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论文编号：	6349
作者编号：	2120122553
上传时间：	2014/6/9 3:44:07
中文题目：	产品市场竞争、代理成本与企业现金持有的相关关系研究
英文题目：	Relationship pattern of Product Market Competition, Agency cost and cash holdings
指导老师：	刘志远
中文关键字：	产品市场竞争 现金持有 代理成本 公司治理
英文关键字：	product market competition agency cost corporate governance cash holding
中文摘要：	现金作为是企业的一项重要资产，其持有动机始终是学术关注的重点。产品市场竞争作为一项战略要素和外部治理要素，近年来被引入企业现金持有相关研究，产生了产品市场竞争影响企业现金持有的掠夺风险理论和代理成本理论。本文在以往对产品市场竞争、代理成本和企业现金持有相关关系研究的基础上，选取产品市场竞争的代理成本理论所描述的产品市场竞争通过影响代理成本中介变量进而对企业现金持有产生影响的作用机制作为研究重点，使用递归模型对其存在性进行了检验。 本文的实证结果表明，我国企业中确实存在着产品市场竞争的代理成本理论所描述的中介作用机制，但这种作用机制的方向与过去研究不同。尽管产品市场竞争起到了降低企业代理成本的“隐含激励”作用，但代理成本的降低反而引起了企业现金持有水平的提高。通过对不同类型子样本进行回归检验，本文发现了该特殊现象的产生，是由于在我国，治理水平较低、代理问题突出的企业通常是非国有的竞争性行业企业，该类型企业同时在融资渠道方面受到较大限制，具有较高的内部资金需求，因而其表现出的现金持有的代理问题，呈现出代理成本越高，现金持有水平越偏离真实资金需求，现金持有量越不足的现象。至此，本文证实了我国企业中特殊的代理成本效应的存在，并验证了其产生的原因。
英文摘要：	Cash is a vital resource for modern companies, so the determinants of cash holding have long been an academic focus. Recently the effect of Industry product market competition on company cash holding draws the attention of scholars, and two relevant theories are built up: the predation risk theory and agency cost theory. This study focused on the agency cost theory, using the recursive model to prove the intermediary role of agency cost between product market competition and cash holding, which is described in the theory. Even though the existence of the mechanism is proved among Chinese corporates, the effect examined is different from the former studies. Product market competition does improved the company’s governance as some other studies suggested, but cash holding is increased as the agency cost decreases. After deeper examination into different kinds of subsamples, this study finds the cause of the usual phenomenon. For Chinese companies as the sample use in this study, the effect of agency cost on cash holdings is found in non-stated-owned, competitive companies, which are both poor-governed and financial restricted, especially compared to some stated-owned monopoly enterprises. So when these companies are countered with agency problems, the cash holding mostly will be insufficient compared to their relatively high inner capital need. This explains the existence of unusual agency cost intermediary mechanism among Chinese companies.
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