没有影响，正常激励型和强激励型股票期权对上市公司业绩有明显的促进作用，但是两者的业绩变化没有显著差别。
英文摘要：	Along with the development of the two powers separate, principal-agent problem arise. Many people began to pay attention to stock options which is a new long-term incentive mechanism. According to the theory of principal-agent, stock option plans will motivate managers to work harder and enhance the performance of the company. But stock options for welfare are common in China which cannot reduce agency cost. In this paper, we selected listed companies which announced equity incentive plan draft from 2006 to 2013. I divide stock option plans into two parts: stock option for welfare and incentive stock option from two different standards. Based on that classification, I investigate which factor affects the two kinds of stock option. In this paper, I find out that poor corporate governance will give rise to welfare stock options. Then I try to figure out which factor affect company when they choose between the performance standards and the incentive period. At last, I investigate the economic consequences of welfare stock option, regular stock option and excessive incentive stock option. I find out that performance of companies which implement welfare stock options is similar to other companies. Companies which implement regular and excessive incentive stock options have better performance than matching companies. But the performance of companies which announce the two kinds of stock options is the same.
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