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论文编号：	6286
作者编号：	2120122573
上传时间：	2014/6/6 22:54:33
中文题目：	公司治理调节效应视角下管理层权力对银行高管薪酬的影响研究
英文题目：	The Research of the Influence of the Managerial Power on the Bank Executive Compensation in terms of the Moderating Effect of Corporate Governance
指导老师：	周建
中文关键字：	高管薪酬；管理层权力；公司治理；银行风险
英文关键字：	Executive Compensation; Managerial Power; Corporate Governance;
中文摘要：	近几年我国金融行业高管天价薪酬引发舆论热议，国内外学者开始探究高管薪酬设计的合理性。目前大多数研究集中在高管薪酬的影响因素分析以及高管薪酬与企业绩效的关系等方面，鲜少关注高管薪酬对企业风险的影响效果。另外，以往的研究对象多选取全部上市公司，而对银行业较少单独研究。鉴于大众对银行业高管薪酬科学性的质疑，本文以我国上市银行为研究样本，试图探究银行业高管天价薪酬形成的原因，并进一步分析其对银行风险的影响。高管与普通员工的薪酬差距直接影响薪酬分配的效率与公平，本文认为有必要在研究高管绝对薪酬的同时，探究薪酬差距问题。 本文基于人力资源管理和公司治理两大学科的理论支持，从权利的来源和约束角度，研究管理层权力和公司治理如何影响高管薪酬。本文首先研究了管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响，并比较了这种影响在国有控股银行和非国有控股银行中的差别。在此基础上，探究了公司治理对管理层权力与高管薪酬关系的调节效应。另外，根据管理者过度自信理论，本文研究我国上市银行的高管薪酬如何影响不良贷款率即银行风险。本文选取了我国上市银行09-12年四年的面板数据，运用多元线性回归方法对假设进行了验证。 本文最终得到如下结论：在我国上市银行中，管理层权力与高管薪酬显著正相关，公司治理能够负向调节管理层权力与高管薪酬的正相关关系；银行内部薪酬差距与不良贷款率显著正相关。根据上述结论，本文建议企业应当着重关注薪酬差距对银行风险的影响，适当缩小薪酬差距。为了确保高管薪酬科学合理，企业应当在削弱管理层权力的同时提高公司治理水平。
英文摘要：	Recently, the sky-high compensation of financial industry has aroused heated discussion from the public. Scholars from home and abroad began to test the reasonability of compensation design. They focused on the relationship of executive compensation and firm performance, as well as the influence factors of executive compensation. But they seldom studied the influence of executive compensation on bank risk. Regretfully, most scholars took all listed companies as the object of study and didn’t study bank separately. Considering the universal skepticism for bank executive compensation, this paper focuses on public banks in order to explore the reason of the formation of sky-high compensation, as well as its influence on bank risk. The compensation gap between executives and ordinary staff influences the efficiency and equality of compensation allocation. It is necessary to study executive compensation as well as the compensation gap. Based on the theories of human resource management and corporate governance, this paper studied how managerial power and corporate governance influence the executive compensation from the aspects of source and restraint of power. This paper firstly studied the influence of managerial power on executive compensation and compared the difference between state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies. On this basis, this paper tested the regulating effect of corporate governance on the relationship of managerial power and executive compensation. Then this paper studied the influence of executive compensation on NPL (bank risk) on the base of transition confidence theory of managers. Sample data have been obtained from 2009 to 2012. This paper used multiple linear regressions to test our hypothesis. This paper got the following conclusions finally. There is a positive correlation relationship between managerial power and executive compensation. Corporate governance could negatively regulate the positive relationship of managerial power and executive compensation. What’s more, there is a positive correlation relationship between compensation gap and bank risk. On basis of these conclusions, this paper recommended that companies should focus on the influence of executive compensation on bank risk and design compensation gap reasonably. In order to ensure the reasonability of executive compensation, companies should restrain the managerial power and improve the corporate governance level.
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