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论文编号：	6324
作者编号：	2120122548
上传时间：	2014/6/8 3:14:32
中文题目：	IPO超募与过度投资的关系研究——基于中国创业板上市公司
英文题目：	Research on the Relationship Between IPO Over Raising and Excessive Investment：A Study on Listed Companies in GEM
指导老师：	姚颐
中文关键字：	超募；过度投资；创业板
英文关键字：	Over raising; Excessive investment; Growth Enterprise Market
中文摘要：	超募是指在新股公开发行后，上市公司实际募集资金净额明显高于其在招股说明书中披露的投资项目计划所需募集资金的现象。超募现象已经成为当前我国A股IPO过程中的一大特色，创业板尤为严重。上市公司通过IPO获得超募资金之后，由于委托代理问题的存在和超募资金监管上的不足，存在管理者为谋取私利而利用超募资金进行过度投资的风险。本文在国内外学者对超募和过度投资相关问题的研究基础上，对委托代理、Jensen自由现金流假说等相关理论进行分析并提出假设。将创业板上市公司作为研究对象，使用Richardson模型对过度投资程度进行度量，建立超募与过度投资关系模型对我国创业板上市公司IPO超募与过度投资之间的关系进行实证研究，并进一步检验了政策监管以及第一大股东持股比例对超募与过度投资关系的影响。本文通过实证研究得到以下结论：（1）由于委托代理问题和监管漏洞的存在，大量超募资金能够被公司管理者相对“自由”的支配，创业板上市公司IPO超募越多越容易引起过度投资，IPO超募率与过度投资呈正相关关系；（2）深交所发布的《创业板上市公司公开谴责标准》在实际执行中并没有达到其应有的效果，政策监管的加强未能降低超募引起过度投资的可能性；（3）我国创业板上市公司以民营控股为主，第一大股东持股比例越高，为保护自身利益而对管理层的监督也会越强，超募引起过度投资的可能性越小。创业板作为我国完善资本市场的重要一步，目前尚处于摸索阶段，存在很大的风险，仍需进一步的完善与改进。根据本文的研究结果，本文针对如何减少上市公司因超募引起的过度投资，从制度改革和监管加强等角度提出了一些建议。
英文摘要：	“Over raising” refers to the phenomenon that the proceeds a company received from IPO significantly exceeds its planned level disclosed in its prospectus. It has become prevalent in Chinese A-share market, especially in the Growth Enterprise Market(GEM). Because of the agency problem and the lack of supervision, management probably manipulates the over-raised funds, such as investing on non-profitable projects, thus causing the problem of excessive investment. This study focuses on the relationship between over raising and excessive investment in GEM of China, raising hypothesis based on the former research of over raising and excessive investment , as well as the principle-agent theory and Jensen’s free cash flow theory. Using companies listed on GEM as the sample, this study measures excessive investment with Richardson Model and further examines the effects of supervision on over-raised funds and the largest shareholder on the relationship between over raising and excessive investment in GEM of China. Results of the tests in this study support the hypothesis that most over-raised funds are manipulated by the management relatively freely because of the lack of supervision, and over raising is more likely to result in excessive investment in GEM. And further examination reveals that the regulation reform in raised-funds management doesn’t restrain the excessive investment of over-raised funds as intended, but the largest shareholder does have this effect. Based on the conclusion, several suggestions are made on the regulation and supervision of over-raised funds received from IPO in GEM, the promising and risky component of Chinese capital market.
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