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论文编号：	6309
作者编号：	2120122541
上传时间：	2014/6/7 18:17:42
中文题目：	管理者过度自信、股权结构对过度投资影响的研究
英文题目：	The research of the effect of manager overconfidence, ownership structure on overinvestment
指导老师：	李姝
中文关键字：	管理者过度自信；过度投资；股权结构；公司治理
英文关键字：	Overconfidence；overinvestment；ownership structure；corporate governance
中文摘要：	作为现代企业财务管理的核心之一，企业的投资行为一直以来都是广大学者关注的重点。学者们从委托代理理论等角度对企业的投资行为进行了不同的研究，这些研究都是以“理性经济人”假设为基础。但事实上，管理者并非总是理性的，一些如过度自信、过度乐观等心理特征都会对管理者的行为产生影响。 本文从行为金融学的角度出发，检验管理者过度自信与过度投资之间的关系。此外，本文通过梳理文献和理论，发现在传统理性经济人的假设下，学者们发现良好的公司治理机制能够缓解由于委托代理问题造成的企业过度投资行为。那么，我们进一步思考在行为金融学理论认为管理者的非理性特征会影响企业过度投资的情况下，基于理性经济人假设而建立的现代公司治理机制，是否也能够抑制由于管理者过度自信导致的过度投资行为。由于股权结构在公司治理中占据了重要的地位，而且股东往往是最有动机和能力去监督管理者的群体，所以，本文着重研究了良好的股权结构是否能够有效地抑制由于管理者过度自信所导致的过度投资。 通过选取2010-2012年沪深两市3759家上市公司为样本，以Richardson模型残差衡量过度投资水平，本文对上述问题进行了实证检验，研究结果发现：（1）在我国的上市公司中，过度自信的管理者表现出了更高的过度投资水平。（2）相比国有企业，在非国有企业中，管理者过度自信与过度投资的正相关性更强。（3）由于我国特有的股权安排以及制度背景，第一大股东持股比例越高，对由于管理者过度自信造成的过度投资行为的抑制作用越强。（4）由于现阶段我国高管持股比例普遍较低，所以高管持股并没有起到显著抑制因管理者过度自信所造成的过度投资的作用。（5）随着机构投资者机制的引入，机构投资者在一定程度上起到了抑制管理者过度自信所造成的过度投资的作用，但是该作用仍比较微弱。
英文摘要：	As the core of financial management in contemporary enterprises, the investment activity has become the focus of scholars’ study. About the study of investment activity, scholars has launched a variety of studies based on the asymmetric information theory and principal-agent theory, but their studies are all based on the hypothesis that the people are rational. However, there exists a lot of irrational phenomenal, such as overconfident, overoptimistic and others, and these irrational factors will definitely affect the investment activity of managers. From the perspective of behavioral finance, this paper aims to study whether the behavioral finance theory also has the practical significance in our country, by doing the empirical test on the relationship between the manager’s overconfidence and overinvestment. In addition, by combing literature and theories, we find that in traditional theories that under the assumption of rational economic man, scholars found that good corporate governance mechanism can alleviate manager’s excessive investment behavior caused by principal-agent problems, then, we further think that under the behavioral finance theory, whether the modern corporate governance based on rational economic man hypothesis is also applicable, namely, within the modern corporate governance mechanism, how will the manager’s overconfidence that leads to excessive investment behavior can be alleviated. Because the equity structure in the corporate governance is of great importance, and shareholders have motivation and ability to supervise managers, so, this paper further studied in different enterprises of different equity structure, what will happen between the correction between manager’s overconfidence and excessive investment. By choosing 3759 listed companies in shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange market from 2010 to 2012, we use Richardson model’s residual error to measure excessive investment level, at the same time we use CEO’s shareholding change and manager’s relative compensation to measure overconfidence, this paper deals with the research hypotheses empirically. At last results show that: (1) In the listed companies in our country, managers overconfidence does exist, overconfident manager has a higher level of excessive investment. (2) At the same time, the correlation of overconfident and overinvestment is higher in non-state corporations. (3) Due to special equity structure in our country, the higher is the biggest shareholding, the higher is the correlation of overconfidence and overinvestment. (4)Due to the low level of executive’s shareholding in the listed companies, the executive’s shareholding has no effects on the correlation between the overconfidence and overinvestment. (5) With the introduction of the mechanism of institutional investors, institutional investors will affect the relationship between the managers’ overconfidence and excessive investment.
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